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School vouchers have been proposed as a way to bypass the political patholo-
gies of school reform and improve school quality by transforming students and 
parents into consumers.  What if we did the same for prisons—what if convicted 
criminals could choose their prison rather than being assigned bureaucratically? 
Under a voucher system, prisons would compete for prisoners, meaning 
that the prisons will adopt policies prisoners value.  Prisons would become more 
constitutionally flexible—faith-based prisons, now of dubious legality, would be 
fully constitutional, and prisons would also have increased freedom to offer 
valued benefits in exchange for the waiver of constitutional rights.  As far as 
prison quality goes, the advantages of vouchers would plausibly include greater 
security, higher-quality health care, and better educational opportunities—
features that prison reformers favor for their rehabilitative value. 
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The counterarguments are threefold.  “Social meaning” and other philo-
sophical arguments hold that choice in prison conditions is either impossible or 
morally undesirable.  On the more economic plane, “market failure” arguments 
hold that because of informational or other problems prisoner choice would not 
succeed in improving overall prison quality.  “Market success” arguments, on 
the other hand, hold that prison choice would improve prison quality too much, 
satisfying inmate preferences that are socially undesirable or diluting the deter-
rent value of prison.  These counterarguments have substantial force but do not 
foreclose the possibility that prison choice results in socially desirable improve-
ments that could outweigh these disadvantages. 
I conclude with thoughts about the politics of prison vouchers, both before 
and after their adoption. 
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In this Article, I invite the reader to indulge in a thought experi-
ment.  What would the world look like if, instead of assigning a pris-
oner to a particular prison bureaucratically, we gave the prisoner a 
voucher, good for one incarceration, to be redeemed at a participat-
ing prison? 
School vouchers have been debated to death1 ever since Milton 
Friedman proposed them in 19552 and progressives championed  
them in the 1960s.3  Vouchers have also been discussed and used for 
 
1 And actually adopted in Milwaukee, Cleveland, and elsewhere. Caroline M. Hox-
by, School Choice and School Competition:  Evidence from the United States, 10 SWED. ECON. 
POL’Y REV. 11, 11, 15 (2003).  School voucher effectiveness remains a topic of debate.  
Compare id. at 11 (arguing that voucher programs have improved student performance 
and created positive incentives for struggling public schools), with Helen F. Ladd, Com-
ment on Caroline M. Hoxby:  School Choice and School Competition:  Evidence from the United 
States, 10 SWED. ECON. POL’Y REV. 67, 71-72, 74-75 (2003) (disputing Hoxby’s claims). 
2 Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education (“Governments could re-
quire a minimum level of education which they could finance by giving parents vouch-
ers redeemable for a specified maximum sum per child per year if spent on ‘approved’ 
educational services.”), in ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 123, 127 (Robert A. 
Solo ed., 1955).  Friedman was not the first theorist to propose school choice.  See 
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1869) (arguing that the government “might leave to 
parents to obtain the education where and how they pleased, and content itself with 
helping to pay the school fees of the poorer classes of children”), reprinted in ON LIB-
ERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS OF JOHN STUART MILL 3, 126 (1926); THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS 
OF MAN (1791) (proposing a distribution of surplus funds to poor families for them to 
spend on the education of their children), reprinted in THE GREAT WORKS OF THOMAS 
PAINE 5, 185 n.* (D.M. Bennett ed., New York, Liberal & Scientific Publ’g House 
1877); ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 822 (Edwin Cannan ed., 2000) (1776) 
(arguing that competition would improve educational quality if students were given 
scholarships and “left free to chuse what college they liked best”). 
3 See, e.g., Christopher Jencks, Private Schools for Black Children, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 
1968, § 6 (Magazine), at 30 (stating the proposal in terms of a tax subsidy instead of 
vouchers, but with generally similar substance); Theodore Sizer & Phillip Whitten, A 
Proposal for a Poor Children’s Bill of Rights, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Aug. 1968, at 59, 62 (sug-
gesting that a voucher program would “provide an incentive to middle-class schools to 
take in poor children”); see also James Forman, Jr., The Secret History of School Choice:  
How Progressives Got There First, 93 GEO. L.J. 1287, 1309-12 (2005) (discussing voucher 
plans proposed in the late 1960s by progressives including Jencks, Sizer, and Whitten). 
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other government services, including housing,4 health care,5 child 
care, job training, environmental protection, welfare, nutrition, and 
transportation.6 
Vouchers are no stranger to the criminal justice system:  they are 
used for halfway houses, mandatory anti-alcohol and drug treatment 
programs,7 and criminal defense lawyers for the indigent.8  A voucher 
system was implemented in a few states in the 1970s to allow inmates 
to buy training and education as part of “mutual agreement pro-
grams”—also known as “contract parole” programs—that helped in-
 
4 See Robert C. Ellickson, The False Promise of the Mixed-Income Housing Project, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 983, 990-92 (2010) (examining housing vouchers and finding some suc-
cess that never developed into wider application). 
5 See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Victor R. Fuchs, Health Care Vouchers—A Proposal for  
Universal Coverage, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1255, 1255-56 (2005) (advocating for health 
care vouchers as a mechanism for creating universal coverage while preserving con-
sumer choice). 
6 See, e.g., Paul Posner et al., A Survey of Voucher Use:  Variations and Common Elements 
(proposing voucher usage for the provision of many government services), in VOUCH-
ERS AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES 503, 504-13 (C. Eugene Steuerle et al. 
eds., 2000).  In Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle’s definition, “voucher programs do not de-
pend upon the issuance of any certificate or other physical manifestation of the financ-
ing scheme; rather, voucher programs earn that characterization by the elements of 
beneficiary designation of the provider coupled with government payment based on 
individualized services or goods provided to the beneficiary.”  Ira C. Lupu & Robert 
Tuttle, Sites of Redemption:  A Wide-Angle Look at Government Vouchers and Sectarian Service 
Providers, 18 J.L. & POL. 539, 539 n.4 (2002). 
7  See JUDITH GREENE & TIMOTHY ROCHE, JUSTICE POLICY INST., CUTTING COR-
RECTLY IN MARYLAND 30 (2003) (recommending the use of vouchers to pay Maryland 
drug treatment providers); see also Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 
324 F.3d 880, 884 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding the constitutionality of a state voucher 
program that allowed alcohol and drug offenders to choose between religious and 
secular rehabilitation programs). 
  Judge Posner commented on the usage of the term “voucher”: 
We have put “vouchers” in scare quotes because the state has dispensed with 
the intermediate step by which the recipient of the publicly funded private 
service hands his voucher to the service provider.  But . . . there is no differ-
ence between giving the voucher recipient a piece of paper that directs the 
public agency to pay the service provider and the agency’s asking the recipient 
to indicate his preference and paying the provider whose service he prefers.  
Id. at 882. 
8 Defense counsel voucher systems have been implemented in Ontario and in 
England and Wales.  See Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking 
Indigent Defense:  Promoting Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and 
Freedom of Choice for All Criminal Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 110-11 (1993) 
(arguing that a similar system of counsel vouchers is possible in the United States); see 
also Posner et al., supra note 6, at 506-07 (noting examples of voucher programs in the 
realm of criminal justice, including a “Goods for Guns” program and disbursements of 
clothing vouchers for those on probation). 
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mates work toward parole.9  This last idea was taken up in 1978 in the 
Model Sentencing and Corrections Act,10 which suggested that prison-
ers get vouchers to purchase “specified treatment programs and ser-
vices directly from either public or private agencies.”11   
But, as far as I can tell, no one has ever discussed vouchers as a se-
rious possibility for prisons.12 
 
9 See FAY HONEY KNOPP ET AL., INSTEAD OF PRISONS:  A HANDBOOK FOR ABOLITION-
ISTS 97-98 (1976) (reviewing the voucher components of mutual agreement programs 
in Maryland); DAVID T. STANLEY, PRISONERS AMONG US:  THE PROBLEM OF PAROLE 66-
68 (1976) (reviewing mutual agreement programs in Wisconsin, California, and Arizo-
na); James O. Finckenauer & Carol Rauh, Contract Parole:  Some Legal and Rehabilitative 
Issues of Mutual Agreement Programming for Parole Release, 5 CAP. U. L. REV. 175, 194 
(1976) (describing mutual agreement program vouchers in California); Leon Leiberg 
& William Parker, Mutual Agreement Programs with Vouchers: An Alternative for Institution-
alized Female Offenders, AM. J. CORRECTIONS, Jan.–Feb. 1975, at 10, 13 (discussing an ear-
ly California experiment with inmate training vouchers); Ronald J. Scott, Contract Pro-
gramming in Probation:  Philosophical and Experimental Bases for Building a Model, 4 JUST. 
SYS. J. 49, 54 (1978) (presenting an overview of voucher programs in California and 
Maryland); id. at 64-65 (including funding for community services vouchers in a model 
of a contractual probation system); id. at 65 (describing Michigan’s voucher system 
that is part of its probation program, which allows for the “provision of financial assis-
tance to secure services available in the community”); Steve Gettinger, Parole Contracts:  
A New Way Out, CORRECTIONS MAG., Sept.–Oct. 1975, at 3, 4 (discussing vouchers in 
Maryland and plans for vouchers in Massachusetts). 
10 MODEL SENTENCING & CORRECTIONS ACT §§ 4-701 to -706, in 10 UNIFORM LAWS 
ANNOTATED 325, 535-40 (2001). 
11 Id. § 4-701(a).  This feature of the Model Act, to my knowledge, hasn’t been 
adopted anywhere.  See also id. § 4-703(b) (proposing vouchers be used “to purchase 
programs or services relating to [a person’s] care, rehabilitation, treatment, or adjust-
ment to life in the free community, including:  (1) academic programs; (2) vocational 
training programs; (3) medical or psychiatric services; (4) counseling services, includ-
ing personal, marital, employment, or financial counseling; and (5) any other program 
or service approved by the director”); id. § 4-704(a) (“An application may not be de-
nied solely because the applicant provides programs or services already available from 
the department or elsewhere.”). 
12 A search for “prison vouchers” in Westlaw’s JLR and ALLCASES databases yields 
no results, other than my own recent work.  See Alexander Volokh, The Constitutional 
Possibilities of Prison Vouchers, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 983 (2011) [hereinafter Volokh, Constitu-
tional Possibilities]; Alexander Volokh, Book Review, 25 J.L. & RELIGION 323, 326-27 
(2010) (reviewing WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, PRISON RELIGION:  FAITH-BASED RE-
FORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2009)).  Cf. Andrei Shleifer, State Versus Private Owner-
ship, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1998, at 133, 139 (“[P]risoner choice is not a realistic possi-
bility . . . .”).  There’s been no shortage of offhand comments and jokes about prison 
vouchers, often in sarcastic response to school choice proposals.  E.g., Bruce Shapiro, 
Portfolio Prisons, NATION, Oct. 20, 1997, at 4, 5 (characterizing a joke about prison 
vouchers as “not quite as facetious as it sounds”); gocards44, Prison Vouchers, KEVIN 
BURKE’S WEBLOG (Mar. 29, 2007, 6:22 PM), http://gocards44.wordpress.com/ 
2007/03/29/prison-vouchers (suggesting a system of prison vouchers, while acknowl-
edging that it “would never get past Congress”); Lightning Bug’s Butt, Even More Bullet-
ins, LIGHTNING BUG’S BUTT (Feb. 19, 2007, 11:40 PM), http://bugsbutt.blogspot.com/ 
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This is a shame, because some of the same factors that led early 
education reformers to suggest school vouchers apply with equal, if 
not greater, force in the context of prisons.  Both prisons and schools 
face a similar confluence of three factors: 
1.  Both face widespread and serious problems. 
2.  The problems in both areas have proven hard to solve through 
the usual political, administrative, and judicial means. 
3.  Allocation of students to schools, like the allocation of inmates 
to prisons, is predominantly done bureaucratically, with limited 
possibilities for choice. 
The prima facie case for considering a market solution, in which 
the subject population would become consumers and thus drive re-
form by voting with its feet—essentially, getting rid of (3) to bypass (2) 
and thereby solve (1)—thus seems strong. 
Let me focus on (1) for a bit.  Modern American prisons—with 
their high violence rates, bad medical care, overuse of highly punitive 
measures like administrative segregation, and the like—are widely be-
lieved to be of low quality.13  Note the similarity to the views of early 
school voucher proponents on the left, who wrote that the “public 
schools have not been able to teach most black children to read and 
write or to add and subtract competently”14 and that the public school 
system “destroys rather than develops positive human potential.”15 
We should care about prison quality even if we don’t care about 
prisoners themselves because bad prison conditions often indirectly 
 
2007/02/even-more-bullet-ins.html (sarcastically envisioning an advertisement for a 
voucher prison “where the guard beatings are minimal”); yourworstnightmare, Com-
ment to Do You Think Kansas Should Have Private Prisons?,  LJWORLD.COM (Mar. 26, 
2006, 9:56 AM), http://www2.ljworld.com/onthestreet/2006/mar/26/prisons/ 
#cll8025 (proposing prison vouchers in response to the question of whether Kansas 
should privatize its prisons).   “Prison vouchers” as discussed here shouldn’t be con-
fused with the same expression that is occasionally used to refer to money that prison-
ers can use in some penal systems to buy products in prison.  See, e.g., ARTHUR KOES-
TLER, DARKNESS AT NOON 43 (Daphne Hardy trans., Bantam Books 1986) (1941) 
(describing a system of vouchers in a fictional prison where the vouchers are required 
to purchase goods); ARTHUR KOESTLER, DIALOGUE WITH DEATH 147 (Trevor & Phyllis 
Blewitt trans., Macmillan Co. 1942) (“Angelito came to change the hundred peseta 
note into prison vouchers.”). 
13 See infra Section I.A. 
14 Jencks, supra note 3, at 30. 
15 Sizer & Whitten, supra note 3, at 62.  But see KEVIN B. SMITH & KENNETH J. 
 MEIER, THE CASE AGAINST SCHOOL CHOICE:  POLITICS, MARKETS, AND FOOLS 16-19 
(1995) (arguing that voucher proponents are overstating some of the problems with 
public education). 
VOLOKH REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2012  7:15 PM 
2012] Prison Vouchers 785 
hurt the rest of society.16  Brutal conditions,17 as well as excessive use of 
high-security segregation,18 make prisoners less useful members of so-
ciety and more likely to reoffend.19  The low level of educational, voca-
tional, and rehabilitative programs also contributes to recidivism.  Fur-
thermore, communicable diseases can spill over into the outside world 
when infected inmates are released.20  The risk of multi-drug-resistant 
tuberculosis in New York in the 1980s and early 1990s may have been 
linked to poor medical treatment in prisons and jails.21 
There are thus clear opportunities for gains from prison vouch-
ers—not just to prisoners, but also to society at large—as competing 
prisons seek to attract prisoners by offering better security, medical 
care, and vocational programs.22 
But, now focusing on (2), why can’t we “just” fix prisons by other 
means, such as reform legislation, administrative oversight, or litigation? 
 
16 See James Forman, Jr., Why Care About Mass Incarceration?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 993, 
1006-09 (2010) (reviewing PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE:  A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUS-
TICE (2009)) (asserting that prison violence, overcrowding, and the lack of educational 
and treatment programs present a threat to public safety when offenders are released). 
17 See M. Keith Chen & Jesse M. Shapiro, Do Harsher Prison Conditions Reduce Recidi-
vism?  A Discontinuity-Based Approach, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 17-21 (2007) (arguing 
empirically that harsh prison conditions make prisoners more likely to reoffend); 
Francesco Drago et al., Prison Conditions and Recidivism, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 103, 
120-25 (2011) (finding similar results in a study of Italian prisoners); Daniel S. Nagin 
et al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, 38 CRIME & JUST. 115, 115 (2009) (concluding, af-
ter reviewing the available literature, that “incarceration appears to have a null or 
mildly criminogenic effect on future criminal behavior”); Rafael Di Tella & Ernesto 
Schargrodsky, Criminal Recidivism After Prison and Electronic Monitoring 28 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15602, 2009, rev. 2010) (finding that recidivism 
rates are lower for offenders who are electronically monitored than for offenders who 
are sent to prison). 
18 THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, CONFRONTING CONFINE-
MENT 52-53 (2006). 
19 See Sharon Dolovich, Foreword:  Incarceration American-Style, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 237, 245 (2009) (“[T]he people who have been marked out for incarceration may 
become through the experience of incarceration the very ‘anti-social’ misfits whose exclusion 
from society was thought so necessary.”); Giovanna Shay, Ad Law Incarcerated, 14 
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 329, 352-61 (2009) (suggesting that restrictive regulation of visita-
tion and outside correspondence has adverse effects on prisoners’ relationships with 
their families and communities). 
20 See THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 13 
(“Every year, more than 1.5 million people are released from jail and prison carrying a 
life-threatening contagious disease.”). 
21 Id. at 47 (citing research showing a correlation between time spent in prison 
and diagnosis with tuberculosis); see also GEORGE KNOX, AN INTRODUCTION TO GANGS 
465 (5th ed. rev. 2000) (noting that over half of correctional facilities surveyed in 1999 
reported having had inmates diagnosed with tuberculosis during the last year). 
22 See infra Section I.A. 
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Legislative prison reform is a tough sell—criminals are widely vili-
fied.23  In contrast, in the school reform context, all politicians at least 
claim to like kids.24  Nor are elected officials eager to fund prisons.25  
Some reformers recognize that prison administrators or legislators 
have shown little interest in improving prisoners’ lives,26 especially if 
such improvements carry a cost.27 Nonetheless, reformers continue to 
“urge” and “encourage” these same officials to increase prison ex-
penditures or implement reforms.28  Of course there’s nothing wrong 
 
23 See, e.g., Marc Mauer, Why Are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular?, 11 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 9, 12 (1999) (noting that politicians frequently favor harsher sentencing 
laws in order to curry favor with voters). 
24 See, e.g., No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.) (reflecting nationwide con-
cern with the education of children in public schools).  
25 See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informational Approach to the Mass Imprisonment 
Problem, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 47, 82-83 (2008) (observing opposition to prison funding from 
state legislatures). 
26 See THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 30 
(finding that the “direct supervision” technique faces resistance that is mostly “attitu-
dinal” and prison officials usually react to the idea with “astonishment”); id. at 31 (ar-
guing that direct supervision will not succeed unless officers “have the competence to 
understand and respect persons from different racial, ethnic, and cultural back-
grounds”); id. at 35 (noting that a shift in priorities toward placing prisons closer to 
inmates’ communities “would require tremendous political will”).  
27 See id. at 36 (acknowledging that welcoming visitors and helping with transpor-
tation would be costly); id. (stating that prisons are under pressure from state legisla-
tures to use telephone contracts to generate income); id. at 39 (“[L]egislatures chroni-
cally underfund correctional health care.”); id. at 41 (“Partnerships between 
correctional agencies and community health-care providers . . . require openness and 
flexibility on the part of participating correctional agencies, a broad-minded sense of 
mission, and a deep commitment to that mission on the part of participating public 
health agencies.”); id. at 46 (stating that adequate mental health standards “cannot be 
met without better funding”); id. at 48 (“[U]nder significant pressure from state law-
makers to control spiraling medical costs, correctional facilities began charging pris-
oners co-payments for health care.”); id. (acknowledging “the tremendous pressure on 
corrections administrators to contain costs and hold prisoners accountable”); id. at 79 
(“[S]ome corrections administrators have been resistant to external monitoring, and 
by and large the public and its representatives have not insisted on it.”); id. (“[T]he 
few [external monitoring] systems that do exist are generally underresourced and lack-
ing in real power.”); see also Lynn S. Branham, “The Mess We’re In”:  Five Steps Towards the 
Transformation of Prison Cultures, 44 IND. L. REV. 703, 732 (2011) (“There is always reti-
cence or resistance on the part of many to initiatives to depart from the status quo.”).  
28 See THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 14 
(“Lawmakers must provide adequate funding . . . .”); id. at 39 (“[T]he Commission 
urges lawmakers to adequately fund correctional health care.”); id. at 41 (“[T]he 
Commission urges correctional agencies and community health-care providers to con-
sider the benefits of forging solid partnerships”);  id. at 49 (“The Commission believes 
the risks are too great to justify any short-term cost-savings and urges state lawmakers to 
eliminate co-payments and provide corrections departments with the resources they 
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with urging, and some reforms have been implemented even in the 
face of political pressure to the contrary.29  But it’s unsurprising that 
mere urges haven’t gone very far.30 
Administrative solutions are likewise difficult because prison offi-
cials resist “scrutiny by ‘outsiders.’”31  Independent inspection and 
monitoring, as well as internal oversight mechanisms, such as effective 
grievance systems, are underused.32 
Judicial solutions are also unpromising.33  Courts often defer to the 
judgment of prison administrators,34 and prisons are exempt from ad-
ministrative procedure acts in many states.35  Prisoner litigation, 
whether as individual claims or as more ambitious prison reform cas-
 
need to provide quality medical care . . . .”); id. at 74 (“Corrections leaders . . . must 
have the courage to confront executive and legislative leaders when proposed policies 
and budgets threaten the health and safety of our prisons and jails, and of our com-
munities.”); id. (“[E]xecutive branch officials must stand up to organized labor . . . .”);  
id. at 81 (“The Commission strongly urges states to create a monitoring body inde-
pendent of the department of corrections . . . .”); id. at 88 (“The Commission urges 
many more facilities to seek accreditation and, at the same time, urges the ACA [Amer-
ican Correctional Association] to strengthen the process so that accreditation is even 
more meaningful.”); id. at 92 (“The Commission encourages the ACA to involve the 
broadest range of interested parties in the process of developing ever stronger stand-
ards for correctional practice.”); see also Branham, supra note 27, at 706 (“There are 
innumerable steps—some big, some small—that need to be taken . . . .”); id. at 714 
(“[G]overnments can and should make transparency and accountability hallmarks of 
their prisons . . . .”).  
29 See, e.g., THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 
88 (explaining that efforts to promote internal accountability “are all the more impres-
sive given that they have been largely self-generated rather than imposed through polit-
ical pressure”); Branham, supra note 27, at 705 (“There are some correctional leaders, 
though not nearly enough, who have publicly espoused the need for, and the feasibility 
of, what has been aptly termed ‘culture busting’ in prisons.” (citations omitted)). 
30 In suggesting merit pay for prison wardens, Rick Hills says that prisons might be 
“the one sort of Big Government that neither party wants to reinvent,” complicating pro-
spects for reform.  Rick Hills, Merit Pay for Prison Wardens?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 3, 2008, 
11:14 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/03/tying-the-salar.html. 
31 THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 16. 
32 See id. at 16-17 (describing existing oversight systems as “inadequate, sometimes 
wholly meaningless”). 
33 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Essential but Inherently Limited Role of the Courts in 
Prison Reform, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 307, 313-15 (2008) (finding that the ability of 
courts to propose solutions is limited by an inability to appropriate funds, “the inher-
ent difficulty in courts formulating standards and enforcing them,” and restrictions 
imposed on judicial remedies by the Prison Litigation Reform Act). 
34 See Shay, supra note 19, at 343 (“[T]he Supreme Court has accorded corrections 
officials significant leeway, even when constitutional rights are implicated.”). 
35 See id. at 346-47 (surveying state regimes and finding that twenty-eight have such 
exemptions). 
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es, is restricted by statute—for instance, by the Prison Litigation Re-
form Act (PLRA)36—and by case law holding prisoners’ rights to be 
quite limited.37 
Some have suggested contracting out prison management to the 
private sector (but holding the method of allocating prisoners con-
stant) as a means of improving prison quality.38  This is a controversial 
proposition—others categorically deny that contracting out improves 
prison quality,39 and even some who are more sympathetic to private 
contracting grant that the evidence on the quality of private prisons 
relative to public ones is mixed.40 
 
36 The PLRA requires inmates to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing 
suit in court.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006).  Even more controversially, the PLRA bars 
recovery for mental and emotional injuries in the absence of a physical injury.  Id. § 
1997e(e).  One district court has held the limitation on recovery for mental and emo-
tional injuries unconstitutional as applied.  Siggers-El v. Barlow, 433 F. Supp. 2d 811, 
816 (E.D. Mich. 2006); see also Margo Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of 
Law in America’s Jails and Prisons:  The Case for Amending the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 
11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 139, 141-42 (2008) (observing that the number of lawsuits filed 
per thousand inmates has declined by sixty percent since passage of the PLRA); Shima 
Baradaran-Robison, Comment, Kaleidoscopic Consent Decrees:  School Desegregation and 
Prison Reform Consent Decrees After the Prison Litigation Reform Act and Freeman-Dowell, 
2003 BYU L. REV. 1333, 1335 (“Congress clearly intended to reduce judicial involve-
ment in the improvement of prison conditions.”). 
37 See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (holding that prisoner regula-
tions can limit prisoners’ rights for “legitimate penological interests”); Estelle v. Gam-
ble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (requiring “deliberate indifference to serious medical 
needs of prisoners” to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation). 
38 See, e.g., GEOFFREY F. SEGAL & ADRIAN T. MOORE, REASON PUB. POL’Y INST., 
POL’Y STUDY NO. 290, WEIGHING THE WATCHMEN:  EVALUATING THE COSTS AND BENE-
FITS OF OUTSOURCING CORRECTIONAL SERVICES PT. 2, at 15 (2002) (concluding that 
privatization can increase quality, introduce innovation, and reduce costs); Samuel Jan 
Brakel & Kimberly Ingersoll Gaylord, Prison Privatization and Public Policy, (arguing that 
prison privatization will lead to greater efficiency), in CHANGING THE GUARD:  PRIVATE 
PRISONS AND THE CONTROL OF CRIME 125, 139 (Alexander Tabarrok ed., 2003). 
39 See Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 505 
(2005) (arguing that private prisons will cut costs in pursuit of greater profits, causing 
prison conditions to fall below the level required by the “humanity principle”). 
40 See Developments in the Law–The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1875-77 
(2002) [hereinafter Developments] (Part III is the author’s student note) (citing evi-
dence that private prisons are superior to public ones on some quality indicators but 
not others); cf. DOUGLAS MCDONALD ET AL., ABT ASSOCS., PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES:  AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PRACTICE 56 (1998) (evaluating existing 
studies on the quality of private prisons and finding that claims of superiority over pub-
lic prisons are “not well documented”); Richard Culp, Prison Privatization Turns 25 (ar-
guing that while private prisons may initially bring cost savings, this “cost advantage 
decreases” over time), in U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY:  A CONTEMPORARY READER 
183, 199 (Karim Ismaili ed., 2011). 
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Here, too, the parallels with schools are clear.  Whether the blame 
lies with teachers’ unions41 or with politicians unwilling to spend mon-
ey on schools,42 schools have been hard to reform politically.  Litiga-
tion hasn’t worked well,43 and any constitutional rights to a good edu-
cation are generally weak.44  Privatization of entire school systems with-
within the context of mandatory government provision has been tried 
sporadically, but the results haven’t been terribly impressive so far.45 
 
41 See Joe Klein, Failing Our Schools, TIME, Feb. 8, 2010, at 20, 20 (chronicling a 
teachers’ union’s successful efforts to block New York from receiving $700 million in 
federal funds for school reform).  
42 See Linda Darling-Hammond, Restoring Our Schools, NATION, June 14, 2010, at 14, 
18 (criticizing Reagan-era policies cutting education funding); Lisa Kaiser, An Interview 
with Educator and Activist Jonathan Kozol, EXPRESSMILWAUKEE.COM (Mar. 4, 2009), 
http://www.expressmilwaukee.com/article-5728-an-interview-with-educator-and-activist- 
jonathan-kozol.html (characterizing education activist Jonathan Kozol as arguing that 
“promises by states to equalize funding for urban districts never materialize”). 
43 See, e.g., D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 556 (Alas-
ka 1981) (rejecting theory of negligent classification, placement, or teaching); Peter 
W. v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (reject-
ing a claim against a school district for negligently failing to provide basic academic 
instruction); Hunter v. Bd. of Educ., 439 A.2d 582, 585-86 (Md. 1982) (rejecting an 
educational malpractice claim because ruling otherwise would require the courts to 
monitor school policies and operations); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 
391 N.E.2d 1352, 1353 (N.Y. 1979) (refusing to recognize an educational malpractice 
claim on public policy grounds because the legislature had established the school sys-
tem and provided for the hearing of complaints).  See generally Melanie Natasha Henry, 
No Child Left Behind?  Educational Malpractice Litigation for the 21st Century, 92 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1117 (2004) (surveying educational malpractice jurisprudence and the emer-
gence of statutory claims under the No Child Left Behind Act); Kevin P. McJessy, 
Comment, Contract Law:  The Proper Framework for Litigating Educational Liability Claims, 
89 NW. U. L. REV. 1768, 1798-1803 (1995) (discussing various contract law theories of 
school liability). 
44 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1973) 
(rejecting an equal protection attack on inequalities in a Texas school system that were 
attributable to a funding scheme dependent on local property tax revenues).  State 
constitutional challenges to funding systems have sometimes been successful.  See, e.g., 
Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1265 (Cal. 1971) (“[W]e are satisfied that plaintiff 
children have alleged facts showing that the public school financing system denies 
them equal protection . . . .”).  But state constitutional challenges to educational quali-
ty have generally failed on the theory that the relevant constitutional provisions are 
nonbinding, unenforceable, or only guarantees a very low minimum quality.  See, e.g., 
Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1353-54 (holding that a state constitutional provision obligated 
the legislature only to maintain and support the school system).  One notable excep-
tion is McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Education, 615 N.E.2d 516, 554-55 
(Mass. 1993), which found a constitutional right to an education and outlining seven 
broad goals, but left their implementation to the legislature. 
45 See, e.g., Shelby Wolff Reitz, Note, Mastering Two Services:  Advancing Public Values 
Through School Privatization, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 110-15 (2008) (reviewing the 
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The market-based approach that prison vouchers represent has an 
obvious appeal in this context.  The logic is similar to that of school 
choice:  vouchers empower the prisoners themselves to reward and 
punish prisons, creating powerful incentives for prisons to improve in 
accordance with the prisoners’ own standards.46  No longer would advo-
cates have to urge prison administrators or legislatures to reform condi-
tions in the interest of prisoners or try to convince these authorities that 
prisoner welfare is aligned with the social interest—a strategy that has 
not worked well so far.47  Instead, prison administrators would be 
moved, as if by an invisible hand, to make their prisons better places. 
In Part I, I explain how a prison choice program might work and 
how the vouchers would be funded.  I also explain how prison choice is 
different from, and conceptually independent of, prison privatization. 
In Part II, I discuss how vouchers would make prisons more  
constitutionally flexible.  First, prisons would be freer to experiment 
with religiously inspired rehabilitation:  faith-based prisons,48 whose 
constitutionality under the current regime is dubious, would become 
fully constitutional.  Under vouchers, the prison system would come 
within Zelman v. Simmons-Harris because prisons would be participat-
ing on a neutral basis, independent of religion.49  As is already the 
case with halfway houses, residential programs for delinquent chil-
dren, and alcoholism and drug addiction programs, participating 
providers could be public or private, religious or secular.50  The par-
ticipant’s ability to choose from a variety of providers, not all of which 
 
management of Philadelphia public schools by for-profit school operator Edison 
Schools, and finding modest but shaky improvement). 
46 See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1285, 1347 (2003) (“Vulnerability can be exacerbated when the consumers of the 
service are not the same as the payers—when taxpayers, for instance, finance prisons 
occupied by convicts, welfare received by eligible low-income applicants, and schools 
occupied by other people’s children.”). 
47 See supra notes 23-40 and accompanying text. 
48 For a discussion of different sorts of faith-based programs, see Marc O. 
DeGirolami, The New Religious Prisons and Their Retributivist Commitments, 59 ARK. L. REV. 
1, 13-19 (2006).  For a discussion of whether faith-based programs reduce recidivism, 
see Alexander Volokh, Do Faith-Based Prisons Work?, 63 ALA. L. REV. 43 (2011) (arguing 
that they don’t).  
49 See 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002) (holding that a school choice program that in-
cludes a large proportion of religious schools does not violate the Establishment 
Clause if all schools can participate based on neutral criteria, and parents can freely 
select or reject the religious school). 
50 See, e.g., Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880, 884 
(7th Cir. 2003) (upholding the dismissal of a suit to enjoin correctional authorities 
from funding a private faith-based halfway house.) 
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are religious, puts these programs in the same category as the school 
vouchers upheld in Zelman. 
The effect of vouchers would be more fundamental than merely 
to validate existing faith-based programs.  Consider private schools 
under a school voucher regime.  Clearly, under Zelman, they are not 
limited to merely providing the sorts of ecumenical prayers that are 
struck down in the public school context.  Rather, they can advertise 
themselves as Catholic, display cruficixes, teach theology, and do  
everything else that private schools can do.  Prisons would be similar.  
Modern-day faith-based prisons, in an effort to comply with the Estab-
lishment Clause, aggressively seek nondenominationalism and ecu-
menism.51  But—just as one can disfavor “To Whom It May Concern” 
prayer in schools—a religious organization may be unsatisfied with 
prison rehabilitation based on “Religion Lite.”52  With vouchers, such 
an organization could become far more ambitious.  One could have 
“religious prisons” in the proper sense, each advertising its own sec-
tarian rehabilitative agenda.  Vouchers could thus be the best, or per-
haps even the only, way to allow for faith-based prisons. 
Second, prisons would be freer to offer inmates packages of fea-
tures that currently would be considered unconstitutional.  Prisoners 
have dramatically reduced rights, but they still retain some.  In gen-
eral, people—prisoners or not—may benefit from being able to waive 
their rights in exchange for other benefits.  For instance, inmates may 
agree to waive some part of their due process rights in exchange for 
better job training.  A prison’s ability to offer such a package is limited 
by the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.53  I argue that, in a prison 
system that is more competitive from the inmate’s point of view, the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine would (and should) be some-
what more permissive because the inmates’ ability to choose would 
 
51 See, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 12, at 157-61 (documenting the efforts of Inner-
Change Freedom Initiative to portray its values system as so general that it would be 
consistent with any religion). 
52 See, e.g., Richard F. Duncan, Public Schools and the Inevitability of Religious Inequality, 
1996 BYU L. REV. 569, 572 (“In my house, we do not offer prayers ‘to whom it may con-
cern.’”); Paul Finkelman, School Vouchers, Thomas Jefferson, Roger Williams, and Protecting 
the Faithful:  Warnings from the Eighteenth Century and the Seventeenth Century on the Danger of 
Establishments to Religious Communities, 2008 BYU L. REV. 525, 551-52 (noting that the 
school prayer at issue in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), “would hardly be recog-
nized as ‘prayer’ in any meaningful way by people of faith who take religion seriously” 
and “was exactly what we would expect from a state agency trying to create a prayer that 
would offend no one, side with no one, and not run counter to anyone’s faith”). 
53 See infra Section II.B. 
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mitigate the possibility that prisons would be illegitimately taking ad-
vantage of inmates. 
With all this going for prison vouchers, what could go wrong? 
In Part III, after having presented the positive case in favor of 
prison vouchers, I address the problems.  One possible critique is that 
this idea is a nonstarter because prisoners either cannot or should not 
exercise voluntary choices regarding their places of imprisonment. 
Another possible critique, sounding more in economics than in 
philosophy, is “market failure”—that inmate’s individual decisions 
won’t succeed in improving overall prison quality.  This lack of im-
provement could be because inmates can’t make themselves better off 
through their decisions because, for instance, they are poorly in-
formed about prison quality.  The lack of improvement could also be 
because some inmates’ decisions will make other inmates worse off be-
cause, for instance, the better informed inmates will get the best pris-
ons and leave the bad prisons to the uninformed. 
A third, more serious critique is what I call “market success”—that 
inmates will succeed in improving prison quality by their own standards, 
and that this is precisely the problem.54  Prisoners’ preferences aren’t 
always good; we are, after all, talking about (presumptive) criminals.  
For example, satisfying prisoner preferences may harm society by al-
lowing gang members to serve their sentences together and thus bet-
ter run their outside criminal enterprises.  Alternatively, prisoner 
choice may merely make prison a less undesirable place and thereby 
undermine the deterrent value of prison.55 
I take these counterarguments seriously, and so I make no strong 
claims about the bottom-line merits of prison vouchers.  If the poten-
tial downsides—that prisoners, through their voucher spending, drive 
prisons to adopt undesirable features in ways that can’t be adequately 
controlled by the political process—are outweighed by the benefits—
such as improvements in prisoner security, health care, and educa-
tion—then vouchers could dramatically improve penal policy.  But this 
Article is meant to spur further research and debate on the question, 
not to come down on one side or another. 
In Part IV, I deal with the politics of prison vouchers.  In the first 
place, if vouchers are so great, and if they improve prison conditions 
 
54 Properly speaking, this is also a species of market failure, since prisoners’ deci-
sions impose negative externalities on the world at large; the term “market success” is 
meant to be merely evocative. 
55 But see infra note 328 and accompanying text. 
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as the political system hasn’t been able to, why would they ever be 
adopted?  Conversely, if prison vouchers are adopted, and if they’re 
good for prisoners, wouldn’t their adoption be evidence of a change 
in attitudes toward prisoners that would make more conventional re-
forms possible?  In this Part, I speculate on a possible political coali-
tion that could get prison vouchers adopted even without a change in 
attitudes toward prisoners.  I further speculate on how the political 
system would treat prison vouchers after their adoption, both in terms 
of funding and in terms of regulation. 
I.  THE MECHANICS 
A.  Choice 
Inmates today have little or no choice regarding where they serve 
their prison sentence.  When assigning prisoners to federal prisons, the 
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is required to consider “the resources of the fa-
cility contemplated,”56 “the nature and circumstances of the offense,”57 
“the history and characteristics of the prisoner,”58 “any statement” by the 
sentencing court “concerning the purposes for which the sentence . . . 
was determined to be warranted,”59 and Sentencing Commission policy 
statements.60  The BOP is also required to consider the sentencing court’s 
recommendations regarding what type of facility is appropriate,61 but isn’t 
required to consider recommendations of particular facilities.62  Moreover, 
if the sentencing court “order[s], recommend[s], or request[s]” that the 
convicted defendant be sentenced to a community correction facility, this 
has “no binding effect” on the BOP.63 
 
56 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)(1) (2006).  Federal law authorizes the BOP to place in-
mates in “any available penal or correctional facility,” whether public or private, any-
where in the federal government’s jurisdiction.  Id. § 3621(b). 
57 Id. § 3621(b)(2). 
58 Id. § 3621(b)(3). 
59 Id. § 3621(b)(4)(A). 
60 Id. § 3621(b)(5). 
61 Id. § 3621(b)(4)(B). 
62 This can be inferred from the absence of a requirement in the relevant section 
of the statute, which directs the BOP to consider the sentencing court’s recommenda-
tion only as to “type . . . of facility.”  Id. 
63 Id. § 3621(b).  While the BOP’s regulations seem to accommodate sentencing 
court recommendations, generally there’s no guarantee that the court will convey the 
prisoner’s preferences and no systematic way for prisoners to have their preferences 
satisfied.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, NO. 5100.08, PROGRAM 
STATEMENT, at IV-3 (2006), available at http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5100_ 
008.pdf (indicating that an inmate’s designation to a particular facility would include 
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In Texas, convicted defendants can’t even ask for a particular 
prison at sentencing; prisoners are assigned according to their sup-
posed needs.64  There is no formal way to “bargain” with the court or 
with the prosecutor, and voluntary transfers are limited.65 
In California, there’s a limited amount of choice in jail assign-
ment.  Through “offender self-pay” programs, minimal-risk offenders 
can, for a fee and with court approval, opt out of the regular jail sys-
tem and be housed in the jail equivalent of a “five-star Hilton,”66 where 
they get distance from violent offenders, work furlough rights, and 
sometimes even have the right to bring computer equipment.67  But 
this California system is both unusual and inegalitarian. 
Thus, under the standard regime, prisoners are assigned primarily 
based on a state correctional employee’s judgment of available space 
and inmate needs, such as proximity to family or appropriate treat-
ment programs. 
 
consideration of the specific institution or program recommended by the sentencing 
court); id. at III-1 (advising the BOP to “follow[] the intentions of the [sentencing] 
Court when designating a facility”); id. at III-3 to -4 (stating the BOP “make[s] every 
effort” to follow the sentencing court’s recommendation); id. at IV-5 (“The court may 
recommend a specific institution or a geographical region for a newly committed in-
mate.”); id. at V-3 (“When consistent with policies or when [the sentencing court’s 
suggestions] are consistent with sound correctional management, the Bureau of Pris-
ons attempts to satisfy judicial recommendations.”). 
64 See TEX. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, OFFENDER ORIENTATION HANDBOOK 6 
(2004) (“Offenders do not have a right to choose their unit of assignment.  Inter-Unit 
transfers are based on departmental and offender needs.  Offenders may not be trans-
ferred closer to home for visitation reasons.”).  The Handbook does contemplate 
“[t]ransfer requests for medical or educational reasons,” subject to approval by the rel-
evant department head and the State Classification Committee.  Id. at 6-7. 
65 See id. (detailing various committees’ roles in the prison assignment process).  
Inmates may request transfers because of problems or conflicts.  Id. at 7.  Such requests 
should be made to “unit staff,” who will send the request to the Classification Commit-
tee, if the staff deems necessary.  Id. 
66 Jennifer Steinhauer, For $82 a Day, Booking a Cell in a 5-Star Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
29, 2007, at A1.  Coincidentally, this sort of jail made the news when celebrity Paris Hil-
ton, great-granddaughter of Hilton Hotels founder Conrad Hilton, was sentenced in 
2007.  See Laurie L. Levenson & Mary Gordon, The Dirty Little Secrets About Pay-to-Stay, 106 
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 67, 68-69 (2007), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/ 
assets/fi/106/levensongordon.pdf (describing public reaction to Hilton’s luxury im-
prisonment as “unequal justice”). 
67 See Steinhauer, supra note 66 (reporting that offenders in paid prisons may in 
some cases use personal music players and laptops); Geoffrey Segal, Innovative Alternatives 
to Traditional Municipal/County Corrections, REASON FOUND. (Mar. 1, 2001), http:// 
reason.org/news/show/innovative-alternatives-to-tra-1 (describing public and private 
self-pay programs in California as beneficial to low-risk inmates and city residents). 
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Prison choice would supersede this mechanism. The process 
would begin at conviction.  The convicted defendant would receive a 
coupon, good for incarceration for the duration of his term, which he 
would be required to redeem at a participating prison (sorry, no 
choice there).  The set of participating prisons may or may not in-
clude private prisons.68  As I discuss below, choice is conceptually in-
dependent of privatization, and—even though some arguments for or 
against vouchers are often made with private providers in mind—one 
can discuss vouchers separately from privatization.69 
I’ve assumed above that everyone gets a voucher, but this needn’t 
be the case.  Some school choice plans only give vouchers to students 
assigned to schools that are judged to be “failing” in some objective 
sense;70 similarly, officials could do an initial round of nonconsensual 
assignment and then give vouchers to prisoners at the “worst” prisons, 
as determined by the Department of Corrections or Bureau of Prisons. 
Imagine a convicted defendant awaiting sentencing, presumably 
with a lot of time on his hands.  The soon-to-be prisoner can spend his 
time flipping through a book, perhaps like the Yellow Pages, with ads 
for different prisons—or perhaps the browsing can be done online if 
he has Internet access.71  To get an initial view of dimensions along 
which prisons might compete, let’s take a more detailed look at some 
of the problems prisoners face today.  Each of the problems listed be-
low suggests possible reforms that inmates might find attractive.72 
Violence.  Though good data is elusive,73 violence against inmates 
by other inmates and by staff is a serious problem.  This includes 
 
68 I’m primarily envisioning this system operating within a single state—or within 
the federal system, for federal prisons—but nothing inherently prevents out-of-state or 
out-of-country prisons from participating, subject to governing laws in the origin and 
destination jurisdictions. 
69 See infra Section I.B. 
70 For a discussion of the complexities of such a system in the education context, see 
David N. Figlio & Marianne E. Page, Can School Choice and School Accountability Successfully 
Coexist?, in THE ECONOMICS OF SCHOOL CHOICE 49 (Caroline M. Hoxby ed., 2003). 
71 On the availability of Internet access, see, for example, Greg Beato, You’ve Got Jail, 
REASON.COM ( July, 2011), http://reason.com/archives/2011/06/24/youve-got-jail. 
72 Prisons could advertise such reforms with color photos, supporting statistics, 
and inmate testimonials.  One blogger suggests:  “Come to Pinal Country Prison, 
where the guard beatings are minimal and shower sex assaults are a thing of the past.  
Color-coded cells identify Black Panthers, [Aryan] Nation Skin Heads, and embezzling 
tax accountants.  Tattoo artist on duty.  Sorry, no shanks allowed.”  Lightning Bug’s 
Butt, supra note 12.  The proposal is sarcastic, but why not take it seriously? 
73 There isn’t even reasonably complete and reliable data on conditions in prisons 
nationwide.  THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 
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prison riots, as well as “gang violence, rape, beatings by officers, and 
in one large jail, a pattern of illegal and humiliating strip-searches.”74  
Overcrowding, idleness, and distance from family and community, 
among other factors, fuel the violence in American prisons.75 
A prison in a voucher system might respond to this problem by 
adopting a more effective security policy.  This could include a “di-
rect supervision” policy, which involves more face-to-face interactions 
between inmates and correctional officers and tends to improve safe-
ty, rather than the “traditional model” in which guards supervise 
prisoners from behind glass or bars.76  It could also include a focus on 
conflict resolution and prevention rather than the present emphasis 
on using force as “a ‘first strike’ response before other tactics are 
considered or attempted.”77  Such a prison could make use of surveil-
lance technology more broadly to “protect prisoners and staff from 
violence and from false allegations of misconduct” to the extent that 
this is consistent with inmates’ preferences for privacy, as well as non-
invasive drug- and weapon-detection devices.78  It could segregate 
populations that are particularly vulnerable to violence or rape—
 
17 (stating that present data “make[s] it impossible to get a complete picture of safety 
and abuse in correctional facilities”). 
74 Id. at 11-12.  The data is better for deadly violence, that is homicides and sui-
cides, than for nondeadly violence.  In state prisons, there were 4 homicides and 14 
suicides per 100,000 prisoners in 2002.  Id. at 24.  In local jails, there were 3 homicides 
and 47 suicides per 100,000 prisoners in the same year.  Id.  For nondeadly violence, 
“[a]ll we have are rough indicators”:  over the course of 2000, “there were 34,355 re-
ported assaults among prisoners in state and federal facilities and 17,952 reported as-
saults by prisoners against staff,” and in 2004, there were “4,252 recorded allegations of 
sexual assault, misconduct, and harassment by prisoners and staff.”  Id.  However, offi-
cial records may underestimate actual rates by perhaps a factor of five.  Id. 
 On prison rape, see, for example, Combating Rape in Prisons:  Little and Late, ECON-
OMIST, May 7, 2011, at 32 and Lovisa Stannow, Rape Factories, REASON, July 2011, at 54; 
see also Sharon Dolovich, Strategic Segregation in the Modern Prison, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1, 2 & nn.1-6 (describing research on the rape of gay and transgender inmates). 
75 THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 12.  For 
a news story on the link between overcrowding and violence, see The Fifth Circle of Hell, 
ECONOMIST, July 16, 2011, at 40, which describes prison conditions in Venezuela. 
76 See THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 29. 
77 Id. at 32. 
78 Id. at 29-34. 
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either identifiable populations like gay and transgender inmates79 or 
a more broadly defined vulnerable class.80 
Health care.  Correctional health care is inadequately funded, un-
derstaffed, and often provided by underqualified doctors.81  Moreover, 
communicable diseases, such as staph infections, tuberculosis, hepati-
tis C, and HIV, are widespread.82  Care for the mentally ill in prisons 
and jails—where rates of mental illness are two to four times higher 
than among the general public—is likewise inadequate.83 
 
79 See Dolovich, supra note 74, at 4 (noting that “gay men and trans women de-
tained in the [segregated unit of the L.A. County] Jail are relatively free from the sex-
ual harassment and forced or coerced sexual conduct that can be the daily lot of sexu-
al minorities in other men’s carceral facilities”). 
80 See id. at 63, 73-82 (exploring ways to protect those vulnerable to sexual assault 
in prison through targeted or general segregation methods).  But see NATIONAL PRIS-
ON RAPE ELIMINATION COMMISSION REPORT:  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8 (2009) (“The 
Commission . . . discourages the creation of specialized units for vulnerable groups 
and specifically prohibits housing prisoners based solely on their sexual orientation or 
gender identity because it can lead to demoralizing and dangerous labeling.”).  The 
idea of sexual orientation–specific prisons might be in conflict with my suggestion be-
low that prisons be required to take all applicants and accept by lottery if they’re over-
subscribed.  See infra text accompanying notes 130-31.  But it could be consistent in a 
variety of ways:  (1) I also suggest that prisons could specialize in particular categories 
of prisoners, and this might be one of them; they would then only be required to ac-
cept all comers within the category that they serve.  (2a) The prison could serve all 
comers but nonetheless have its own gay segregation wing.  (2b) The prison might not 
offer any particularly interesting services for those not in its gay segregation wing, so it 
might not be particularly attractive to the population at large.  But cf. infra notes 289-91 
and accompanying text.  In any event, the “accept all comers” rule is just one way of 
running a voucher system.  The “mutual choice” rule is another, though it presents 
greater opportunities for cream skimming.   
81 See THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 38 
(demonstrating the problems with correctional health care and offering solutions like 
partnerships with health providers and screening for infectious diseases). 
82 See id. at 47 (stating that among people released from prisons and jails in 1996, 
over 1.3 million had hepatitis C and approximately 39.000 had AIDS). 
83 See id. at 13 (describing the higher than average drug treatment, contagious dis-
ease treatment, and mental health needs of the prison population); id. at 39-40 (not-
ing the challenges correctional facilities face in recruiting qualified medical staff, 
which results in care by “unlicensed physicians, doctors with substance abuse prob-
lems, [and] doctors with criminal histories” (quoting Michael S. Vaughn & Leo Car-
roll, Separate and Unequal:  Prison Versus Free-World Medical Care, 15 JUST. Q. 3, 3 
(1998))); id. at 43-47 (discussing the prevalence rate of serious mental disorders in 
jails and prisons, which is on average two-to-four times higher than among the general 
population (citing 1 NAT’L COMM’N ON CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE, THE HEALTH 
STATUS OF SOON-TO-BE-RELEASED INMATES 24 tbl.3-3, 25 fig.3-3 (2002))); see also 
SpearIt, Mental Illness in Prison:  Inmate Rehabilitation & Correctional Officers in Crisis, 14 
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 277, 280-85 (2009) (detailing the deficiencies in California’s men-
tal health programs for prisoners). 
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A voucher prison could offer better medical care—including bet-
ter screening, testing, and treatment of infectious diseases, and better 
care for the mentally ill—better staffed facilities, more doctors and 
nurses per inmate, and partnerships with community health-care pro-
viders.  A voucher prison could also provide a variety of health insur-
ance plans offering inmates the chance to opt out of the common 
cost-control system that requires copayments for medical care.84 
High-security segregation.  High-security segregation is overused, of-
ten on prisoners who pose little security risk or are mentally ill.  Some 
believe that such segregation is counterproductive because segregated 
prisoners have reduced access to programming that could make them 
more productive citizens when they reenter society.85 
A voucher prison could limit the use of high-security segregation, 
have secure therapeutic units for mentally ill prisoners, and offer 
more human contact and dedicated programs to inmates in segrega-
tion.  These prisons could also develop individualized plans to transfer 
high-security prisoners to the general prison population near the end 
of their sentences to prepare them for release.86 
Correctional officers.  Correctional officers are often underqualified 
and insufficiently trained to resolve problems without violence.  Alt-
hough learning to treat prisoners with respect is a valuable skill that 
helps maintain security and control, the idea is undervalued in officer 
training.87  A voucher prison could (perhaps through higher wages 
 
84 See THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 48-
49 (arguing that state legislatures should revoke existing laws that require prisoner co-
payments because such payments cause prisoners with legitimate medical concerns to 
forego or delay treatment). 
85 See, e.g., id. at 55 (citing COMM. OF MASS. GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON CORR. RE-
FORM, STRENGTHENING PUBLIC SAFETY, INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY, AND INSTITUT-
ING FISCAL REPONSIBILITY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION (2004)); JOAN PETER-
SILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME:  PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY (2003); Hans 
Toch, The Future of Supermax Confinement, 81 PRISON J. 376 (2001); David Lovell & 
Clark Johnson, Felony and Violent Recidivism Among Supermax Prison Inmates in 
Washington State:  A Pilot Study (Apr. 19, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://www.son.washington.edu/faculty/fac-page-files/LovellSupermaxRecidivism-
4-19-04.pdf; see also Atul Gawande, Hellhole, NEW YORKER, Mar. 30, 2009, at 36, 40 
(documenting the destructive psychological effects of long-term solitary confinement 
and suggesting that such treatment amounts to torture and is counterproductive to the 
reintegration of released offenders). 
86 See THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 52-
53 (describing how the misuse and overuse of segregation work against rehabilitation 
and threaten public safety). 
87 See id. at 15, 66-73 (suggesting improvements such as promoting a culture of 
mutual respect and recruiting a diverse work force); see also SpearIt, supra note 83, at 
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and better training) recruit a more highly qualified and diverse staff 
with lower turnover and higher morale.88 
These are only a few possibilities.  Here are some more: 
 A prison could offer improvements over existing services, 
like better gym equipment, more diverse television  
programming, Internet access,89 or help with writing legal 
petitions.90   
 A prison could offer better programming, such as high-
school and college-level education,91 job training or op-
portunities for voluntary inmate labor, partnerships with 
post-release job placement programs,92 counseling, and 
other rehabilitative programs.93   
 The prison could also adopt policies that might be ex-
pected to yield better results in the long run—one exam-
ple is “merit pay” for the prison warden.94 
 A prison could offer more space per inmate.95 
 
290-93 (reviewing the mental health training provided to correctional officiers in the 
California prison system and finding it lacking). 
88 Cf. THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 70-
73 (citing low pay, demanding hours, inadequate benefits, and stress as obstacles to 
instilling morale and professionalism in correctional officers). 
89 On Internet access, see, for example, Beato, supra note 71, at 16. 
90 Cf. Ira P. Robbins, Ghostwriting:  Filling in the Gaps of Pro Se Prisoners’ Access to the 
Courts, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 291-96 (2010) (advocating that attorneys ghost-
write petitions for pro se prisoners). 
91 See Gregory A. Knott, Cost and Punishment:  Reassessing Incarceration Costs and the 
Value of College-in-Prison Programs, 32 N. ILL. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript 
at 19), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1649164 (describing the recent rise in 
interest for such programs) 
92 For a study of the effectiveness of one such program, see CINDY REDCROSS ET 
AL., WORK AFTER PRISON:  ONE-YEAR FINDINGS FROM THE TRANSITIONAL JOBS REENTRY 
DEMONSTRATION 88-89 (2010). This follow-up report on prison-to-work program par-
ticipants one year later found an increase in temporary, transitional jobs, but few per-
manent placements and a minimal effect on recidivism. 
93 See THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 27-
29 (advocating prison rehabilitation programs that reduce violence and change behav-
ior); see also A New Deal, ECONOMIST, Mar. 22, 2008, at 36 (discussing the success of a 
Texas rehabilitation program that teaches entrepreneurship skills). 
94  Such a scheme might tie the warden’s salary negatively to later recidivism.  See 
Hills, supra note 30; see also Max Taylor & Ken Pease, Private Prisons and Penal Purpose 
(advocating that a “no reconviction” bonus be written into private prison contracts), in 
PRIVATIZING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 179, 189-90 (Roger Matthews ed., 1989); James Slack, 
We’ll Pay Jail Governors to Cut Reoffending, Say Tories, DAILY MAIL (Eng.), Oct. 8, 2008, at 
39, available at 2008 WLNR 19151823 (describing the implementation of “super gover-
nors” who are paid more for each convict who does not reoffend after release). 
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 A prison could facilitate family visits by “providing ample 
space and time, and even assisting with transportation.”96 
 A prison could provide cheaper telephone calling plans 
that would allow more frequent communication between 
inmates and their families.97 
 A prison could be located closer to inmates’ home com-
munities.98 
 A prison could institute an independent system of exter-
nal monitoring with meaningful enforcement, perhaps 
through a nongovernmental organization modeled after 
the International Committee of the Red Cross, which 
“carries out inspections of detention facilities in conflict 
zones worldwide.”99  Implementation of this system might 
involve encouraging politicians, judges, citizens, the me-
dia, and nongovernmental organizations to visit prisons 
and interview prisoners and staff.100 
 A prison could develop a meaningful internal grievance 
system, where complaints are confidential, inmates get 
copies of their grievances, and prisoners and guards are 
protected from retaliation.101 
 A prison could seek accreditation from the American Cor-
rectional Association (ACA), develop its own standards, or 
adopt another organization’s standards.102 
 A prison could allow inmates to sue it—at least in state 
court and on contract grounds—regardless of the PLRA.103 
 
95 See THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 23, 
26-27 (arguing that reducing prison overcrowding will reduce violence). 
96 Id. at 36. 
97 See id. at 36-37 (explaining that prisoners pay more for phone service because 
prisons use telecommunications contracts to generate income). 
98 See id. at 35-36 (arguing that incarcerating offenders closer to their homes will 
improve family and community bonds, which improve the chances that a prisoner will 
succeed after release). 
99 Id. at 82. 
100 See id. at 79-82, 95-99 (advocating external monitoring as a mechanism for im-
proving prisoner safety and curbing abuse). 
101 See id. at 92-94 (discussing the importance of a meaningful grievance system as a 
source of institutional knowledge and as a commitment to procedural justice). 
102 See id. at 88-90 (reviewing and criticizing current standards of professional ac-
countability); see also Developments, supra note 40, at 1888-90 (discussing standards and 
performance-based measures that could be used to measure prison quality).  But see 
Dolovich, supra note 39, at 488-90 (expressing skepticism about the ACA’s willingness 
to engage in reform of accreditation standards). 
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None of these policies requires vouchers.  Any could be adopted by 
reform-minded legislatures or correctional agencies.  Perhaps they all 
should be.  The problem, though, is that (rightly or wrongly) they ha-
ven’t been.  Many reforms are costly; people don’t like inmates, so 
they hesitate to implement reforms that would improve prison life;104 
and bureaucracies are slow to change.105 
Many of these policies would be costly for voucher prisons as well.  
Prisons that adopted such changes would tend to make less profit per 
inmate.  But if inmates value the change enough, the prisons could 
make up for the lower per-inmate profit by attracting more inmates.  
Prisons could also bundle a valued but costly change with a reduction in 
other amenities.  For instance, a prison with better medical care or a 
prison that abolished copayments might locate in cheaper areas further 
from the inmates’ communities or might offer less programming.106 
The inmate’s choice would be limited by security level (minimum, 
medium, or maximum) and gender.  There may also be certain man-
datory conditions attached to the voucher.  For example, a sexual of-
fender might be required to go to a prison with appropriate pro-
grams.  Additionally, mentally ill prisoners may be incapable of choos-
choosing themselves.  But even for the mentally ill, the person who 
chooses the prison need not be a Department of Corrections bureau-
crat.  The inmate’s family or an appointed legal guardian could make 
the choice. 
Having made his choice, the convicted defendant would be sent to 
his requested prison, subject to availability.  A prison system may want 
to guarantee a spot in certain units to certain prisoners:  those with 
particular physical or mental illnesses may need special accommoda-
tion, and a gang member who has informed on his gang may have to 
be sent to a “snitch farm” to avoid reprisals.107  As with schools, popu-
 
103 For prospective relief, the PLRA only covers proceedings “arising under Federal 
law.”  18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2) (2006).  Litigation over contract provisions wouldn’t arise 
under federal law unless the contract explicitly incorporated federal law.  Moreover, 
while the PLRA does regulate consent decrees, id. § 3626(c)(1), it doesn’t regulate pri-
vate settlements, id. § 3626(c)(2), or state law remedies, id. § 3626(d).  The exhaustion 
provisions only apply to suits brought under § 1983 or § 1997e(a).  Id. § 1997e(e).  It 
does not apply to suits brought under a contract, and the limitations on recovery for 
mental or emotional injury only apply to federal civil actions.  Id.  
104 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.  
105 See supra text accompanying notes 12-13. 
106 For bundles that include a waiver of constitutional rights, see infra Section II.B. 
107 See, e.g., KNOX, supra note 21, at 445-46 (describing the protections “snitch 
farms” provide including anonymity, physical isolation, and visual security); George W. 
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lar prisons will have waiting lists, which—provided the voucher 
amount is high enough—would provide an incentive for the prison to 
increase its capacity.108  This growth would be easier because a voucher 
prison wouldn’t need permission to accept new prisoners if it ex-
pands, aside from any necessary local construction permits.109 
Once a prisoner is in a minimally acceptable place, he may want 
to stay, perhaps because of social connections he has forged in prison.  
Therefore, it makes sense to offer the choice before incarceration be-
gins.  But because prisoners may not have enough information to 
make a good choice before they’ve served any time, the voucher sys-
tem should offer at least one transfer after a fixed time period, so that 
prisoners can effectively punish a low-quality prison.  Alternatively, 
there could be transfer possibilities at regular intervals—like open en-
rollment periods for health plans or the natural reenrollment periods 
in schools based on the school year.  One could even imagine trans-
fers at will, though this would involve greater administrative and 
transportation costs.110 
Current policies on involuntary transfers111 could still be used in the 
same way as before, for instance to fight gang activity or otherwise to 
 
Knox, The Problem of Gangs and Security Threat Groups (STG’s) in American Prisons Today:  
A Special NGCRC Report, J. GANG RES., Fall 2004, at 1, 15  (stating that only 14.5% of 
wardens surveyed indicated that their state provided a separate facility for informants); 
see also Dolovich, supra note 74, at 77-78 (describing the California prison system’s 
“sensitive needs yards,” designed for “likely victims of prison violence,” including “gang 
dropouts, sex offenders, prison informants (i.e., ‘snitches’), and anyone else who re-
quests protective custody”). 
108 The idea that a prison would want to have more inmates is key.  Cf. Ladd, supra 
note 1, at 70 (“[S]uccessful schools will be reluctant to expand if doing so requires 
lowering the average socioeconomic or ability level of their students.”).  Requiring 
prisons to take all comers, and accept inmates by lottery if they are oversubscribed, is 
thus an important feature.  See infra Section I.C.  
109 Local communities are often eager for the business.  See Dolovich, supra note 
39, at 539-42 (noting rural community support of prison building as a sustainable form 
of economic development); Eric J. Williams, The Big House in a Small Town:  Prisons, 
Communities, and Economics in Rural America 5 (Apr. 2010) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://ssrn.com/=1580533 (same). 
110 Furthermore, frequent transfers may reduce the incentives that inmates have to 
cooperate with staff and other inmates. 
111 Prisons may, for instance, transfer inmates to relieve overcrowding.  See Bran-
don v. Alaska Dep’t of Corr., 938 P.2d 1029, 1030 (Alaska 1997) (discussing the process 
by which Alaska solicited inmates to be transferred to other states to relieve overcrowd-
ing).  Involuntary transfers have been held not to implicate a liberty interest under the 
Due Process Clause.  See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976) (holding that 
there is no due process right to pretransfer hearing); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 
228 (1976) (holding that the Due Process Clause is not implicated in every change in 
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maintain safety.112  (But the more frequent involuntary transfers are, the 
less attractive the ability to choose one’s initial assignment will be.) 
B.  Choice Is Not the Same as Privatization 
As I’ve mentioned above,113 arguments about choice are often 
merged with arguments about privatization.  Privatization skeptics 
thus may also be skeptics about choice, but this needn’t be the case. 
In the school choice debate, a prominent question has been 
whether religious schools should be allowed to participate.114  This 
question presumes that the school choice plan includes private 
schools since a religious public school would obviously be unconstitu-
tional.  More generally, arguments for school choice often include ar-
guments in favor of private schools.  This is because the factors that 
are claimed to make choice work—chiefly, flexibility, cost savings, and 
responsiveness to market incentives—are claimed to be more present 
in the private than in the public sector.115 
But choice needn’t have anything to do with private provision.  
These are logically distinct policies. 
First, imagine the following scenarios, but ignore private providers. 
 Without choice, everyone could be assigned to a particular 
public school, perhaps their local one.  This also describes 
the current system of incarceration in states without pris-
on privatization,116 as well as state-funded indigent defense 
in most jurisdictions.117 
 
confinement conditions).  In contrast, a due process liberty interest is implicated when 
an inmate is transferred to a mental hospital.  Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-93 (1980). 
112 See infra text accompanying notes 354-56; see also Muhammad v. Carlson, 845 
F.2d 175, 179 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding involuntary transfer to AIDS unit); Philip El-
lenbogen, Beyond the Border:  A Comparative Look at Prison Rape in the United States and 
Canada, 42 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 335, 371 (2009) (proposing a protective process 
including involuntary transfer for rape victims). 
113 See supra text accompanying note 69. 
114 See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004) (holding that a state may ex-
clude ministry education from a publicly funded college scholarship plan); Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002) (holding that a state may include religious 
schools in a publicly funded voucher plan).  
115 In the prison context, see Charles W. Thomas, Correctional Privatization in Amer-
ica:  An Assessment of Its Historical Origins, Present Status, and Future Prospects (character-
izing private firms as more flexibile and open to change than government agencies), in 
CHANGING THE GUARD:  PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE CONTROL OF CRIME 57, 93 (Alexan-
der Tabarrok ed., 2003). 
116  Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, 
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 Alternatively, one could have a choice program within the 
public system alone, for example, one that offered vouch-
ers limited to public schools.118  Magnet and charter 
schools are also a form of public school choice. 
Now suppose some services are provided privately. 
 Even then, one could have privatization without choice.  
For instance, a private company, like Edison Learning 
(formerly Edison Schools), could become the superinten-
dent of an existing, choiceless public school system.119  
This structure is also evident in the W-2 program for wel-
fare in Wisconsin,120 the current prison privatization re-
gime,121 assigned private counsel for indigent defend-
ants,122 and a regional health facility to which Arizona has 
delegated the entirety of its health care responsibilities 
under the Medicaid statute.123 
 Alternatively, one could have choice within a regime of 
partly or wholly private provision.  Food stamps are a clas-
sic example of such a program since the government plays 
 
Rhode Island, Utah, and West Virginia have no prisoners in private facilities.  
HEATHER C. WEST ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 
23167, PRISONERS IN 2009, at 34 app. tbl.20 (2010).  
117 See Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 102 & n.93 (noting that most juris-
dictions do not allow the indigent to select defense counsel from among those eligible). 
118 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 7225–7225g (2006); CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE AD-
VANCEMENT OF TEACHING, SCHOOL CHOICE:  A SPECIAL REPORT, at xvi, 1-2, 29-62 
(1992) (arguing for choice to be limited to the public school system); Richard D. 
Kahlenberg, Public School Choice:  Student Achievement, Integration, Democracy, and Public 
Support (similar), in PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE VS. PRIVATE SCHOOL VOUCHERS 137, 137-
52 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2003). 
119 See, e.g., Reitz, supra note 45, at 108-10 (discussing Edison’s management of 
schools in Philadelphia); see also, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 832 (1982) 
(discussing a state-funded private school specializing in the education of special-needs 
students referred by public school districts or the Department of Mental Health); 
Logiodice v. Trs. of Me. Cent. Inst., 296 F.3d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 2002) (stating that the 
school district did not operate schools, but contracted secondary education to “a pri-
vately operated high school in the district”). 
120 See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1385-
88 (2003) (reviewing the growing privatization of welfare systems using Wisconsin as 
the primary example). 
121 Developments, supra note 40, at 1867. 
122 See Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 92-96 (reviewing the assigned coun-
sel approach to indigent defendants); see also HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 
165-66 (Warner Books 1982) (1960) (discussing an attorney’s appointment to repre-
sent an indigent criminal defendant). 
123 See J.K. ex rel. R.K. v. Dillenberg, 836 F. Supp. 694, 697-99 (D. Ariz. 1993). 
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no significant role in food distribution.124  Consider also 
drug or alcohol abuse rehabilitation125 and traffic school, 
where defendants are sentenced to the program but can 
then choose (with or without government funding) 
among a range of providers, many of which are private.  In 
England, Wales, and Ontario, indigent defendants choose 
their own private defense attorneys using public funds.126  
And, of course, school choice proposals often include pri-
vate schools. 
This last option of choice with at least partial private provision is the 
one imagined most often, and so I’ll primarily use private-sector exam-
ples.127  But it should be clear that we can have privatization without 
choice and choice without privatization.  All four possible schemes exist 
in the real world.  Thus, choice is an option, whether in schools, pris-
ons, or elsewhere, even if one is hostile to private provision. 
C.  Funding 
As with school vouchers, the prison voucher amount simply could 
be a percentage of the average cost of incarceration at public pris-
ons.128  If the program is to include private prisons, the percentage 
 
124 See Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Privatization and Accountability, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1447 (2003) (discussing the evolution from direct to indirect 
provision of food subsidies to the poor).  
125 See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880, 881-82 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (concerning public funding of a private halfway house). 
126 Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 110 & nn.123-24 (noting jurisdictions 
where an indigent defendant may choose his own counsel). 
127 Note, though, that nonprofit prisons may also be an option.  See Daniel L. Low, 
Nonprofit Private Prisons:  The Next Generation of Prison Management, 29 NEW ENG. J. ON 
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 5-8 (2003) (proposing nonprofit prisons as an option for 
reform); Richard Moran, Op-Ed., A Third Option:  Nonprofit Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 
1997, at 23 (opining on the benefits of prison management by nonprofit foundations).  
For discussions of the advantages of nonprofit schools, see Byron W. Brown, Why Gov-
ernments Run Schools, 11 ECON. EDUC. REV. 287, 293-96 (1992), and John Morley, Note, 
For-Profit and Nonprofit Charter Schools:  An Agency Cost Approach, 115 YALE L.J. 1782, 1795-
810 (2006). 
128 In school voucher plans, the value of the voucher is set at a percentage below 
one-hundred percent of per-pupil expenditure.  See JOHN MERRIFIELD, CATO INST., 
POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 616, DISMAL SCIENCE:  THE SHORTCOMINGS OF U.S. SCHOOL 
CHOICE RESEARCH AND HOW TO ADDRESS THEM 46 (2008) (explaining that in “option-
demand” programs, school vouchers are worth less than the public schools’ per-pupil 
funding); Hoxby, supra note 1, at 15 (“[T]he typical voucher in the US is worth be-
tween 14 and 29 percent of per-pupil expenditure in the local public schools.”).  Pub-
lic school funding and voucher funding are typically separate, so if someone switches 
from a public to a private school, the private school gets the voucher amount, but the 
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would have to be high enough to induce enough prisons to partici-
pate in order to yield meaningful competition. 
The voucher amount could be determined in more complicated 
ways.  The amount could be determined by an inmate-specific formula 
based on as many observable characteristics of the inmate as are per-
missible to consider, such as disability level,129 sex, age, security level, 
nature of the crime, known psychological or medical conditions, and 
known history of violence.130 
The voucher amount also could vary with the prison at which it is 
redeemed.  The amount might depend on how many inmates the 
prison already has.  Thus, if initial inmates are expensive but addi-
tional inmates (up to some limit related to the capacity of the prison) 
are less costly to serve, the voucher amount at a prison could start 
high and decline as the number of inmates increases.  But this ap-
proach would have costs of its own:  it would require that the govern-
ment monitor prisons’ costs to ensure honest pricing, and it would 
discourage the expansion of successful prisons by penalizing prisons 
with more inmates. 
Before talking further about funding, we should determine how 
prisons should be able to pick and choose among inmates, if they 
should be able to do so at all.  Clearly, all prisons can’t choose the in-
mates they prefer because they might all reject the same inmates.  
Consequently, there must be at least one prison of last resort, perhaps 
a public prison, although one could imagine a private firm willing to 
serve in this capacity.  If some prisons can choose, they’ll probably be 
better informed than the government about the characteristics of the 
inmate, if for no other reason than that some factors that are probably 
correlated with the cost of incarceration, like race, may well be im-
permissible for the government to include in the voucher-
 
public school’s funding doesn’t decrease by the amount of the voucher.  See id.  For a 
discussion of the importance of the voucher amount for the participation of multiple 
providers, see Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 569.  Of course, the percentage is en-
dogenous to each school voucher program.  See infra text accompanying note 380. 
129 For a discussion of how the analogous issue of special education would fare un-
der school choice, with stress on the need to fund special education adequately to in-
duce schools to compete for such students, see Julie Berry Cullen & Steven G. Rivkin, 
The Role of Special Education in School Choice, in THE ECONOMICS OF SCHOOL CHOICE, 
supra note 70, at 67, 69-70, 98-101.    
130 The school voucher program at issue in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris provided a 
percentage of private-school tuition up to a cap, with the percentage varying according 
to family income.  536 U.S. 646, 639 (2002); see also Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 
8, at 113-17 (discussing alternate funding mechanisms for indigent defense, including 
lump-sum payments and hourly rates). 
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determination formula.  Thus these prisons will consider more factors 
than those used in the formula that determines the voucher amount. 
Prisons that can choose will systematically reject inmates with in-
sufficient vouchers, placing the burden of incarcerating these inmates 
on the prison of last resort.  Perhaps in future rounds of voucher-
amount determination, the government will be able to correct past mis-
takes, but in general, voucher prisons will have an advantage over the 
government in determining the true cost of incarcerating an inmate. 
Therefore, it may make sense to require participating prisons to 
take all comers, with a lottery system used to admit prisoners if the 
prison has a waiting list.  Prisons might still be allowed to serve partic-
ular categories of persons—a company might specialize in women’s 
prisons, or prisons for inmates with particular medical or psychologi-
cal problems—but at least within those categories, prisons shouldn’t 
be able to pick and choose accepted inmates.  In this scenario, the on-
ly burden on the government is to make the voucher amount for each 
prisoner category generous enough that, on average, inmates in that 
category are worthwhile for private prisons to incarcerate. 
So far, I have assumed that the voucher amount—however deter-
mined—for a particular type of inmate at a given prison is a flat fee.  
But voucher amounts could be even more complicated.  As an alterna-
tive to a flat fee, one could imagine a “per service” voucher amount, 
where the government pays a fee that varies with the number of medi-
cal visits, disruptions, etc.  However, assuming the per-service amount 
is generous enough to exceed the cost of providing the service, this 
type of system would give prisons incentives to oversupply the service 
and in turn require the government to incur heavy monitoring costs 
to avoid having to pay for too many unnecessary services.131 
I only mention alternatives to flat fees to illustrate the variety of 
conceivable funding schemes.  From now on I’ll assume that vouchers 
 
131 Cf. Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 116-17 (discussing an “hourly-rate” 
approach to indigent defense and explaining the drawbacks to such a scheme, includ-
ing costly government monitoring).  Another possibility would be to institute an auc-
tion system, in which prisons would bid on each prisoner, who would then be issued a 
voucher sufficient to cover a certain number of bids.  For instance, if prison A is willing 
to handle prisoner X for $30/day, prison B would require $35/day, prison C would re-
quire $40/day, and prison D would require $45/day, prisoner X could be issued a 
voucher worth $40/day and would be allowed to choose among prisons A, B, and C.  
An auction system would allow prisons to reject inmates while still allowing for compe-
tition.  But this might be too complicated from an administrative standpoint and 
would also require a prison of last resort in case all prisons demanded a fee that the 
government considered excessive. 
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are structured as a flat fee and that prisons are unable to reject in-
mates who fall within the category the prison serves. 
The voucher would replace the current arrangements by which 
private prisons are reimbursed.  If an inmate chooses a particular 
prison, the prison gains the voucher amount as revenue, and, if the 
inmate transfers out, the prison loses that amount. 
For public prisons, the financial impact of the gain or loss of a 
prisoner is less clear.  Public schools under voucher plans often con-
tinue to be funded out of general revenues, without any explicit ac-
counting of how many students attend the school.132  Whether a public 
school loses money when it loses a voucher student to a private school 
depends on the details of the school finance system.  Some school 
voucher plans are structured so that public schools don’t suffer at all 
from losing students.133  In school systems with “pseudo-choice plans,” 
successful schools experienced a fall in funding because “money does 
not follow students or so little money follows students that a school 
accepting an extra student cannot cover its marginal costs.”134  The 
public-prison funding system under a voucher system should probably 
avoid such perverse incentives.  If public schools, or prisons, don’t lose 
money when they lose “customers,” we shouldn’t expect competition 
to improve the quality of the public system.135  Not reducing the public 
system’s funding when people leave also increases the total cost of the 
system;136 on the other hand, an argument in favor of such a system is 
that it might be a political concession to public employees.  I would 
suggest that public and private prisons be funded by vouchers in the 
same way, with each individual prisoner in the prison associated with a 
specified funding amount. 
 
132 Hoxby, supra note 1, at 18.  Competition is further hindered because “schools are 
not able to enter, expand, contract, or exit [or] schools need to seek approval or finan-
cial support from other schools with which they are supposed to compete.”  Id.; see also id. 
at 24 (explaining that most school choice reforms failed to satisfy competitive criteria 
where perverse incentives were created); infra text accompanying notes 135, 143. 
133 Hoxby, supra note 1, at 18. 
134 Id.  
135 See id. at 18 n.1 (discussing the failure of these types of plans and the lack of 
incentives they provide to schools to improve). 
136 But cf. Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 113 (noting that a pure lump-
sum indigent defense voucher system “would cost no more than the prior system of 
representation”). 
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The analogy with schools or food stamps suggests that prisoners 
could be allowed to supplement their voucher with their own funds,137 
but this probably isn’t a good idea on ethical grounds—I’ve noted the 
inegalitarianism of California’s “offender self-pay” program138—despite 
its possible efficiency benefits.139 
D.  Statutory Restrictions 
Suppose the prison choice plan includes private prisons.  What 
regulations would govern them?  We may focus on two possibilities: 
 anyone may establish a prison, subject to certain security 
requirements;140 or, 
 the government may choose who may operate a prison, 
but the allocation of prisoners to prisons would proceed 
by choice rather than by bureaucratic assignment.141 
By analogy to schools, one could imagine a system of “charter 
prisons,” prisons that are public but that have significant independ-
ence from the Department of Corrections.142  Like charter schools, 
charter prisons could operate without regard to the presence of pri-
 
137 The school program in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris only covered a portion of tui-
tion, leaving parents responsible for a copayment.  536 U.S. 639, 646 (2002).   
138 See supra text accompanying note 66-67. 
139 Cf. John R. Lott, Jr., Do We Punish High Income Criminals Too Heavily?, 30 ECON. 
INQ. 583, 586-99 (1992) (arguing that the rich already face the highest expected penal-
ties, even when lower conviction rates are taken into account, because of the great ef-
fect of conviction on their future earnings); John R. Lott, Jr., Should the Wealthy Be Able 
to “Buy Justice”?, 95 J. POL. ECON. 1307, 1310 (1987) (arguing that it may be efficient for 
the rich to reduce their probability of criminal conviction through payment for high-
quality legal services).  There may also be retributive value in letting the rich off more 
lightly, if one wants to equalize the “subjective experience of punishment” and if rich 
people are, on average, more sensitive because they’re more accustomed to luxurious 
lifestyles.  See Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
182, 230-35 (2009) (explaining that if one accepts that people suffer in proportion to 
their blameworthiness, then rich people deserve a “subjectively equal but objectively 
less severe punishment” than poor people).  But see Martin H. Pritikin, Fine-Labor:  The 
Symbiosis Between Monetary and Work Sanctions, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 343, 353 (2010) (jus-
tifying sanctions based on income and wealth because they “help ensure a proportion-
ate impact on all offenders”). 
140 Cf. Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 112-17 (noting that in “voucher 
models” of indigent defense, legal service providers could be public or private, provid-
ed that they comply with certain threshold requirements and ethical standards). 
141 Cf. id. at 101-12 (explaining that in an indigent defense “deregulation” scheme, 
the government would continue to designate public defenders, but each defendant 
could choose his own defense counsel). 
142 See Hoxby, supra note 1, at 15-17. 
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vate providers.  This could increase the possibility that choice within 
the public system will improve public prisons.143 
Once the universe of providers is determined as above, prisons 
could be governed by most of the same statutes and regulations that 
currently exist.  However, one sort of statute that may now be moot 
would be the sort that requires private prisons to achieve particular 
cost savings or quality improvements relative to public prisons.144  The 
quality improvement requirement would be replaced by prisoner 
choice.  Quality would no longer be defined by an externally imposed 
yardstick (like the Logan quality of confinement index145), and each 
prison could pursue its own vision of quality, just as each prisoner 
could have his own view of what constitutes quality.  Litigation over 
quality, like floor space assignments or grievance procedures, would 
become contractual disputes.  Arguably, this would benefit prisoners 
because they would be in a better position to litigate as contractual 
partners than as prisoners.146 
Nonetheless, just as the government requires minimum standards 
for private schools,147 nothing prevents quality regulations from serv-
ing as a floor.  There may also be a role for continuing monitoring to 
prevent prisons from reneging on the promises they make in their ad-
vertising.  Shady, venal, incompetent, and sadistic operators will, after 
all, always be with us, even in the presence of competitive markets.  In 
many competitive markets, consumer choice, litigation, and word of 
mouth are sufficient to keep such operators in line.  If these mecha-
nisms work well for prisons, so much the better; but given that in-
mates are stuck in their prison at least for a while, that a bad prison 
experience is worse than a bad hotel stay, and that prisoners’ com-
 
143 Cf. supra text accompanying note 140-41. 
144 See Developments, supra note 40, at 1873 n.38 (citing statutes requiring private 
prisons to attain numerical cost and quality targets). 
145 See RICHARD W. HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 113-
15 (1997) (describing Charles Logan’s factors for assessing prison quality, such as se-
curity, activity, and justice); see also Developments, supra note 40, at 1889-90 (advocating 
performance-based contracts and suggesting the Logan index, among other possibili-
ties, as a measure of performance).  
146 The possibility that courts might be less deferential to private prisons may partly 
explain this.  But conceivably litigation with a public prison might also be contract-
based.  See Developments, supra note 40, at 1879-83 (addressing the legal accountability 
of private prisons in comparison to public prisons in light of the immunity exceptions 
for the latter). 
147 See, e.g., E. Vance Randall, Private Schools and State Regulation, 24 URB. LAW. 341, 
369-70 (1992) (evaluating the efficiency of private-school regulation). 
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plaints aren’t always credible, it may be better to err on the side of 
greater market policing. 
Under a voucher system, there is also an argument for govern-
ment regulation to provide a ceiling for quality, lest prisons become so 
good from the prisoners’ perspectives that prison’s deterrent value is 
reduced.  Similarly, increases in “quality” (from the prisoners’ per-
spectives) that are socially harmful will also have to be regulated.  But 
more on this later.148 
As for cost savings, this requirement is probably unnecessary be-
cause there’s already a strong incentive to cut costs under any fixed-
reimbursement scheme.149  In addition, the government can reduce 
the voucher amount if it believes there’s sufficient competition for 
prisoners at a given voucher amount. 
The voucher system could also change how prisons enter, exit, 
contract, and expand.  Currently, private prison firms win contracts 
and then build prisons to fulfill these contracts, or build the prisons in 
advance, hoping to win the contracts to use them.150  Under a voucher 
system,151 firms would still need to get local building or zoning permis-
sion,152 but otherwise they’d only need to convince the prisoners them-
selves.  As noted above, and assuming the market worked correctly, 
popular prisons would have waiting lists and be able to expand without 
having to ask permission from the Department of Corrections, while 
 
148 See infra text accompanying note 361. 
149 See Oliver Hart et al., The Proper Scope of Government:  Theory and an Application to 
Prisons, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1127, 1152-54 (1997) (discussing the incentives of private pro-
viders to cut costs compared to their public counterparts); Developments, supra note 40, 
at 1875-77 (presenting data from three studies showing cost savings in privatization 
and roughly comparable quality to public prisons).  But see MCDONALD ET AL., supra 
note 40, at 33-34 (arguing that private prisons may not save money, but that current 
empirical studies are inadequate to test the proposition); Brad W. Lundahl et al., Pris-
on Privatization:  A Meta-Analysis of Cost and Quality of Confinement Indicators, 19 RES. ON 
SOC. WORK PRAC. 383, 393 (2009) (finding that cost savings from privatization appear 
minimal). 
150 See Thomas, supra note 115, at 87 (“In 1998 . . . CCA assessed the need for pris-
oner housing space . . . to be so great that it committed more than $100 million of pri-
vate capital to construct a 2,304-bed medium-security prison . . . without any contract 
that guaranteed the utilization of the facility.”).   
151 Whether entrance and exit is as easy as expansion and contraction of existing 
facilities depends on whether we’re in a “voucher” or “deregulation” model.  See supra 
notes 140-41 and accompanying text. 
152 See supra text accompanying notes 108-09. 
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unpopular prisons would contract or close.153  I discuss the constitu-
tional regime that would govern voucher prisons immediately below. 
II.  VOUCHERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FLEXIBILITY 
In this Part, I explain how prison vouchers would increase prisons’ 
constitutional flexibility in two ways.  First, they would make faith-
based prisons—which, as currently constituted, likely violate the Estab-
lishment Clause—fully constitutional.  Second, even though prisons 
are always state actors and must respect inmates’ constitutional rights, 
a voucher regime would give prisons somewhat greater leeway to offer 
inmates valued benefits in exchange for the waiver of some constitu-
tional rights.154 
A.  The Constitutionality of Faith-Based Prisons 
Faith-based prisons today face a number of constitutional hurdles:  
depending on the program, faith-based prisons may have the effect of 
advancing religion, either through funding or through mere en-
dorsement; they may “coerce” religious practice by offering greater 
benefits within the religious program; and they may delegate govern-
mental power to religious organizations.  Avoiding these problems 
might be possible, but it would be difficult. 
But under vouchers, these problems would largely disappear.  
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris establishes that, when money is funneled to 
religious providers by the independent choice of beneficiaries, there 
is no government advancement or endorsement of religion.155  Coer-
cion and delegation become moot when inmates choose freely among 
a wide range of providers chosen without reference to religion. 
1.  Religious Effects 
One way that the government can inappropriately advance reli-
gion is by reimbursing the religious organization’s expenses.  For di-
rect reimbursement to be constitutional, the organization’s program 
 
153 Cf. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(i) (2006) (stating that a failing school can be 
closed down and reopened as a public charter school).  Of course, arrangements 
would have to be made for the prisoners incarcerated in a prison that is closing, but 
this is no different from the issues presented under the current system when a private 
prison goes bankrupt. 
154 For a more developed version of this argument, see Volokh, Constitutional Possi-
bilities, supra note 12, at 1006-10.  
155 536 U.S. 639, 652-53 (2002). 
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can’t be dominated by religious material.156  The aid has to be “offered 
to a broad range of groups or persons without regard to their reli-
gion.”157  And the criteria for choosing the programs cannot be related 
to religion.158  Even a small number of programs could be prohibitively 
resource intensive, especially if they are residential. 
All these problems would no longer be relevant under a voucher 
system.  Direct reimbursement wouldn’t be an issue anymore, so reli-
gious content wouldn’t need to be diluted.  Vouchers would fall with-
in the permissive scope of Zelman, because inmates, not prisons or 
program providers, would receive the benefits.  Provided the voucher 
would be available to any prison that provided adequate security or 
otherwise satisfied certain technical requirements, neutral choice of 
providers would be automatic. 
Vouchers would also solve the resource problem.  Because in-
mates could select one prison over another, the choice available to 
them would span the entire system, even if each prison had no more 
than one religious program.  Therefore, no prison would be obligated 
to offer multiple programs. 
“Endorsement” is not limited to monetary aid.  But under Zelman, 
vouchers cure any endorsement:  in a voucher program, the “inci-
dental advancement of a religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of 
a religious message, is reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, 
not to the government.”159 
Finally, one might wonder whether Zelman applies to prisons, 
which, unlike schools,160 are always state actors under the “traditional 
public function” doctrine.161  If the government itself can’t teach any 
religious doctrine as true, why can a private religious prison?  The 
 
156 See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution, 
55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 88-89 (2005) (“[T]eaching about the truth or falsity of particular 
religious commitments, or encouraging (or discouraging) faith in particular beliefs, 
crosses the constitutional line into impermissible indoctrination.”). 
157 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
158 See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 207-12 (1948) (finding 
a constitutional violation where a public school hosted teachers of specific religions who 
offered voluntary weekly religion classes, even though a secular alternative was available). 
159 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652 (emphasis added). 
160 See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-43 (1982) (illustrating that a 
school for maladjusted students operating principally on public funds is not a state ac-
tor in the employment context). 
161 See, e.g., Rosborough v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459, 460-61 (5th Cir. 
2003) (“Private prison-management companies and their employees are subject to  
§ 1983 liability because they are performing a government function traditionally re-
served to the state.”). 
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state action doctrine shows us how to solve this problem:  when state 
action is found in a particular context, it doesn’t mean that the actor 
is a state actor in all contexts.  Rather, a finding of state action means 
that the particular action is “fairly attributable to the State”162 or 
“chargeable to the State,”163 and that the state is “responsible for the 
specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.”164 
Because private prisons fulfill the exclusively public function of 
incarceration, their incarcerative functions, like restricting prisoners’ 
freedoms and meting out punishment, constitute state action.  But in 
a voucher system, their offer of religious services does not.165 
2.  Coercion 
Though faith-based prison programs are voluntary, modern Estab-
lishment Clause doctrine nonetheless prohibits them as “coercive” if 
they involve “subtle coercive pressure,”166 or if they force participants 
to make a “difficult choice”167 and “forfeit . . . benefits as the price of 
resisting conformance to state-sponsored religious practice.”168 
Programs that offer “a better possibility of parole”169 or reduced 
security restrictions170 may be coercive.  A great enough quality differ-
ence might be coercive, but this is less likely if vouchers are used, 
since Zelman already requires, for “true private choice,”171 that the sec-
ular options be “adequate substitutes”172 for the religious options, even 
if they might “not be superior . . . in every respect.”173 
The doctrine thus contains a built-in mechanism to prevent secu-
lar options from becoming too unattractive.  Moreover, the govern-
ment could fulfill its secular-quality maintenance duty differently un-
 
162 Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). 
163 Id. at 937. 
164 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). 
165 For further discussion of the state action doctrine as related to prison vouchers, 
see Volokh, Constitutional Possibilities, supra note 12, at 1006-10. 
166 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992). 
167 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000). 
168 Lee, 505 U.S. at 596. 
169 Richard R.W. Fields, Perks for Prisoners Who Pray:  Using the Coercion Test to Decide 
Establishment Clause Challenges to Faith-Based Prison Units, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 541, 561. 
170 See Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that “classification 
to a higher security risk category” if an inmate didn’t attend a religious program was a 
severe enough penalty to amount to coercion). 
171 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002). 
172 Id. at 670 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
173 Id.  
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der a voucher system than it does today.  No longer will the govern-
ment have to guarantee attractive options at the same prison; because of 
inmate choice, the government needs merely to ensure that, system-
wide, the secular system is sufficiently comparable. 
The government could fulfill this requirement by running a sys-
tem of secular public prisons.  But even in a world where the govern-
ment disengages from private provision and where all prisons are pri-
vate voucher operations, the government could still fulfill its duty by 
contracting with prisons to accommodate prisoners who want an ade-
quate secular alternative. 
3.  Delegation of Governmental Power 
Delegation may also be problematic.  A religious organization’s 
management of a residential wing of a prison might violate the Estab-
lishment Clause because it could “enmesh[] churches in the exercise 
of substantial governmental powers,”174 which would independently 
violate the Establishment Clause.  The Supreme Court has most prom-
inently used this doctrine in two cases.  First, in Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 
it struck down a Massachusetts statute allowing churches to veto liquor 
license applications for establishments located near a church:175  the 
Establishment Clause forbids an arrangement whereby “important, 
discretionary governmental powers” are “delegated to or shared with 
religious institutions.”176  Next, in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village 
School District v. Grumet, the Court struck down a New York statute 
drawing a special school district to coincide with an insular religious 
community.177  The Court held that the statute “allocat[ed] political 
power on a religious criterion.”178  
Is running a wing of a prison a governmental power?  Perhaps so.  
As long as the officials of the religious organization maintain order in 
their wing, keep track of disciplinary infractions, and perform similar 
penal functions, the delegation problem plausibly may arise. 
But vouchers would eliminate this problem.  Neutrality is the key 
factor:  as the Court held in Kiryas Joel, the problem was that the legis-
 
174 Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126 (1982). 
175 Id. at 126-27 (holding that the statute violated the Establishment Clause). 
176 Id. at 127. 
177 512 U.S. 687, 690-92 (1994) (discussing the process that culminated in the crea-
tion of a special carve-out school district comprising members of the Satmar Hasidic 
community). 
178 Id. at 690. 
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lature had “fail[ed] to exercise governmental authority in a religiously 
neutral way.”179 
4.  The Future of Faith-Based Prisons 
For a program to comply with the Establishment Clause, it must 
solve the problems discussed above.  The religious component must 
be watered down. Providers must be chosen neutrally. Secular  
programs must be available.  Religious programs must not offer signif-
icantly greater benefits, and program officials must not maintain or-
der and discipline. 
Perhaps one can’t fulfill all these conditions and still have a real 
faith-based program.  Some programs might be constitutional; for in-
stance, the Federal Bureau of Prisons runs a program called Life 
Connections, which “hires spiritual guides of different faiths, links 
inmates with mentors of their own faith, and provides no special privi-
leges to participants.”180  But if that’s constitutional, it is because it 
combines a secular program with extensive extracurricular use of con-
stitutionally innocuous chaplains and volunteers. 
But whether or not the current regime could constitutionally sup-
port faith-based prisons, vouchers would make faith-based prison pro-
grams much more clearly valid.181 
B.  Beyond the Establishment Clause 
A voucher system affects more than just faith-based prisons.  Sup-
pose a prison wants to save money or improve security by banning in-
coming mail or eliminating its grievance system. 
Under current law, this would violate prisoners’ constitutional 
rights.  But what if prisons merely offered these “features” to prisoners, 
perhaps as part of a package that might include other benefits like 
better health care or gym facilities? 
 
179 Id. at 703. 
180 Patrick B. Cates, Comment, Faith-Based Prisons and the Establishment Clause:  The 
Constitutionality of Employing Religion as an Engine of Correctional Policy, 41 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 777, 824-25 (2005). 
181 Whether they reduce recidivism or not is another question.  See generally Volokh, 
supra note 48 (reviewing available empirical studies of faith-based prisons and conclud-
ing that there’s no strong reason to believe that faith-based prisons work).  On whether 
faith-based prisons might be affirmatively harmful, see infra text accompanying notes 
331-40. 
VOLOKH REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2012  7:15 PM 
2012] Prison Vouchers 817 
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine governs state actors’ 
ability to “offer” such “deals.”  Vouchers would probably allow prisons 
to offer such deals to a greater extent than is allowed today.  The un-
constitutional conditions doctrine serves the purpose, among others, 
of making sure that governments don’t abuse their power, and when 
prisons compete with each other, the risk of such abuse is reduced. 
1.  The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine 
It’s one thing to say that there are certain rights the government 
may not abridge, but quite another to say that the government may 
never induce the waiver of those rights by the offer of benefits.  The 
government presumably can’t prevent a private school from banning 
interracial dating through its disciplinary code, but it may deny such a 
school a charitable tax exemption.182  The federal government might 
not be able to force states to adopt a minimum drinking age of twenty-
one, but it may offer federal highway funds to states that do.183  
Whether the government may conduct a warrantless search of a pro-
bationer depends on whether such a search is “reasonable” in a broad 
sense;184 a probationer’s consent to such warrantless searches as a con-
dition of his probation, while it may not validate all such searches, at 
the very least makes them likely to be found reasonable.185 
These examples all take the form of “deals” or “contracts,” and in-
volve three steps.  First, someone holds a constitutional right.  Second, 
the government controls a benefit which it is under no obligation to 
grant.  Third, the government offers the benefit conditioned on a 
waiver of the right. 
The law has neither endorsed such conditions wholesale, nor 
banned them entirely.  Instead, it has steered a middle course and dis-
tinguished valid conditions from “unconstitutional conditions.”186 
Consider how this might operate in prisons.  Take a right that is 
not very valuable to the inmate and that the prison would like the in-
mate to waive.  For instance, the prison might want its sex offender 
 
182 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604-05 (1983).  
183 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (“Even if Congress might lack 
the power to impose a national minimum drinking age directly, we conclude  
that encouragement to state action . . . is a valid use of the spending power.”). 
184 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
185 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 114, 119-20 (2001).  
186 See, e.g., Doyle v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 543 (1876) (Bradley, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that a state may not impose unconstitutional conditions on foreign cor-
porations transacting business within the state). 
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inmates to participate in a treatment program.  Further suppose the 
prison also wants these inmates to take responsibility for past-
uncharged crimes187—perhaps because admitting responsibility im-
proves the benefit an inmate receives from the treatment program.  
Most sex offenders would probably comply with the condition because 
no one will know if they omit undiscovered sex crimes.  Even if the 
prisoners object to the condition, they likely prefer the proposed ben-
efit more.  The Supreme Court held that this deal was valid188—but 
one can think up other deals that are not.189 
2.  Vouchers and the Rationale of Unconstitutional Conditions 
Why have such a doctrine?  Kathleen Sullivan articulates a system-
ic rationale:  banning certain deals is necessary to preserve, among 
other things, “the overall distribution of power between government 
and rightholders.”190  Her most interesting argument, for our purpos-
es, is the following: 
Preferred constitutional liberties generally declare desirable some realm 
of autonomy that should remain free from government encroachment.  
Government freedom to redistribute power over presumptively auton-
omous decisions from the citizenry to itself through the leverage of 
permissible spending or regulation would jeopardize that realm.
191
  
The danger of the government acquiring power over benefit re-
cipients is heightened in prisons.  Prisoners’ constitutional rights are 
quite minimal.  Generally, actual prison conditions fall short of being 
unconstituitional.  This is good from a prisoner’s perspective, but it 
also means that the government can exercise significant leverage over 
the inmate. 
Prison officials can already make an inmate’s prison experience 
much less pleasant with no oversight simply by underinvesting in secu-
 
187 See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 30-31 (2002) (plurality opinion) (describing a 
Kansas prison’s sex offender treatment program which required inmates to sign an 
“Admission of Responsibility” form). 
188 See id. at 44-45 (allowing a state to require an inmate to choose between partici-
pation in a treatment program and losing certain prison privileges, and holding that 
such a choice “does not amount to compulsion”).  
189 See Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a state 
Department of Corrections couldn’t force an inmate to give up accrued interest on 
prison savings accounts as a condition of continued prison employment). 
190 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 
1490 (1989). 
191 Id.   
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rity and health care—thus avoiding the deliberate indifference that 
constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation192—and by removing any-
thing that isn’t part of an inmate’s liberty interest and therefore isn’t 
subject to the Due Process Clause.193  Or, at least, they can threaten to 
do so—and then offer those benefits back to the inmate in exchange 
for a waiver of certain troublesome constitutional rights. 
However, in a world with prison vouchers, where prisons compete 
and prisoners choose, the risks of abuse are much less.  In fact, we 
may face a quite different problem:  that voucher prisons will become 
too cushy, undermining the deterrent value of a criminal sentence.194  
There is always a danger that prisons will improperly pressure inmates 
to waive their rights, but this danger is surely attenuated in a competi-
tive context. 
Recall, too, that the government is responsible for making sure 
that every inmate has a fully constitutionally compliant prison experi-
ence, if he wants one.  This means not only that every inmate is enti-
tled to secularity on demand, but also that every inmate is entitled to 
have a spot in a prison where the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
applies in full force.  This is necessary to avoid the unacceptable pro-
spect that all prisons might demand that their inmates waive their 
rights. The guarantee of constitutional compliance should further 
make us comfortable that deals offered by prisons aren’t illegitimate. 
III.  VOUCHERS AND PRISON QUALITY 
A.  The Potential Benefits of Vouchers 
Let me recap how vouchers could improve prison quality.  Under 
a voucher system, inmates would be free to choose a particular prison, 
and they would tend to choose prisons that best satisfied their own 
preferences.  This choice might be very different from the one made 
under the current system by prison officials, whose humanity and pro-
 
192 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1976) (“In order to state a cogniza-
ble claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence de-
liberate indifference to serious medical needs.”). 
193 See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976) (“As long as the conditions 
or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence im-
posed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process 
Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial 
oversight.”). 
194 See infra subsection III.B.3. 
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fessionalism can’t always be taken for granted,195 and whose interests 
don’t necessarily align with those of the prisoners.196  This choice 
might also be different from the one made by judges who may be 
steering prisoners to particular prisons for political reasons,197 and 
who may actually be opposed to prisoner welfare. 
If inmates’ preferences are very heterogeneous, this could just re-
sult in a reallocation of inmates among prisons, creating a better 
match between prisons and inmates.  That alone would be a signifi-
cant benefit from the prisoners’ point of view, even if some objective 
measure of “quality” didn’t rise.198 
But many amenities are likely to be broadly desired:  safety, good 
medical care, less high-security segregation, better activities and pro-
gramming, and more floor space.199  Inmates may also value opportu-
nities to work, which may reduce recidivism.200 
It therefore seems reasonable to expect that prisons, if forced to 
compete for prisoners, will offer these broadly desired amenities; I’ve 
 
195 See John J. DiIulio, Jr., What’s Wrong with Private Prisons, PUB. INT., Summer 
1988, at 66, 77-78 (describing some prison administrators as “uncaring” and highlight-
ing competent administration as a key attribute of successful prisons). 
196 Cf. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 419 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(discussing how state officials overseeing private prisons may focus on minimizing cost 
above all other considerations); Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 83-89 (high-
lighting conflicts of interest between indigent defendants and the current mechanism 
for selecting a public defender). 
197 Cf. Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 111 (arguing that judges steer indi-
gent counsel appointments in part based on political reasons, including courthouse 
budgetary constraints and who supported the judge politically). 
198 See infra text accompanying note 277; cf. Caroline M.  Hoxby, Does Competition 
Among Public Schools Benefit Students and Taxpayers?, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 1209, 1209 
(2000) (“Choice may also allow students to self-sort among schools in a manner that 
facilitates learning—for instance, a disabled child may be able to attend a school that 
has an especially good program for disabled children.”).  But note that from an effi-
ciency perspective, free entry into a marketplace with product diversity can be either 
excessive or insufficient.  See, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, Free En-
try and Social Inefficiency, 17 RAND J. ECON. 48, 49, 54-55 (1986) (arguing that heteroge-
neity may have benefits in a free market).  
199 For more on what it means to be a “safer prison,” see infra text accompanying 
notes 289-91. 
200 Whether prison labor reduces recidivism is empirically disputed.  Compare Kath-
leen E. Maguire et al., Prison Labor and Recidivism, 4 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 3, 
15 (1988) (noting that a growing amount of research indicates that programs allowing 
inmates to work in prisons have no effect on recidivism rates), with Jeffrey D. Hopper, 
The Effects of Private Prison Labor Program Participation on Inmate Recidivism 79-81 
(Aug. 2008) (Ph.D. dissertation, Middle Tenn. State Univ.), available at http:// 
gradworks.umi.com/33/22/3322480.html (finding that prisoner participation in in-
dustry work while incarcerated lowers recidivism rates). 
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suggested a list of them earlier in this Article.201  Prisons that have 
many of those attributes will likely be oversubscribed, and inmates 
may have to go to their second, third, fourth, or even last choice. 
Under conditions of substantial overcrowding, perhaps no prison, 
not even the worst one, will lose inmates.  Thus, in a static world, pris-
ons might not benefit from being more attractive; there would be no 
pressure on prisons to change, and so (apart from taste-based reallo-
cation) quality wouldn’t rise.  However, in the long run, if the voucher 
amount is generous enough, prisons will want more inmates,202 and 
oversubscribed prisons will benefit from building extra wings and ex-
tending their business model.203 
Prisons would thus improve by competing with each other on at-
tributes prisoners value; the mechanism is essentially similar to the one 
driving educational improvements in voucher schools.204  Further, indi-
vidual prisons would reap substantial benefits by adding more valued 
features.  First, (at least private) prison providers would be able to im-
plement a feature directly, without having to convince a procurement 
officer that the feature is a good idea and a wise use of funds.  Second, 
a prison could benefit more immediately than under the current re-
gime, as it could “poach” existing inmates from other prisons through 
transfers rather than having to wait for an influx of new prisoners as 
they are convicted.205  Even if an amenity is expensive, a prison can 
benefit from adding it if its inmate population increases sufficiently.206 
 
201 See supra text accompanying notes 73-103; see also Hoxby, supra note 198, at 1209. 
202 See supra Section I.C; infra Section IV.B. 
203 For a discussion of how easy this will be to accomplish, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 150-53. 
204 See, e.g., Jay P. Greene et al., School Choice in Milwaukee: A Randomized Experiment 
(finding significant effects on math scores starting three years in and significant effects 
on reading scores three or four years in for the Milwaukee Choice program), in EVALUA-
TION IN PRACTICE:  A METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 329, 331 (Richard D. Bingham & 
Claire L. Felbinger eds., 2d ed. 2002); Jay P. Greene et al., The Effectiveness of School Choice 
in Milwaukee:  A Secondary Analysis of Data from the Program’s Evaluation 32 tbl.4 (Program 
in Educ. Policy & Governance, Occasional Paper 96-3, 1996), available at 
http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED401597.pdf (finding significant gains in math scores in 
students’ third and fourth years in the Milwaukee Choice program, though no significant 
effects for reading); Paul E. Peterson et al., An Evaluation of the New York City School Choice 
Scholarships Program: The First Year (finding that being offered a voucher had a positive 
and significant effect on both math and reading scores, at least in grades four and five, in 
the New York City School Choice Scholarships Program), in EARNING AND LEARNING:  
HOW SCHOOLS MATTER, at x, x tbl.18 (Susan E. Mayer & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1999).  
For a general discussion of these studies, see Volokh, supra note 48. 
205 Cf. Michael Spence, Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition, 43 
REV. ECON. STUD. 217, 230-31 (1976) (arguing that product differentiation may be ex-
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These choice-driven improvements thus bypass the barriers to leg-
islative, administrative, and judicial reform.207  Likewise, privatization 
may improve quality in a nonchoice allocation regime through com-
petitive bidding and reputation building.208  But this depends crucially 
on the competence and benevolence of the officials who run the bid-
ding (which, like those of the officials who assign prisoners, aren’t 
guaranteed).209  Once a private provider gets a prison contract, if rep-
utational and contract-renewal concerns are weak, there are strong in-
centives to reduce quality.210  Choice prisons, on the other hand, have 
less of an incentive to reduce quality because at least the deci-
sionmakers can punish them directly if they observe quality reduc-
tions.211  If prisoners can transfer out, quality reductions can result in a 
loss of inmates.  Even if the possibility of transferring is limited, quality 
reductions could harm the prison’s reputation, thus reducing the in-
flow of new prisoners. 
Choice can also have long-term effects on the entire prison sys-
tem.  As Caroline Hoxby has noted in the analogous context of school 
vouchers:  “choice can affect productivity through a variety of long-
term, general equilibrium mechanisms that are not immediately avail-
able to an administrator.”212  In the prison context, this could include 
increasing the wages of more competent prison managers or correc-
tions officers, which may attract higher-quality people to these profes-
sions.  Schools, Hoxby continues, may find it in their interest to “issue 
more information about their achievement[s] and may thus gradually 
make students into better ‘consumers’”;213 the same could be true for 
prisons.  The need to attract “customers” may make prisons more re-
sponsive to evidence-based techniques rather than fads that appeal to 
bureaucrats. 
 
cessive under monopolistic competition because firms fail to take account of the lost 
profits of competing firms). 
206 See supra Section I.A. 
207 See supra text accompanying notes 23-37. 
208 See supra text accompanying notes 38-40. 
209 See supra text accompanying notes 195-97. 
210 See Shleifer, supra note 12, at 138-40 (explaining that private prisons might cut 
costs and reduce quality to inefficient levels absent “soft incentives”). 
211 See id. at 139 (noting that quality reductions often cause consumers to switch 
suppliers, and arguing that the lack of these incentives undercuts the value of govern-
ment-administered programs). 
212 Hoxby, supra note 1, at 21; see Caroline M. Hoxby, School Choice and School 
Productivity:  Could School Choice Be a Tide That Lifts All Boats?, in THE ECONOMICS OF 
SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 70, at 287, 309-10. 
213 Hoxby, supra note 1, at 21. 
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While the “active” inmates under a voucher system are those who 
transfer from one prison to another, or make an initial choice to go to 
a different prison than the one to which they would otherwise have 
been assigned,214 choice could also improve the prison experience for 
those who never transfer or who choose to go to their default prison.  
In fact, this could be the most important vehicle for improvements if 
many inmates don’t actively exercise their freedom of choice.215  More-
over, if public sector quality rises enough, this could overcome any 
negative spillovers on certain inmates, such as those based on peer ef-
fects.216  Similarly, there is evidence that vouchers have improved 
productivity in Milwaukee public schools,217 that charter schools have 
improved productivity in Michigan and Arizona public (noncharter) 
schools,218 and that the quality of public schools and public school 
teachers in Texas is positively correlated with the degree of competi-
tion among public schools, even without vouchers or charter schools.219 
 
214 For instance, the most widely publicized results of school vouchers relate to 
whether achievement rises for students who actually use the vouchers and transfer to a 
voucher-accepting private school.  Recent studies suggest that transferring to a private 
school does increase scholastic achievement, at least for black students.  Paul E. Peter-
son et al., School Vouchers:  Results from Randomized Experiments, in THE ECONOMICS OF 
SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 70, at 107, 131. 
215 Cf. Hoxby, supra note 1, at 17 (making this point for schools).  I have made a  
similar point in the context of prison privatization, arguing that cheaper prisons may  
alleviate overcrowding and thus improve both the public and private sector.  Developments, 
supra note 40, at 1875. 
216 See infra text accompanying notes 289-91. 
217 See Hoxby, supra note 1, at 22-34 (“Overall, Milwaukee suggests that public schools 
can have a strong positive productivity response to competition from vouchers.”). 
218 See Hoxby, supra note 1, at 44 (finding a causal connection between gains in 
productivity and achievement and the introduction of charter schools in Arizona); see also 
GREG FORSTER, FOUND. FOR EDUC. CHOICE, A WIN-WIN SOLUTION:  THE EMPIRICAL EVI-
DENCE ON SCHOOL VOUCHERS 24 tbl.4 (2d ed. 2011), available at http://www.edchoice. 
org/CMSModules/EdChoice/FileLibrary/656/A-Win-Win-Solution---The-Empirical-
Evidence-on-School-Vouchers.pdf (surveying empirical studies of voucher programs in 
Milwaukee, Florida, and elsewhere, and finding positive effects in all but one study).  
But see Ladd, supra note 1, at 75 (arguing that there is insufficient evidence to deter-
mine the actual impact vouchers have on public schools). 
219 Eric A. Hanushek & Steven G. Rivkin, Does Public School Competition Affect Teacher 
Quality?, in THE ECONOMICS OF SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 70, at 23, 23.  Note also 
that the likelihood of competitively driven improvements in public sector quality de-
pends on how public sector funding reacts to the use of vouchers or the loss of stu-
dents generally.  See supra text accompanying notes 132-36. 
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B.  The Potential Disadvantages 
Two key factors have been implicit in the argument that vouchers 
would improve prisons.  The first assumption is that a prisoner’s abil-
ity to choose would make certain prisons more attractive, which would 
mean that inmates would choose such prisons, and that as a result, the 
system as a whole would indeed improve from the prisoner’s perspec-
tive.  One could dispute this mechanism on a number of grounds.  
Perhaps the prison industry won’t be competitive enough to generate 
meaningful innovation.  Perhaps inmates won’t be informed enough 
to reward innovative prisons.  Perhaps inmates, while making choices 
that are individually rational, will impose external costs on other in-
mates that leave the system as a whole worse off—for example, 
through self-segregation along undesirable dimensions.  These sorts 
of market failures could prevent vouchers from being successful. 
The second assumption is that “improvement” of prisons from the 
prisoners’ perspective is socially desirable.  This depends on how well 
inmates’ preferences are aligned with social preferences.  What if 
prisoners effectively demand prisons with loose regulation of contra-
band or with country club–like conditions?  While the previous set of 
objections stemmed from “market failure,” these objections may be 
said to stem from “market success”—in other words, the market 
“works” too well, and society disapproves.220 
Another factor has also been implicit—a “step zero” of the analy-
sis:221  the belief that a regime of choice is, in principle, possible or ap-
propriate for people who have been intentionally deprived of their 
choice over most important aspects of their lives. 
In this Section, I discuss these three factors.  First, I discuss the 
nonempirical arguments against vouchers based on the supposed in-
consistency between the idea of choice and the idea of incarceration.  
Second, I discuss the “market failure” arguments.  Third, I discuss the 
“market success” arguments. 
 
220 Of course, “market success” is just an evocative term; this is really just another 
form of market failure, one that hurts society at large.  See supra note 54. 
221 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 & n.19 (2006) 
(addressing “step zero,” the initial inquiry into whether a framework applies at all, in 
one context (citing Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 
GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001))). 
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1.  Nonempirical Arguments Against Vouchers 
Is the concept of prison choice inherent in vouchers inconsistent 
with the very idea of incarceration?  Perhaps prisoners are unable to 
freely choose because as prisoners, they are under “duress.”222  Per-
haps the very idea of incarceration is inconsistent with free choice. 
Prisoners are placed in an environment that, by its nature, re-
stricts their freedom.  They have no privacy rights under the Fourth 
Amendment.223  All sex, including consensual sex and sometimes even 
masturbation, is forbidden, except in the limited context of conjugal 
visitation programs,224 although prisoners and prison officials 
acknowledge—even if only tacitly—that these acts do occur.225  Prison-
ers aren’t allowed to exercise choice in a range of activities; for in-
stance, they are limited in their right to consent to medical studies.226 
But the mere fact that prisoners’ choice is sometimes—or even usu-
ally—restricted doesn’t mean that prisoners are incapable of exercis-
ing choice.  Prisoners retain constitutional rights, even if these can be 
 
222 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 156, at 28 (suggesting that limited circumstances 
may affect the constitutional permissibility of a school voucher scheme). 
223 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984) (concluding that a prisoner has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in his prison cell entitling him to Fourth Amendment 
protection). 
224 See Christopher Hensley, Introduction:  Life and Sex in Prison (discussing the poli-
cy justifications for and benefits of conjugal visitation programs), in PRISON SEX:  
PRACTICE AND POLICY 1, 10 (Christopher Hensley ed., 2002); Brenda V. Smith, Rethink-
ing Prison Sex:  Self-Expression and Safety, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 185, 200 & nn.79-80 
(2006) (discussing prison regulations regarding a variety of sexual acts); see also Dolo-
vich, supra note 74, at 59 n.296 (explaining the difficulties inherent in collecting data 
about sexual contact between inmates and staff at a particular prison). 
225 See Dolovich, supra note 74, at 40 & n.196 (explaining that one attraction of the 
L.A. County gay segregation program is that inmates admitted there “will find many 
willing sexual partners”); id. at 88 n.393 (noting the existence of prison condom-
distribution programs); Nina T. Harawa et al., Sex and Condom Use in a Large Unit for 
Men Who Have Sex with Men (MSM) and Male-to-Female Transgenders, 21 J. HEALTHCARE 
FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 1071, 1076 (2010) (discussing condom use among a ran-
dom sample of inmates in a Los Angeles prison).  See generally Terry A. Kupers, Rape 
and the Prison Code (discussing systemic and sociological factors that feed the culture of 
rape that pervades most prisons in spite of bans on sexual activity), in PRISON MASCU-
LINITIES 111 (Don Sabo et al. eds., 2001). 
226 See Ian Urbina, Panel Suggests Using Inmates in Drug Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 
2006, at 1 (discussing current and historical issues involved in the participation of in-
mates in medical studies).  See generally INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., ETHICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING PRISONERS (Lawrence O. Gostin et al. eds., 
2007) (providing a comprehensive review of the ethical considerations implicated in 
conducting research on prisoners). 
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limited in the interests of prison management.227  Many of these 
rights—for instance, free speech,228 free exercise of religion,229 and 
freedom to marry230—are based on the idea that, despite their unfree 
condition, prisoners can still make autonomous moral choices.  In 
fact, prisoners’ ability to experience religious freedom,231 combined 
with outrage at prison officials’ arbitrary treatment of various merito-
rious religious claims,232 motivated the passage of the bipartisan Reli-
gious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,233 so that 
now, “in principle, inmate religious claims against states are given 
more solicitous consideration than are nonprisoner religious claims 
against states.”234  (Presumably, the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 
2003,235 which passed unanimously,236 also bespeaks at least a minimal 
commitment to bodily and sexual autonomy.237) 
Prisoners often have some flexibility as to whether they work while 
in prison.238  They’re allowed to control the course of their own litiga-
 
227 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (adopting a more lenient standard 
of review for cases in which prisoners’ constitutional rights were impinged in the name 
of legitimate penological interests). 
228 See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (“[A] prison inmate retains those 
First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner . . . .”). 
229 See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (declaring that inmates are entitled 
to “a reasonable opportunity of pursuing [their] faith comparable to the opportunity 
afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts”). 
230 See Turner, 482 U.S. at 96-99 (overturning a regulation banning inmate mar-
riages without approval of the prison superintendent). 
231 See Lynn S. Branham, “The Devil Is in the Details”:  A Continued Dissection of the 
Constitutionality of Faith-Based Prison Units, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 409, 427-29 (2008) (not-
ing that most prisons have chapels and other spaces set aside for religious practice). 
232 See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 716 & n.5 (2005) (detailing Con-
gress’s findings regarding “frivolous or arbitrary” barriers to prisoners’ free exercise of 
religious beliefs). 
233 Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5).  
The “institutionalized persons” section of the Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. 
234 Developments, supra note 40, at 1895 (emphasis omitted). 
235 Pub. L. No. 108-79, 117 Stat. 972 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601–15609).  
236 Robert Weisberg & David Mills, Violence Silence:  Why No One Really Cares About 
Prison Rape, SLATE (Oct. 1, 2003, 2:07 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_ 
and_politics/jurisprudence/2003/10/violence_silence.html. 
237 But see id. (arguing that “no one who knows our criminal justice system believes 
[the Act] will do much of anything to eliminate prison rape”). 
238 See Christopher Stafford, Note, Finding Work:  How to Approach the Intersection of 
Prisoner Reentry, Employment, and Recidivism, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 261, 272 
(2006) (noting the low rate of participation among those eligible for work assignments 
in prison).  Federal prisoners, however, are required to work if they’re physically able, 
not a security risk, not subject to discipline, and not participating in particular rehabil-
itative programs.  Crime Control Act of 1990 § 2905, 18 U.S.C. § 4121 (2006).  The 
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tion.  Moreover, they can choose whether to participate in prison pro-
grams239 and whether to accept offers of protective custody.240 
Suppose that a prisoner values prison and its coercive nature.  
Perhaps the prisoner’s behavior on the outside has been so self-
destructive and his impulses so uncontrollable that he experiences 
prison as a respite from everyday concerns and the overwhelming 
choices of freedom.241  Even such a prisoner may well want to make 
some choices.  Aside from the opportunity to use prison to experience 
religious and spiritual renewal,242 anyone may value being in a place 
with relatively better medical care or lower assault or rape rates. 
There are various reasons for restricting prisoners’ freedom, in-
cluding retribution, incapacitation, and deterrence.  One also may 
want to protect prisoners from other prisoners; rapists may be able to 
intimidate their victims into stating that the sex was consensual243 or 
perhaps the prison system’s interest in preventing the spread of STDs 
might override inmates’ interest in sexual freedom.244  One may want 
to protect prisoners from hidden and subtle coercion from other 
sources.  Given a history of inmate mistreatment by medical research-
 
same is true in various states.  E.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 497.099 (West 2004); see 
also Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization and Democracy:  Resources in Administrative Law 
(“[I]n 1997, ten states created mandatory work programs for inmates.”), in GOVERN-
MENT BY CONTRACT:  OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 261, 275 ( Jody Free-
man & Martha Minow eds., 2009); Raja Raghunath, A Promise the Nation Cannot Keep:  
What Prevents the Application of the Thirteenth Amendment in Prison?, 18 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 395, 409 (2009) (examining nonpunitive compulsory labor in prisons within the 
context of the Thirteenth Amendment). 
239 See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 44-45 (2002) (plurality opinion) (allowing a 
state to require an inmate to choose between participation in a treatment program and 
losing certain prison privileges and holding that such a choice “does not amount to 
compulsion”).  
240 Harding v. Jones, 768 F. Supp. 275, 277-78 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (maintaining that a 
prisoner’s decision to participate in protective custody is entirely discretionary). 
241 See MARTHA GRACE DUNCAN, ROMANTIC OUTLAWS, BELOVED PRISONS:  THE 
UNCONSCIOUS MEANINGS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 21-23, 26-27, 30-31, 48-50 (1996) 
(exploring the nearly maternal comfort some inmates derive from incarceration). 
242 See, e.g., Duffy v. State Pers. Bd., 283 Cal. Rptr. 622, 629 (Ct. App. 1991) (affirming 
that religion in prison “subserves the rehabilitative function by providing an area within 
which the inmate may reclaim his dignity and reassert his individuality”); DUNCAN, supra 
note 241, at 32-37 (considering the prison as a context for “spiritual rebirth”).  
243 See Smith, supra note 224, at 218-22 (“Often, concern for physical safety and 
well-being is a key motivator for sex between inmates and between inmates and correc-
tional staff.”); cf. id. at 193-95 (outlining the effects that unduly strict regulations on 
sexual activity in prisons may have on the environment of consensual prison sex).   
244 See id. at 229 (discussing public health risks, including hepatitis and HIV infec-
tion, associated with sex in prisons). 
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ers, it’s certainly not crazy to want to exercise a bit of paternalism on 
behalf of relatively powerless prisoners.245  But all this is consistent with 
a recognition that, in whatever free space is left to them, prisoners are 
able to make choices that are as autonomous as anyone else’s. 
One may still argue that, though prisoners of course retain resid-
ual liberty, there’s no value in such liberty,246 and so there’s no reason 
to treat prisoners like parents of schoolchildren, whose choices we 
presumptively value. 
But nothing in this proposal requires treating prisoners as morally 
entitled to choose.  In fact, the same is true of school choice.  Some ad-
vocates of school choice present vouchers as designed to give parents 
the choice they are entitled to,247 but others present vouchers as mere-
ly an instrumental way of using choice to pursue socially beneficial 
policies.248  Indeed, this is the standard approach of economists, who 
usually treat competition and choice as mechanisms that can improve 
social welfare,249 and not as morally valuable goals in themselves.250 
Similarly, we can allow prisoner choice instrumentally, as a policy 
matter, if we find that the social positives outweigh the social nega-
tives—in other words, using prisoner choice as a means to the end of 
 
245 See Urbina, supra note 226, at 1 (reporting on a federal panel that recommend-
ed using inmates in drug trials). 
246 Cf. Dan Markel, Wrong Turns on the Road to Alternative Sanctions:  Reflections on the 
Future of Shaming Punishments and Restorative Justice, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1401 (2007) 
(calling an emphasis on prisoner choice “largely beside the point” because punish-
ment is “a coercive measure imposed on offenders as a means of demonstrating their 
lack of superiority to the state”). 
247 See CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, supra note 118, at 
4 (detailing arguments for the proposition that school choice is a “fundamental 
right”); see also AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 28-33 (1999) (discussing, and 
rejecting, the ideal of the “state of families,” which contends that families have an in-
herent right to control their children’s upbringing). 
248 CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, supra note 118, at 5 
(“Saul Yanofsky, superintendent of White Plains, New York, Public Schools, concludes 
that ‘choice is a means to a variety of ends; it is not the end.’”); GUTMANN, supra note 
247, at 66-70 (discussing consequentialist justifications for voucher plans). 
249 See generally ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 549-50 
(1995) (presenting the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics, which “pro-
vides a formal and very general confirmation of Adam Smith’s asserted ‘invisible hand’ 
property of the market,” showing that competitive equilibria, under certain assump-
tions, are Pareto optimal). 
250 Cf., e.g., LUDWIG VON MISES, LIBERALISM:  THE CLASSICAL TRADITION 4 (Bettina 
Bien Greaves ed., Ralph Raico trans., Liberty Fund 2005) (1927) (“[T]here is only one 
argument [against slavery] that can and did refute all others—namely that free labor is 
incomparably more productive than slave labor.”). 
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socially desirable correctional policy—even if we don’t actually respect 
prisoner choice.251 
2.  “Market Failure” Arguments Against Vouchers 
If we suppose that there’s nothing about a voucher proposal that’s 
inherently inconsistent with the idea of incarceration, we may then 
proceed to the next question:  whether prison vouchers would work. 
The discussion above of how prisons would accommodate prison-
ers’ values if the prisons had to compete for prisoners252 assumes that 
market forces would lead prisons to offer more valued amenities.  
Here, I discuss possible market failures that could prevent this from 
happening. 
a.  Barriers to Individually Maximizing Decisionmaking 
Information.  Convicted defendants may not know the actual quali-
ty of prisons, just as parents may not know the actual quality of 
schools.253  Does this argument apply with more or less force in prisons 
than in schools? 
 
251 There is a robust tradition of opposition to private prisons on “social meaning” 
and other nonempirical grounds, recently embodied by, for instance, Mary Sigler, Pri-
vate Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of Punishment, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 149, 
152 (2010).  See also HCJ 2605/05 Acad. Ctr. of Law & Bus., Human Rights Div. v. Min-
ister of Fin. ¶¶ 18, 33 [2009] (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/ 
05/050/026/n39/05026050.n39.htm (holding that prison privatization violates “the 
constitutional rights to personal liberty and human dignity of inmates” because of pri-
vate prisons’ profitmaking aspect, even if the level of human rights violations in each 
prison “is identical”); DiIulio, supra note 195, at 71 (“The question of whether it is ever 
right to profit from the misfortunes of criminals and their victims is a serious one.”); 
Alon Harel & Ariel Porat, Commensurability and Agency:  Two Yet-to-Be-Met Challenges for 
Law and Economics, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 749, 769 (2011) (arguing that certain tasks like 
imprisonment must be public not because public officials are superior, but because the 
identity of the agent who performs these tasks has an intrinsic value); Michael Walzer, 
At McPrison and Burglar King, It’s . . . Hold the Justice, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 8, 1985, at 10 
(arguing that prison privatization is illegitimate because it forces prisoners to interact 
with private parties with a corporate purpose).  I respond to these critiques in other 
work.  Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Elusive Employee-Contractor Distinc-
tion (October 7, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  But nothing 
in these critiques seems directly on point to the prison voucher idea, especially since 
choice is conceptually distinct from privatization.  See supra Section I.B. 
252 See supra Section III.A. 
253 SMITH & MEIER, supra note 15, at 126-27 (“The market solution assumes parents 
and students will have enough information to make a decision on what school offers 
the ‘best’ education.  This assumption appears to be patently insupportable.” (citing 
Brown, supra note 127, at 293)); Brown, supra note 127, at 292 (“Elementary and sec-
ondary schooling are excellent examples of input-based relationships between agents 
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Someone sentenced to prison for the first time may not know 
much about different prisons.  Even repeat offenders might have little 
direct experience with prisons if they’ve mostly spent time in jails ra-
ther than prisons; even someone who’s been in one prison may know 
nothing about others. 
But information is available about prisons from several sources.  
First, information can spread by word of mouth from friends or 
neighbors who have been in prison.  Second, prisons can advertise, 
and (possibly anonymous) reviews of prisons by current or former in-
mates may be available on the Internet.254  Third, there are already 
ways to evaluate prisons, such as reports from monitoring agencies or 
the Logan quality of confinement index.255  Prisons could even be re-
quired to publish such information as part of their advertising, as well 
as other information that would result from the voucher program 
such as the length of the wait list and the rate of transfer out of the 
prison.256  The Federal Prison Guidebook already describes facility charac-
teristics in detail for the benefit of criminal defense lawyers.257  Anoth-
er possible model would be the federal government’s “Nursing Home 
 
(schools) and their clients (students, parents and taxpayers).  Furthermore, the rela-
tionships are based on an inherent uncertainty in the production process that places 
the task of monitoring output somewhere between expensive and impossible.”). 
 Richard F. Elmore observes, 
In education and medical care there are at least two a priori reasons for skepti-
cism about informed choice.  One reason is that the practice of education and 
medicine, and the organization of that practice, are relatively complex . . . . A 
second reason . . . is that providers . . . have relatively strong incentives to limit 
clients’ access to information. 
Richard F. Elmore, Choice as an Instrument of Public Policy:  Evidence from Education and 
Health Care, in 1 CHOICE AND CONTROL IN AMERICAN EDUCATION:  THE THEORY OF 
CHOICE AND CONTROL IN EDUCATION 285, 299 (William H. Clune & John F. Witte eds., 
1990) (citation omitted). 
254 Cf. Irina D. Manta, Privatizing Trademarks, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 381, 415-17 (2009) 
(describing how feedback conveyed through the Internet can help consumers pick the 
highest-quality product). 
255 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
256 Cf. Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 102 (suggesting similar publication 
requirements for criminal defense attorneys’ qualifications and experience). 
257 ALAN ELLIS & J. MICHAEL HENDERSON, FEDERAL PRISON GUIDEBOOK (2010–
2011 ed. 2010).   The publisher’s web site describing the Guidebook offers the subtitle:  
“Federal prison placement, profiles, and tips:  How to ensure that your client gets into 
the best possible prison and is released at the earliest opportunity.” Federal Prison 
Guidebook, JAMESPUBLISHING, http://jamespublishing.com/books/fpg.htm (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2011). 
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Compare” site,258 which conveniently pulls together government-
collected information about nursing homes. 
Fourth, if the voucher program allows an inmate to transfer out 
after a certain amount of time, that inmate will at least have some di-
rect experience of his or her own prison.  If that experience is bad 
enough, it could be worthwhile to gamble on another prison.259 
So far, the arguments here look similar to those for schools.  But 
the informational problem seems to be less severe in the prison con-
text because the people who choose the prison are the same people who 
experience the service.260  With schools, by contrast, there is an agency 
problem:  the parents make the choice, but because they don’t expe-
rience the school directly, they have less of an incentive to become 
well informed and are less able to do so.  Parents are imperfect agents 
of their children, whereas inmates are perfect agents of themselves.261 
A convicted defendant may also have some help from his lawyer, 
just as lawyers now try to get their clients’ sentences reduced by enrol-
ling them in drug treatment programs or enlisting them in the mili-
tary.262  The government could also provide a default assignment or a 
 
258 Nursing Home Compare, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/NHCompare 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2011). 
259 See supra text accompanying note 110. 
260 Morley, supra note 127, at 1797-1800 (cataloguing barriers to parents’ ability to 
monitor the quality of their child’s school). 
261 See Brown, supra note 127, at 294 (highlighting that parents, not students, are 
the “ultimate consumer” because they pay for schooling); see also Burton A. Weisbrod 
& Mark Schlesinger, Public, Private, Nonprofit Ownership and the Response to Asymmetric 
Information:  The Case of Nursing Homes (noting similar agency problem with respect to 
nursing homes), in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS 133, 138-39 (Susan 
Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986); cf. Sigler, supra note 251, at 160 (pointing out the agency 
problems under the current model of assigned prisons, where inmates “are not the 
purchasers of prison services”).  I take no position here on who—parents or children—
should choose if vouchers are used for juvenile detention facilities.  Of course, parents 
may also choose differently than their children would because they value different 
things, perhaps for good reason.  In this sense, an “agency problem” in school selec-
tion may be positive.  And one can argue the same for prison—the absence of an 
agency problem isn’t all good, since prisoners will have some preferences that are so-
cially undesirable.  On this, see supra text accompanying notes 243-44. 
262 Natasha Saulnier, Recruiting at Any Cost:  How the Pentagon Keeps the New Recruits 
Coming, COMMONDREAMS.ORG (Dec. 10, 2004), http://www.commondreams.org/ 
views04/1210-20.htm (“In the Vietnam era, Judges often offered enlistment as an al-
ternative to prosecution and jail time.  But after Vietnam, Congress passed legislation 
to prevent this practice.  But former recruiters and military lawyers affirm that it is still 
taking place in a more covert form, with judges often working in concert with recruit-
ers to drop charges.”).  But see 3 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-8.010 (2d ed. 
2010–2011) (“Plea or sentence bargaining agreements should not be contingent on, or 
contain provisions designed to facilitate, enlistment in the Armed Services.”). 
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list of recommendations,263 although the bureaucrats who currently 
make inmate assignments may well be less favorably disposed toward 
prisoners than education bureaucrats are toward schoolchildren. 
Ultimately, what convicted defendants lack in information, they 
may make up for in motivation, both to acquire information and to 
act on it.264  Even if these information problems persist, this argument 
favors having prisons run by the nonprofit sector, just as information 
problems in education are often taken as an argument supporting 
nonprofit schools.265 
Competitiveness.  In addition to this lack of information, there 
might also be insufficient competitiveness, meaning that inmate 
choice might still fail to meet inmate desires.266 
Although I’ve stressed that prison choice needn’t involve private 
provision,267 making the market competitive enough to respond to 
“consumer demand” might require the participation of private pris-
ons.  Public prisons, after all, may not even want more prisoners.  To-
day, corrections departments actually ask for fewer prisoners.268  They 
may do this because of inadequate funding, which would be alleviated 
if an adequate voucher accompanied each prisoner.  This solution 
would require total voucher funding to do more than merely match 
the current funding for the correctional system.  Or perhaps they’re 
just advocating a less incarcerative penal policy in general and not tak-
ing a position on whether they, as opposed to someone else, should 
 
263 Cf. Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 103 (describing how courts could 
create a list or registry of criminal defense attorneys to assist defendants in making 
more informed choices). 
264 Cf. id. at 86, 107 (arguing that, though criminal defendants have trouble de-
termining who the best lawyer is, he “might be better off making his own, poorly in-
formed, choice” than relying on the choice of a defender or judge who is better in-
formed but doesn’t have the defendant’s interests at heart); Trebilcock & Iacobucci, 
supra note 124, at 1448 (describing how consumer choice disciplines private actors into 
disclosing useful information). 
265 See supra sources cited in note 127. 
266 Elmore, supra note 253, at 308-09 (discussing the Dutch system of school 
choice, which some argue “does not operate as a quasi-competitive market offering 
options to its clients, but rather as a cartel of interlocking interests supported by the 
state which limits competition and improvements in quality”). 
267 See supra Section I.B. 
268 See Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law and Economics of Political Advocacy, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1235-37 (2008) (describing several examples of state correc-
tional officers who have requested reductions in the prison population, including by 
suggesting alternate sentencing schemes).   
VOLOKH REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2012  7:15 PM 
2012] Prison Vouchers 833 
get existing prisoners.269  But in general, it’s not obvious that public 
prisons benefit from having more prisoners,270 and in any event, pub-
lic prisons may have less flexibility than private prisons to respond to 
market incentives.  To combat this problem, rewards and penalties for 
public prisons should be structured so that it’s in their best interest to 
attract more people and so that they have the freedom to experiment 
with different models. 
One shouldn’t overstate the difference between the public and 
private sectors:  private and public school curricula often look quite 
similar, perhaps because adopting similar curricula allows parents to 
minimize the risk that their children will be unprepared to compete 
against their peers in college admissions and in the job market.271  
This may apply to prisons too:  prisons are traumatic places even in 
the best circumstances, and inmates who will spend a few years in one 
may not want to experiment. 
But this doesn’t mean that competition is useless or that schools 
(or prisons) won’t differ in their treatment of students (or inmates).  
First, some schools (or prisons) will cater to those parents (or inmates) 
whose uncertainty or risk tolerance differs from the norm.272  Similar-
ly, inmates may have heterogeneous rates of substitution between, for 
example, the risk of violence and the quality of medical care.  Second, 
schools still vary in “location, presence of religious instruction, and, 
perhaps most importantly, whether a school is a ‘good’ school or a 
‘bad’ one in terms of technical efficiency.”273  All these factors are rel-
evant for inmates as well.  The third factor—the actual productivity of 
the prison—may most significantly drive prison improvements. 
 
269 Cf. id. at 1220-21, 1227-30 (distinguishing between pro-incarceration advocacy, 
which seeks to increase man-days in prison, and pro-privatization advocacy, which seeks 
to acquire a greater proportion of the existing man-days). 
270 Cf. Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 104 (explaining that public de-
fenders may be motivated to perform poorly in order to reduce their caseload).   
Compare WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
36-42 (1971) (arguing that bureaucrats are largely motivated by a desire to maximize 
their budgets), with Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 932-34 (2005) (questioning the Niskanen hypothesis by propos-
ing alternate motivations for bureaucrats, such as matching the budget of their agency 
with the minimum cost of operations).    
271 See Brown, supra note 127, at 287-88. 
272 See id. at 297 n.1 (arguing that art and science magnet schools exist in large cit-
ies because “the desire to specialize is a rare trait, which can be accommodated only 
under the most unusual circumstances of large scale systems”). 
273 Id. at 291. 
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b.  External Effects of Individually Rational Decisionmaking 
The previous market failure arguments focused on the plight of 
the individual inmate-consumer who wouldn’t know how to choose or 
who would be faced with unresponsive suppliers.  Other market fail-
ure arguments could be based on externalities.  Even if inmates 
choose rationally for themselves, the results may be suboptimal be-
cause individual decisions negatively affect other prisoners.274 
The administrative burden on the system poses one obvious ex-
ternality (in this instance on the taxpayer).275  I only flag this briefly, 
because the administrative costs of running the system seem minor 
relative to the overall advantages or disadvantages of the system itself. 
Another effect of prison choice could be distributional across in-
mates.  The better informed inmates will tend to get better prisons, 
and this population is likely made up of repeat prisoners and those 
with the best connections in the criminal world.276  This objection is 
strongest when there’s a single, unidimensional measure of prison 
quality.  If “best” is different for different prisoners—if some prisoners 
prefer proximity to family while others prefer good medical care and 
still others prefer particular job training programs—choice serves a 
valuable matching purpose.277  In the extreme case, everyone could have 
his or her top choice.  Moreover, even if there’s some redistribution 
from less- to more-informed prisoners, a rising tide could lift all boats:  
if prison vouchers lead to quality improvements, the uninformed may 
become better off as well—much like school choice can improve pub-
lic schools even for students who don’t use vouchers.278 
 
274 Of course, there are also external effects on third parties outside of the prison 
system.  I defer that discussion to the next section on “market success” problems.  See 
infra subsection III.B.3. 
275 Cf. Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 111 (noting that the administrative 
burden on the courts may motivate judicial decisions regarding freedom of choice). 
276 Cf. United States v. Davis, 604 F.2d 474, 478-79 (7th Cir. 1979) (acknowledging 
the risk that letting defendants choose their own counsel may disproportionately benefit 
repeat offenders); Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 110 (arguing that freedom 
of choice for appointed counsel may disproportionately benefit “well-informed defend-
ants,” which in turn “may include a disproportionate share of repeat offenders”).  For 
an example of the distributive argument against choice in the educational context, see 
CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, supra note 118, at 25-27.  
277 Cf. Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 109 (noting that freedom to choose 
appointed counsel could better match attorneys based on defendants’ idiosyncratic 
preferences). 
278 See supra text accompanying notes 215-19; see also H. Spencer Banzhaf & Garima 
Bhalla, Do Households Prefer Small School Districts?  A Natural Experiment 9-10 
(Sept. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/=1247822 
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Similarly, some have argued that, to the extent that the weakest 
and most vulnerable inmates “escape” into safer environments, the 
burden of rape and violence falls onto the next weakest remaining 
inmates.  The result is a redistribution of rape.279  This is a plausible 
concern, although rape and violence tend to become a costlier enter-
prise for the predator when the remaining potential victims are, on 
average, less obvious targets and are better able to put up a fight.280  
Overall the redistribution would probably also reduce the extent of 
the problem.281 
The rest of this subsection focuses on a particular dynamic that 
seems especially relevant in the prison context:  self-segregation of 
prisoners based on their level of violence, gang membership, or race. 
In schools, the quality of one’s fellow students helps determine 
the quality of one’s education.  Thus, students (or usually their par-
ents) seek out schools with “better” students, which tends to cause 
pressure to stratify.282  Of course, the empirical importance of these 
pressures depends on the design of the particular voucher program.283 
If such stratification occurs in schools, it can have a variety of ef-
fects.  First, the mere existence of segregation is significant—as when 
students seek out other students of their own social class, ethnicity, reli-
gion, or race.  However, voluntary segregation, even if some consider it 
undesirable in itself, doesn’t necessarily affect educational outcomes. 
Second, because of the peer effects discussed above, stratification 
can affect the overall quality of the system.  In schools, this is so even if 
 
(suggesting that educational choice might not only improve educational quality 
through competition but also serve an independently valuable function in allowing 
consumers to sort themselves). 
279 See Jeannie Suk, Redistributing Rape, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 111-13 (2011) 
(presenting this point as a critique of Sharon Dolovich’s advocacy of programs like the 
Los Angeles County gay segregation unit, or even of broader-based units that segregate 
vulnerable inmates generally); see also Dolovich, supra note 74, at 80-82 (responding to 
Suk’s concerns about weaker men becoming targets for rape).  Dolovich and Suk argue 
in the context of assigned jails, but similar arguments could be made about vouchers. 
280 Dolovich, supra note 74, at 82. 
281 However, I later discuss how a reallocation of prisoners can lead to increased 
violence.  For instance, incomplete segregation by violence level, race, or gang affilia-
tion may disrupt an existing balance of power in a prison and leaves minority gang 
members at the mercy of the majority gang.  See infra text accompanying notes 293-307. 
282 See Helen F. Ladd, School Vouchers:  A Critical View, J. ECON. PERSP., Autumn 
2002, at 3, 13-14 (arguing that the “peer effect” of parents choosing schools based on 
social and ethnic composition, coupled with peer pressure from other parents, will 
lead to racial and socioeconomic stratification between schools). 
283 See Hoxby, supra note 1, at 54-56 (comparing achievement outcomes across 
schools using different types of voucher programs). 
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parents don’t select directly based on the school’s test scores, so long 
as they choose based on something correlated with high achievement 
like socioeconomic status.284 
Whether this applies to prisons depends on the significance of 
stratification pressures and peer effects.  As an initial matter, the pre-
dicted stratification effect for schools arises—if at all285—not only be-
cause of peer effects but also because of tuition.  Rich people can af-
ford to pay more for their children to receive a better education.  
Personal achievement increases when a student is surrounded by smart-
er peers.  Thus, private schools can benefit by attracting high-ability 
students with low tuitions and then charging high tuitions to rich stu-
dents who want to benefit from the resulting positive peer effect.286 
Since prisons won’t charge fees, they can’t utilize a tuition-based 
stratification mechanism.  If prisons can’t be selective in their “admis-
sions,”287 stratification will only be based on differences in taste.  If 
everyone had identical preferences for prisons, then everyone would 
rank prisons equally, and a random cross section of inmates would 
 
284 See Hoxby, supra note 198, at 1214-16 (examining the factors parents consider 
when making choices in the education market). 
285 Whether school vouchers would actually increase stratification is disputed, 
since public schools are already stratified because of patterns of residential segrega-
tion.  See MERRIFIELD, supra note 128, at 6 (disputing, based on existing “de facto seg-
regation” in public schools, claims that vouchers would increase stratification); Caro-
line Minter Hoxby, Are Efficiency and Equity in School Finance Substitutes or Complements?, J. 
ECON. PERSP., Fall 1996, at 51, 69 (noting the prevalence of “homogenous school dis-
tricts” and of students with high human capital at certain schools); cf. Dennis Epple & 
Richard Romano, Neighborhood Schools, Choice, and the Distribution of Education Benefits 
(stratification engendered by neighborhood schooling without intradistrict choice is 
comparable to stratification engendered by “a universal and laissez-faire voucher sys-
tem with vouchers of sufficient magnitude”), in THE ECONOMICS OF SCHOOL CHOICE, 
supra note 70, at 227, 234-35 [hereinafter Epple & Romano, Neighborhood Schools]; id. at 
272 (“Even a cursory look at the stratification of households across neighborhood 
schools in large urban districts is sufficient to put to rest the notion that there is no 
stratification among schools in a district when expenditures are equalized.”); Dennis 
Epple & Richard Romano, Educational Vouchers and Cream Skimming, 49 INT’L ECON. 
REV. 1395, 1426-27 (2008) (claiming that different voucher designs can have radically 
different stratification effects and that vouchers that place no restrictions on tuition or 
admissions will result in “cream skimming that adversely affects poor and less able stu-
dents,” while other decisions might minimize stratification); Hoxby, supra note 198, at 
1210 (observing that reforms extend, rather than introduce, choice, and that the strati-
fication effects likely materialize more slowly and more incrementally than anticipated). 
286 E.g., Dennis Epple & Richard E. Romano, Competition Between Private and Public 
Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 33, 43-47 (1998) (suggesting 
that high-income students will subsidize high-ability students when vouchers are avail-
able); Epple & Romano, Neighborhood Schools, supra note 285, at 235. 
287 See supra Section I.C. 
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end up in the best prisons.  If stratification occurs, it will be because 
prisons differ in what they offer and prisoners differ in what they val-
ue.288  Prisons with effective violence-prevention policies will acquire 
the prisoners who place the highest relative value on low violence 
(bearing in mind that prisoners can still only select within their securi-
ty classification); prisons with good medical care will acquire the pris-
oners who put the highest relative value on such care. 
Would self-segregation of the prison system by violence level—into 
“safer” and “more violent” prisons—be beneficial? 
First, let’s flesh out what it means to talk about safer prisons.  Rela-
tively nonviolent prisoners would prefer a prison with low violence 
rates—but so would violent predators.289  As a result, a prisoner who 
values safety should select a prison that has policies that encourage low-
er violence and should avoid prisons that merely happen to be less vio-
lent, for example, because of their inmate composition.  Such policies 
may include continuous monitoring of admitted inmates to weed out 
the fakers290—although the effectiveness of such a scheme isn’t guaran-
teed.291  Prisoners may not be able to tell from the outside whether a 
low violence level at a particular prison is due to good policies or good 
prisoners, but advertising, testimonials, and experience might effec-
tively inform them.  A prison with effective security policies would thus 
tend to attract nonviolent prisoners and deter predators, who would 
prefer to stay in prisons with comparatively ineffective policies. 
What would such stratification do to the overall “quality” of the 
inmates?  Caroline Hoxby writes, in the context of human capital seg-
 
288 Cf. MERRIFIELD, supra note 128, at 12 (discussing, in the school voucher con-
text, the preferences for subject- or pedagogy-focused schools and the multidimen-
sional abilities of students). 
289 See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 74, at 21-22 (noting that the lack of procedural 
controls under an early Los Angeles County gay segregation program meant that “all a 
would-be predator needed to do to gain access to potential victims was to aver his ho-
mosexuality on entrance to the Jail”). 
290 See id. at 23 (reserving the power under a later iteration of the gay segregation 
program for “[ j]ail officials to determine whether those men who claimed to be gay 
belonged in the unit reserved exclusively for ‘homosexual inmates’”); id. at 32, 43 (ob-
serving that it is less important to be perfectly accurate in classifying gay inmates than 
it is to demonstrate an “official commitment” to “accurate classification” and “persis-
tent monitoring”). 
291 See id. at 32 (noting that even if nongays could be excluded from the gay segre-
gation program, “heterosexuals and bisexuals have no monopoly on sexual preda-
tion”).  But see id. at 33 (reporting that the gay segregation unit is “well-known to be the 
safest place in the Jail,” which means that “many of those seeking admission under 
false pretenses only want a respite from the gang politics and consequent pressure and 
volatility that define daily life in [the general population]”). 
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regation (the tendency of high-quality students to live near and attend 
school with other high-quality students): 
[W]ithout knowing how spillovers work, we do not know whether the equilib-
rium has too much or too little segregation.  Consider the “one bad apple” 
scenario.  If a single household with low human capital in the district could 
make everyone else learn substantially less, yet would only experience small 
human capital gains itself, there would obviously be too little segregation.  
The converse scenario might be called “one shining light.”  If a single house-
hold with high human capital could make everyone else learn substantially 
more, yet its own children would not learn any less (despite being surrounded 




Prisons seem more like the “one bad apple” scenario.  High-
violence inmates exert a bad influence on low-violence prisoners 
and—now switching metaphors—“the bad eggs seem to have more of 
an influence on the good eggs than vice versa.”293  Stratification by vio-
lence level may then be desirable to mitigate this problem. 
However, this solution may not hold true if stratification is incom-
plete.  Imperfect stratification might be extremely bad for some low-
violence inmates who are denied their preferred choice of prison and 
remain among an increased population of high-violence inmates.  So, 
violence-based self-segregation may be beneficial in the extreme case, 
but it could be either beneficial or harmful in the imperfect cases. 
What if inmates self-segregate according to race and ethnicity?  
This resembles self-segregation according to gang membership, be-
cause race substantially drives prison violence294 and prison gangs typi-
cally organize along ethnic and racial lines.295 
Estimates of prison gang membership vary widely.296  Some sources 
report that prison gangs account for no more than 5% or 6% of pris-
 
292 Hoxby, supra note 285, at 63. 
293 Martin H. Pritikin, Is Prison Increasing Crime?, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1049, 1055. 
294 THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 23 
(linking race to violence in prisons but suggesting that good prison leaders can adopt 
policies that mitigate race-related violence); id. at 26 (contrasting Sheriff Lee Baca’s 
view attributing the 2006 Los Angeles jail riots to racial tensions, with Jody Kent’s view 
that “interracial violence was in large part a reaction to institutional problems, particu-
larly crowding, which had created stressful living conditions and a near total absence 
of programming and productive activities”).  
295 See Dolovich, supra note 74, at 49-50 (defining “gangs” as interchangeable with 
“race” in California prisons); Chad R. Trulson et al., Gang Suppression and Institutional 
Control, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Apr. 2006, at 26, 26-27 (noting that race and ethnicity 
represent two of the primary determinants of inmate behavior and gang membership).   
296  Some prison systems manipulate their gang density by counting only “validated 
gang members.” See KNOX, supra note 21, at 435.  Additionally, many researchers fail to 
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on inmates.297  Others estimate that mean gang density at male institu-
tions rose from 9.4% in 1991 to 24.7% in 1999, and 3.5% to 7.5% at 
female institutions.298  The 24.7% figure at male institutions masks var-
iation by security level:299  in male institutions membership was 16.1% 
in minimum-security prisons, 23.6% in medium-security prisons, and 
32.7% in maximum-security prisons.300  And even these numbers do 
not account for substantial regional variation (states have reported 
numbers as divergent as 75% in California prisons301 and 90% in Illi-
nois302) and variation among individual prisons303 (some have reported 
a gang density of zero and others 100% membership304), although 
such stark divergence may also reflect differences in reporting stand-
 
recognize the difference in reporting mechanisms.  See id.  The error leads them to 
“grossly underestimate the scope and extent of the prison gang problem to the point 
of officially disseminating totally inaccurate information in their government funded 
research reports.”  Id.    
297 E.g., AM. CORR. ASS’N, GANGS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES:  A NATIONAL AS-
SESSMENT 8 tbl.1 (1993) (estimating total gang membership to be 5.9% in 1992); Trul-
son et al., supra note 295, at 26 (“[S]trictly prison-based gang members accounted for 
1.2 percent of all state and federal prison inmates . . . . Gang-related inmates constitut-
ed less than 5 percent of all prison inmates across the country.”); cf. KNOX, supra note 
21, at 434 (calling the 1993 American Correctional Association report “notoriously un-
reliable and more fictional than factual”).  Knox noted that other researchers found 
gang membership rates in 1993 to be double the ACA’s estimate.  Id. at 446. 
298 KNOX, supra note 21, at 448; see also Knox, supra note 107, at 8 (reporting that 
prison wardens surveyed estimated 25.9% gang density among new arriving male in-
mates and 6.28% among female inmates).  Gang allegiances shift over the course of in-
carceration, with inmates joining or quitting gangs.  The Knox survey reported an ad-
justed gang density of 24.8% for male institutions and 4.09% for female institutions.  Id. 
299 George W. Knox & Edward D. Tromanhauser, Gangs and Their Control in Adult 
Correctional Institutions, PRISON J., Fall–Winter 1991, at 15, 19 (providing empirical  
support for the intuition that “the higher the security level, the higher the density of 
gang members”). 
300 KNOX, supra note 21, at 449. 
301 Id. at 434. 
302 Knox & Tromanhauser, supra note 299, at 20 (citing Michael P. Lane, Inmate 
Gangs, CORRECTIONS TODAY, July 1989, at 98).  Even the 1993 American Correctional 
Association report, which has been criticized as severely underestimating gang mem-
bership, reports 48.1% gang membership in Illinois in 1992, an order of magnitude 
higher than in any other state.  AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 297, at 8 tbl.1.   
303 Cf. REID H. MONTGOMERY & GORDON A. CREWS, A HISTORY OF CORRECTIONAL 
VIOLENCE:  AN EXAMINATION OF REPORTED CAUSES OF RIOTS AND DISTURBANCES 25 
(1998) (noting that 80% to 90% of inmates “in many prison systems have some affilia-
tion with street gangs” but also that affiliation differs from membership and that street 
gangs aren’t the same as prison gangs (citing GANGS:  A CRIMINAL JUSTICE APPROACH 
( J. Mitchell Miller & Jeffery P. Rush eds., 1996))). 
304 KNOX supra note 21, at 448. 
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ards.  Estimates of gangs’ contribution to prison violence also vary 
greatly, from less than 30%305 to over 50%.306 
The prevalence of prison gangs—even if the low estimates are 
right, there are some systems with high gang density—suggests that ra-
cial/ethnic or gang-based segregation is a realistic possibility.  It’s 
plausible that an inmate will seek out other inmates of the same race 
or ethnicity, if only to be victimized less by opposing gangs. 
This would tend to make voluntary self-segregation, either by race 
or gang affiliation, a positive force purely from the perspective of 
prison security.307  However, imperfect segregation could be bad for 
inmates of the minority racial or ethnic group or of the minority gang 
who don’t get their first-choice prisons. 
At least one study has found that racial integration may not actual-
ly increase prison violence.  In Texas, where the prison system has 
been progressively desegregated since the late 1970s, the inmate-on-
inmate assault rate was found to be lower among inmates who were 
racially integrated in double cells; moreover, the rate of racially moti-
vated inmate-on-inmate assaults decreased as the prison system be-
came more desegregated.308 
This is an interesting result, although the study had some limita-
tions.  First, inmates were ineligible for placement in racially integrat-
ed double cells if they were members of racial or ethnic gangs or if 
 
305 See id. at 463 (29.2% in 1999, up from 20.4% in 1993); Knox, supra note 107 
(estimating that 26.3% of prison violence is gang-related). 
306 See AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 297, at 16 tbl.5; Robert S. Fong & Salvador 
Buentello, The Detection of Prison Gang Development:  An Empirical Assessment, 55 FED. 
PROBATION, March 1991, at 66, 66 (citing C. G. CAMP & G. M. CAMP, CRIM. JUST. INST., 
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES FOR COMBATING PRISON GANG VIOLENCE (1988)).  
307 Cf. MONTGOMERY & CREWS, supra note 303, at 73 (detailing a current practice 
whereby prison administrators use interfacility transfers to separate rival gangs); Dolo-
vich, supra note 74, at 49 n.250 (“The California Department of Corrections does its 
best to house [rival gang members of the] Surenos and Nortenos in separate facili-
ties.”).  Self-segregation by gang could thus achieve the result that prison administra-
tors already intend, unless the strategy is in fact to selectively transfer inmates to 
achieve a “balance of power” among gangs.  See infra text accompanying notes 354-56.  
In prisons with rival gangs, officials “tolerate and even facilitate gang control.”  See 
Dolovich, supra note 74, at 52 (referring to Los Angeles County jails, where rival gangs 
have organized to share jail amenities, “since for much of the time it ensures order and 
stability”).  With more segregation by gang affiliation, this tolerance for gang control 
would presumably be less necessary, although such segregation might have deleterious 
effects on the outside world.  See infra text accompanying notes 350-60. 
308 See Chad Trulson & James W. Marquart, The Caged Melting Pot:  Toward an Under-
standing of the Consequences of Desegregation in Prisons, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 743, 762 
(2002) (dubbing their theory explaining this trend the “contact hypothesis”). 
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they had had previous race-related problems in prison.309  Second, be-
cause not all interracial assaults were coded as “racially motivated,”310 
it’s possible that some interracial assaults weren’t considered to be di-
rectly motivated by race but were nonetheless motivated by member-
ship in opposite-race gangs.  Such membership may not have been 
known to the prison authorities so as to disqualify the member from 
integrated double-celling. 
Even if prisons do become racially more homogeneous, it may 
make little difference.  To the extent it does make a difference, it 
might actually reduce violence, although life could become worse for 
those who remain in an otherwise racially homogenous prison. 
Finally, regardless of the effect on violence, some might still find 
the “social meaning” of such racial stratification objectionable.311  But 
this voluntary self-segregation wouldn’t be unconstitutional,312 and 
even liberal scholars have been more willing to accept some degree of 
racial segregation in prisons (for instance, on a temporary basis after 
race riots) than in other contexts.313  Moreover, while there’s wide-
spread agreement that children benefit from being exposed to a di-
verse set of their peers,314 no similar consensus exists for prisoners. 
 
309 Id. at 755.  For instance, when Texas was starting to desegregate, gangs pres-
sured inmates to resist desegregation efforts:  “In some cases, serious assaults were per-
petrated on cell partners to earn a ‘racial restriction’ and be placed in a single-race 
cell.”  Trulson et al., supra note 295, at 28  
310 Trulson & Marquart, supra note 308, at 767-69. 
311 Cf. Sarah Spiegel, Comment, Prison “Race Riots”:  An Easy Case for Segregation?, 95 
CALIF. L. REV. 2261, 2276-85 (2007) (objecting to racial segregation within prisons as a 
policy that carries pernicious social meanings). 
312 Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (holding, in the context of a 
written exam to join the District of Columbia police force, that a rule’s disproportion-
ate impact alone does not signal a due process violation). 
313 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
148 (1980) (concluding that racial separation after a prison riot would meet strict scru-
tiny); see also Spiegel, supra note 311, at 2263-64 (noting that Paul Brest and John Hart 
Ely laid the foundation for accepting “racial segregation” as a legitimate response to 
prison rioting (citing Paul Brest, Foreword:  In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1976))); id. at 2264 (“Not a single voice, either from the legal 
academy or from the courts, has contested the characterization of prison race riots as 
the prototypical example of a situation that satisfies strict scrutiny.”). 
314 See Brown, supra note 127, at 297 (“[G]rouping students with different traits 
may have desirable effects and create a kind of external benefit which would be lost if 
students could group themselves.”); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 
(1954) (asserting that segregation in schools is detrimental to children regardless of 
the equality in tangible resources). But see U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE BENE-
FITS OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION 15-
17 (2006), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/112806diversity.pdf (finding little 
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3.  “Market Success” Arguments Against Vouchers 
Suppose that the “market failures” discussed in the previous sec-
tion are relatively harmless, and that the sort of competition described 
above really would improve prisons from a prisoner’s perspective.  If 
whatever allocative harms some prisoners suffer from being in the 
“wrong prison” are outweighed by the benefits of being in a prison 
that is of higher overall quality, would the project be worthwhile? 
Some of the preferences prisoners likely share seem unequivocally 
desirable.  Prisoners probably prefer less violence and sexual abuse, 
better health care, and better vocational training.  They may also pre-
fer prisons close to their families to facilitate visits.315  These all seem 
unobjectionable, on either humanitarian or rehabilitative grounds, 
though many commentators favor more brutal and abusive prisons on 
“retributive” or deterrence grounds.316  I put “retributive” in quotation 
marks to distinguish the casual, popular, “more is better,” “harsh jus-
tice”317 approach to punishment from the more serious retributivism 
of criminal theorists.318 
 
to no evidence that diversity in elementary and secondary schools results in significant 
academic or social benefit). 
315 In the school context, the fact that parents often choose a school based on 
proximity as opposed to “quality” is often cited as a negative aspect of voucher pro-
grams.  This only shows that parents have a broader view of quality than the experts.  
Indeed, to the extent a shorter commute makes life more pleasant for the child and 
his family, why not consider proximity a valid component of quality? 
316 Cf. Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 120 (acknowledging arguments 
that improvements in indigent defense may not be socially desirable because some 
guilty defendants may go unpunished).  But see Mary Sigler, By the Light of Virtue:  Prison 
Rape and the Corruption of Character, 91 IOWA L. REV. 561, 563-64 (2006) (citing prison 
rape jokes in popular culture and questioning their social acceptance). 
317 See, e.g., JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE:  CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE 
WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 15-16 (2003) (arguing that conti-
nental European punishments are milder than American ones because of sociopoliti-
cal traditions inherited in Europe but rejected by the American Revolution). 
318 The latter sometimes cuts in the direction of more punishment, but at other 
times argues in favor of less punishment on justice grounds.  See, e.g., David Gray & 
Jonathan Huber, Retributivism for Progressives:  A Response to Professor Flanders, 70 MD. L. 
REV. 141, 145 (2010) (“[W]e think that American justice is harsh as measured by re-
tributive standards and that it would be less harsh if policymakers took more seriously 
the constraints on punishment that retributivism recommends.”); Robert A. Pugsley, A 
Retributivist Argument Against Capital Punishment, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1501, 1513-23 
(1981) (offering an example of retributivism counseling in favor of a less harsh pun-
ishment).  But see Chad Flanders, Can Retributivism Be Progressive?:  A Reply to Professor 
Gray and Jonathan Huber, 70 MD. L. REV. 166, 167 (2010) (“[A]re Gray and Huber cor-
rect that Kant gives us a ‘retributivism for progressives’?  I am skeptical.”); Chad Flan-
ders, Retribution and Reform, 70 MD. L. REV. 87, 89 (2010) (characterizing as “deeply 
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To the extent we favor these unobjectionable preferences, prison 
vouchers would beneficially remove prison reform from the hands of 
unresponsive democratic majorities and place it in the more respon-
sive hands of impersonal market forces—that is, of competitive pris-
ons and shopping inmates. 
But not all prisoner preferences should be satisfied. (If prisoners 
had nothing but praiseworthy preferences, why would we have locked 
them up?)319 
First, some prisoner preferences shouldn’t be satisfied, even 
though they may be morally neutral.  Consider amenities like gym fa-
cilities and television.  These are commonly derided as “country club” 
amenities,320 although they can be beneficial in maintaining prisoner 
discipline.321  Similarly, conjugal visits, far from being a frivolous luxu-
ry, may be important on rehabilitative grounds.  Conjugal visits may 
reduce the incidence of prison rape, and helping the prisoner main-
tain family connections and marital ties may also reduce recidivism.322 
Nevertheless, the concern over prisoners’ enjoyment of ameni-
ties—for example, pleasant weather conditions—may be sound.323  
 
correct” a critique that at least some types of retributivist philosophy have contributed 
to harsh American punitive practices).  
319 Although I don’t give any normative weight here to the satisfaction of prison-
ers’ preferences in themselves, some have argued that an optimal policy should give 
equal weight to all happiness, including the happiness criminals derive from commit-
ting crimes.  See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law (including 
gains from wrongdoing in social welfare), in 3 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1661, 
1748 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven 
Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 48 
& n.12 (2000) (same); DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER:  WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO 
DO WITH LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS 229-31 (2000) (same).  But see George J. Stigler, 
The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527 (1970) (suggesting that illic-
it utility should not enter the social welfare calculus). 
320 See, e.g., Nygel Lenz, “Luxuries” in Prison:  The Relationship Between Amenity Fund-
ing and Public Support, 48 CRIME & DELIN. 499, 502, 503-05 (2002) (explaining that the 
objects of media complaint—the so-called “Club Feds”—tend to be medium- and low-
security prisons, and that a system of rewards and punishments is important in any 
prison system).   
321 In 1995 and 1999, surveyed correctional administrators were almost evenly split 
on whether to eliminate weight lifting for inmates.  KNOX, supra note 21, at 463-64. 
322 See Rachel Wyatt, Note, Male Rape in U.S. Prisons:  Are Conjugal Visits the Answer?, 
37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 579, 597-602 (2006) (explaining that conjugal visits serve a 
greater purpose than just providing a sexual outlet, and that prison rape may be moti-
vated by more than just a need for sex); see also Suk, supra note 279, at 113-14 (suggest-
ing that prison rape may be the result of a lack of legitimate sexual outlets). 
323 Cf. California to Allow Prisoners to Serve Sentences Online, ONION (Sept. 26, 
2011), http://www.theonion.com/articles/california-to-allow-prisoners-to-serve-sentences-
o,26173 (satirizing California’s prison system).  
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Any amenity that improves the prison from the prisoner’s perspective 
also presumably dilutes its deterrent value, and therefore may be un-
desirable from an optimal deterrence perspective.324  Similarly, from a 
retributive perspective, even small pleasures should be eliminated 
precisely because they’re pleasant. 
This reduction in deterrence may be ameliorated by increasing 
the prison term, but this solution would be expensive relative to mak-
ing prison stays shorter but less pleasant.  In fact, considering the high 
social costs of imprisonment,325 and ignoring any negative effects of 
bad prison conditions on rehabilitation, it may be more efficient for 
deterrence purposes to concentrate on making prison conditions 
worse than to lengthen prison terms.326 
Of course, the full policy analysis is more complicated.  Partisans 
of prison brutality and rape may be right on deterrence grounds but 
wrong on rehabilitation grounds, as brutalization may make prisoners 
more likely to reoffend after their release.327  Having a high-amenity 
prison may, on balance, be socially desirable.  Further, if the deter-
rence skeptics are right,328 then we don’t have to worry about ameni-
 
324 On prison amenities, see Lenz, supra note 320, at 502, 518.  This issue recently 
became newsworthy following the arrest of Norwegian mass murderer Anders Behring 
Breivik and the “posh” conditions of Norwegian prisons, which are “among the cushi-
est in the world.”  See, e.g., The Super-Lux Super Max, FOREIGN POL’Y ( July 25, 2011), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/25/the_super_lux_super_max (ex-
hibiting the relatively upscale conditions of Norway’s prisons, including amenities like 
personal trainers, recording studios, and a rock-climbing wall).  
 For evidence that prison conditions, as proxied by prison death rates, have a de-
terrent effect, see Lawrence Katz et al., Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and Deter-
rence, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 318, 331 (2003).  See also Kelly Bedard & Eric Helland, The 
Location of Women’s Prisons and the Deterrence Effect of “Harder” Time, 24 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 147, 159-61 (2004) (demonstrating that distance between a prison and female 
inmate’s home city also has a deterrent effect); cf. Katz et al., supra at 322 (“We cannot 
stress enough that evidence of a deterrent effect of poor prison conditions is neither a 
necessary nor sufficient condition for arguing that current prison conditions are either 
overly benign or unjustifiably inhumane.”). 
325 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 492 (2004) 
(asserting that nonmonetary sanctions, such as imprisonment, are socially costly,  
both in their operation costs to the state and in the opportunity costs suffered by the 
incarcerated).  
326 Cf. id. at 484-88 (suggesting that, because law enforcement is costly, “sanctions 
should be raised until they are maximal,” and the probability of detection should be 
correspondingly reduced). 
327 See sources cited supra note 17. 
328 See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 64 (1990) (“The most im-
portant normative influence on compliance with the law is the person’s assessment 
that following the law accords with his or her sense of right and wrong; a second factor 
is the person’s feeling of obligation to obey the law and allegiance to legal authori-
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ties weakening deterrence effects at all.  Even so, it is possible that ac-
cess to some amenities should be restricted. 
Second, some prisoner preferences may be affirmatively harmful 
to the outside world.  I’ve already mentioned that we may want to 
force certain prisoners into certain services, like psychological services 
for the mentally ill.329  The prisoners likely would not choose this ser-
vice for themselves; mentally ill prisoners’ distaste for psychiatric 
treatment would thus be socially negative.  More generally, prisoners 
may not value rehabilitation, even if it works (aside from immediately 
useful rehabilitation like vocational training). Some sort of training 
may have to be mandated. 
In a sense, this is similar to mandated curricula in the school con-
text:  just as parents can’t always be trusted to choose the best for their 
children, so too are prisoners perhaps inadequate selectors of their 
own best punishment.  Imagine how much more we might mandate in 
the curriculum if the students themselves could make curricular 
choices.  Solving the agency problem330 by allowing prisoners to 
choose may exacerbate these negative externalities. 
A related concern is that self-selected prisons could be breeding 
grounds for racially separatist or extremist religious movements.  
Many already complain that prisons are “‘fertile grounds for radical 
Muslim chaplains to recruit’ adherents as inmates are already disaf-
fected with America.”331  Thus, critics may fear that prison vouchers 
could lead to inmates self-selecting into a prison for Muslim radicals.  
Compare this to the debate about school vouchers, and the fear that 
parents will have socially undesirable plans for their children’s educa-
tion332 and send their kids to witches’ coven schools or madrassas,333 or 
 
ties.”); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of 
Criminal Law Rules:  At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 953-56 (2003) 
(identifying three prerequisites to criminal deterrence and arguing that potential of-
fenders do not meet the prerequisites).  But see sources cited supra note 324.  
329 See supra text accompanying notes 106-07. 
330 See supra text accompanying note 261. 
331 DeGirolami, supra note 48, at 34 (quoting MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE 
GAVEL:  RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 145 (2005)); see also John W. Popeo, Com-
ment, Combating Radical Islam in Prisons Within the Legal Dictates of the Free Exercise Clause, 
32 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 135, 148-50 (2006) (describing the cur-
rent Bureau of Prisons policies in place to allow Muslim inmates to freely practice their 
religion while simultaneously discouraging violence and terrorism).   
332 E.g., CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, supra note 118, at 
12-14 (noting that many parents don’t cite academic concerns for choosing schools); 
GUTMANN, supra note 247, at 30-31 (suggesting that historically parents have not 
taught their children the value of mutual respect and tolerance);  Elmore, supra note 
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schools whose student makeup matches their children’s race or socio-
economic class.334 
Is this concern over radicalization mere paranoia?  Perhaps, but I 
don’t know for sure.  A 2004 report from the DOJ’s Office of the In-
spector General shows that conversion and radicalization of inmates 
does happen sometimes—domestic terrorists Richard Reid and Jose 
Padilla are the highest-profile recent examples.335  But the report 
doesn’t reveal just how common these examples are.  At least one in-
formed observer—Paul Rogers, president of the American Correc-
 
253, at 306-09 (citing strong parental preferences for close geographic proximity be-
tween home and school). 
 On the other hand, Caroline Hoxby argues that parents’ preferences for their 
children’s schooling tend to be rational.  Caroline M. Hoxby, The Effects of School Choice 
on Curriculum and Atmosphere (arguing that parental choice of school districts encour-
ages more parental involvement, “more challenging curriculums, stricter academic  
requirements, and more structured and discipline-oriented environments,” but not 
necessarily “sports or extracurricular activities”), in EARNING AND LEARNING:  HOW 
SCHOOLS MATTER, supra note 204, at 281, 311-12; see also Banzhaf & Bhalla, supra  
note 278, at 8 & n.6 (collecting sources documenting that “households are willing to  
pay . . . more for housing in districts supplying more educational services”).  
333 E.g., William J. Bennett, Perspective on School Vouchers, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1993, 
at B7 (“In the increasingly shrill world of the NEA and the CTA, allowing parents to 
pick the schools their children will attend raises the specter of ‘David Koresh High 
School,’ science courses in which students learn how to make Molotov cocktails, witch-
es’ covens, etc.”); Neon Mama, School Vouchers Create Madrassas Here, DAILY KOS (Oct. 
23, 2006, 2:50 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2006/10/23/260889/-School-
Vouchers-create-Madrassas-here (passionately asserting the view that school vouchers 
are a mechanism to segregate and brainwash children); cf. Paul Thoreson, Letter to 
the Editor, Cartoon on Vouchers Was Unfair and in Poor Taste, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., 
Oct. 5, 2001, at B9, available at LexisNexis (search “San Diego Union-Tribune” data-
base for “Cartoon on Vouchers”) (condemning a cartoon that drew a connection be-
tween school vouchers and religious terrorism). 
334 See, e.g., Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439-41 (1968) (holding that a 
“freedom of choice” school assignment plan was not an end in itself but only a means 
by which to achieve segregation); GUTMANN, supra note 247, at 119-21 (discussing pos-
sible parental preferences for racial and religious separatism); Wendy Parker, The Color 
of Choice:  Race and Charter Schools, 75 TUL. L. REV. 563, 568 (2001) (discussing use of 
school choice to evade desegregation).  One can argue against this position in various 
ways.  For instance, perhaps government shouldn’t care about children’s religious ed-
ucation; also, housing patterns under the current system already induce racial or class 
segregation in schools.  See Hoxby, supra note 285, at 68 (“[M]any city residents are 
likely to use vouchers to exercise the degree of self-sorting that suburban residents al-
ready exercise.”); Shleifer, supra note 12, at 146 (identifying the potential for segrega-
tion as a critique of voucher programs).  But cf. Elmore, supra note 253, at 307-08 (dis-
cussing a choice system in Cambridge, Massachusetts that “resulted in substantial 
reduction of racial isolation and substantial reduction in the previous racial identifica-
tion by schools”). 
335 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL 
BUREAU OF PRISONS’ SELECTION OF MUSLIM RELIGIOUS SERVICES PROVIDERS 6-9 (2004). 
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tional Chaplains Association—commented that the problem has been 
“blown out of proportion.”336 
But to the extent this fear is warranted, prison vouchers may actu-
ally alleviate the problem.  Some of the concern stems from the activi-
ties of Muslim clerics,337 but many blame primarily an inmate-driven 
“breed of ‘Prison Islam’ that distorts [traditional] Koranic teaching to 
promote violence and gang loyalty.”338  The heavy influence of radical-
ism in Muslim observance in prison, in turn, may be caused by an 
“acute [Muslim] clerical shortage”—as of 2006, there was only one 
chaplain for every 900 inmates.339  Moreover, fears about Muslim reli-
gious activity in prison are founded not only on the radicalization of 
existing Muslims, but also on the conversion of non-Muslims.340  Allow-
ing Muslim prisoners to self-segregate may alleviate the clerical short-
age through economies of scale in chaplaincy and may reduce re-
cruitment among non-Muslims. 
Thus, this concern might not be well-supported with regard to 
Muslims; but perhaps it may still be justified in other cases. 
Moving on to other examples of undesirable prisoner preferences:  
would prisoners prefer prisons that help them escape?  Clearly they 
would, but this preference is easy to control.  Prison escapes are even-
tually, even if not immediately, highly public affairs,341 so voucher pris-
ons could simply be heavily penalized for escapes.  But while this ex-
ample may seem silly, it has a serious core:  sometimes (though not for 
 
336 Terrorism:  Radical Islamic Influence of Chaplaincy of the U.S. Military and Prisons:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech. & Homeland Sec. of the S. Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 108th Cong. 32 (2003) [hereinafter Radical Islamic Influence of Chaplaincy] 
(statement of Paul E. Rogers, President, Am. Corr. Chaplains Assoc.). 
337 See Popeo, supra note 331, at 140 (observing that Muslim chaplains provided by 
the Bureau of Prisons were alleged to have been connected to terrorism and Wahha-
bism); id. at 150 (discussing former New York State Department of Corrections chap-
lain’s support of Wahhabism and pro-terrorism preaching after 9/11). 
338 Primary Sources:  “Prison Islam,” ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2004, at 48 (citing U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 335, at 8), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
magazine/archive/2004/09/primary-sources/3427; cf. Knox, supra note 107, at 15 (stat-
ing that about half of prisons surveyed allow inmates to serve as spiritual leaders). 
339 Popeo, supra note 331, at 138 (quoting Primary Sources:  “Prison Islam,” supra 
note 338); see also Radical Islamic Influence of Chaplaincy, supra note 336, at 33 (identify-
ing state budget deficits as a reason behind the elimination of correctional chaplains). 
340 See Popeo, supra note 331, at 136 (explaining that Wahhabi organizations focus 
on radicalizing prisoners).  
341 But see JOEL DYER, THE PERPETUAL PRISONER MACHINE:  HOW AMERICA PROFITS 
FROM CRIME 204, 211, 221 (2000) (noting some private prisons’ successful efforts to 
cover up problems, such as CCA’s concealment of escapes from its Youngstown facility); 
Developments, supra note 40, at 1884 (same). 
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escapes) undesirable activities are hard to observe. In such cases, 
voucher prisons may have broad scope to cater to prisoners’ antisocial 
preferences. 
One example is easy access to contraband.  Voucherized prisons 
may not have much of an incentive to control contraband like por-
nography, but this likely wouldn’t be terribly harmful.  For contra-
band like drugs or tobacco, voucherized prisons may again have little 
incentive to limit proliferation, except to the extent that drugs make 
prisoners violent.  In that case, at least some prisons would have an in-
centive to control drugs in order to attract security-conscious inmates.  
This last point also applies to weapons.  If prisons are motivated to 
improve security, they will also be motivated to control the flow of 
weapons into the prison. 
Even if voucher prisons would have few incentives to control con-
traband, public prisons already do a bad job.  It is no secret that pris-
ons can’t effectively control the flow of drugs, even into high-security 
prisons.342  Inmates often have drug ties, and the stakes of the in-
prison trade are high, as illegal drugs and tobacco can be sold for up 
to ten times their street value in prison.343 
Prisons may also choose to cater to criminals interested in run-
ning their criminal enterprise from within the prison. Prisons could 
attract such criminals by loosely monitoring incoming and outgoing 
mail, phone calls, and visits.344 
Cell phone smuggling is a related problem, as “[i]llegal cell 
phones are used to circumvent supervision of conversations, and can 
be used by inmates to orchestrate criminal activity, plan escapes, and 
 
342 See Cindy Carcamo, Keeping a Close Watch, FRESNO BEE, Mar. 31, 2003, at B1, 
available at 2003 WLNR 2843074 (estimating that “inspectors catch only about 5% of 
drugs sent through” Corcoran State Prison in California).   
343 See IRA SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS:  A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW 240 (2d ed. 2001) 
(explaining that a small bag of tobacco worth less than a dollar outside of prison can 
sell for twenty-five dollars inside); Carcamo, supra note 342 (noting that a hit of heroin 
sold for $10 on the streets goes for about $50 inside Corcoran State Prison); Greg Gar-
land, Contraband Floods Md. Prisons:  Officials Struggle to Stem Inflow of Drugs, Tobacco, 
BALT. SUN, July 6, 2005, at A1, available at 2005 WLNR 10576160 (“A pound of loose 
tobacco that costs $100 to get into a prison can bring upward of $1,000 once inside.”). 
344 To some extent, prisons do try to control inmates’ attempts to continue their 
outside criminal activities from the inside.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 
63, at V-10 (stating that inmates who utilize the telephone for criminal activities are 
subject to increased security measures). 
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be a menace outside of prison walls.”345  Inmates have always been able 
to plan criminal activity or intimidate witnesses through prison visits 
by confederates, calls on approved prison phones, and other means, 
but communication with the outside has its costs.  La Nuestra Familia 
members resort to various methods, including use of the Aztec lan-
guage, “micro writing,” codes, messages hidden in artwork, and relay-
ing messages sent through paroled members.346  Cell phones can re-
duce these costs substantially, and detecting progressively smaller 
modern cell phones has become more difficult in recent years. 
To the extent cell phones encourage disorder and violence within 
the prison, we might expect voucher prisons to police cell phone smug-
gling.  Unfortunately, this may not hold true since the main disad-
vantages of cell phone smuggling likely flow to people on the outside, 
such as intimidated witnesses or future crime victims.  Cell phone jam-
ming technology may provide a technological resolution to this prob-
lem, although implementation would require a change in the law.347 
The bottom line on smuggling is that prisons will have incentives 
to control some forms of smuggling but not others.348 
 
345 Lawmakers Push to Criminalize Prison Cell Phone Smuggling as Problem Spreads, CAL. 
DEP’T CORR. & REHAB. (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/Press_Release_ 
Archive/2009_Press_Releases/April_14.html. 
346 David Skarbek, Putting the “Con” into Constitutions:  The Economics of Prison Gangs, 
26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 183, 195 (2010). 
347 One commentator notes:  
The FCC, and therefore the wireless industry, has interpreted the Federal 
Communications Act of 1934 to prohibit intentional interference with any 
wireless signal:  “[T]he [marketing, sale or operation] of transmitters de-
signed to prevent, jam or interfere with the operation of cellular and personal 
communications service . . . telephones . . . is unlawful” under Section 333 of 
the Act. . . .  The federal government is exempted from this prohibition . . . , 
but the exemption does not apply to state and local entities. 
Erin Fitzgerald, Comment, Cell “Block” Silence:  Why Contraband Cellular Telephone Use in 
Prisons Warrants Federal Legislation to Allow Jamming Technology, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1269, 
1282-83 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 333 (2006) and Public Notice, Sale or Use of Transmit-
ters Designed to Prevent, Jam or Interfere with Cell Phone Communications is Prohib-
ited in the United States, 20 FCC Rcd. 11134, 11134 ( June 27, 2005) (alteration in 
original)); see also Jack Dolan, Blocking Cells in Cellblocks, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2011, at 
AA 1 (detailing the California prisons’ plans to pursue a deal with companies provid-
ing in-prison phone services to install cell phone signal-blocking technology); Prisons 
and Mobile Phones:  Bricking the Intruders, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 2010, at 39 (noting that a 
bill allowing state prisons to jam mobile phone signals is unlikely to pass). 
348 Smuggling can still be measured, albeit imperfectly.  The government could try to 
smuggle contraband into the prison—perhaps by using a fake inmate who would try to 
acquire drugs or a cell phone, or by using a real inmate whose cooperation has been pur-
chased.  A prison that is discovered to be tolerating smuggling could thus expect to suffer 
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Recall the discussion above about self-segregation by race or eth-
nicity.349  There, I argued that such self-segregation may not be bad for 
inmates, since whatever benefits diversity provides to students, such 
benefits are probably smaller for adult prisoners.  Given the correla-
tion between race and prison gangs, self-segregation may actually have 
the beneficial effect of reducing violence. 
But self-segregation has negative effects beyond prison.  Being 
around members of one’s own community, and members of one’s 
own outside criminal community, makes prison less undesirable, and 
therefore constitutes an amenity that reduces prison’s deterrent value.  
Further, many gangs, like the Mexican Mafia, La Nuestra Familia, or 
the Nazi Low Riders, operate on the outside as well as in prison.350  In 
fact, various outside gangs may have originated in prison.351  Thanks to 
telephone and mail monitoring and other measures,352 gangs that op-
erate across prisons and in the outside world experience difficulties in 
communicating.353  Concentrating gang members in one place would 
 
penalties.  This strategy will only be as effective as inmates’ willingness to serve as conscien-
tious double agents, so some smuggling—particularly the kind that is harmful but not con-
trary to the interests of prison administrators—may continue to be a problem.  
349 See supra text accompanying notes 282-95. 
350 See, e.g., United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 970 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that 
the Mexican Mafia gained influence outside of the prison system by taxing drug deal-
ers and collecting dues from Mexican street gangs); CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ORGA-
NIZED CRIME IN CALIFORNIA:  ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 2004, 
at 8-11, available at http://ag.ca.gov/publications/org_crime2004.pdf (explaining how 
California gangs maintain criminal contacts inside and outside of prison); Fong & 
Buentello, supra note 306, at 66 (arguing that prison gangs have developed into orga-
nized crime syndicates); James B. Jacobs, Foreword:  Focusing on Prison Gangs, CORREC-
TIONS MGMT. Q., Winter 2001, at vi (highlighting the danger of prison gangs working 
to bolster street gangs); David Skarbek, Governance and Prison Gangs, 105 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 702, 709-14 (2011) (describing broad categories of Mexican Mafia activity occur-
ring inside and outside of prison).  The Mexican Mafia also provides socially useful 
services by “regulat[ing] drive-by shootings, which bring law enforcement and media 
attention.”  Id. at 711 (citing TONY RAFAEL, THE MEXICAN MAFIA 37 (2007)).  Accord-
ing to George Knox, not all prison gangs also operate in the outside world:  in Illinois, 
the Southern Illinois Association and the Northsiders, both white “self-protection” 
gangs that formed in response to minority gangs, are exclusively prison gangs.  KNOX, 
supra note 21, at 431-32. 
351 See Knox & Tromanhauser, supra note 299, at 15 (citing LAWRENCE J. BOBROWSKI, 
COLLECTING, ORGANIZING AND REPORTING STREET GANG CRIME (1988)); Steve Daniels, 
Prison Gangs:  Confronting the Threat, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Apr. 1987, at 66.  
352 See AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 297, at 21 tbl.8 (showing frequent use of tele-
phone monitoring in prisons); KNOX, supra note 21, at 464 (stating that in 1999, 
91.4% of surveyed correctional administrators believed telephone monitoring and 
91.5% believed mail monitoring stopped gang members from maintaining ties to out-
side gang members). 
353 See supra text accompanying note 346. 
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probably reduce these communication costs.  This is why various pris-
on systems try to disperse gangs throughout many different institu-
tions.354  Individual prisons also try to isolate gang leaders or mem-
bers355 by transferring them among prisons or even out of state.356 
Concentrating gang members might not be all bad.  Just as dis-
persing a gang increases its recruitment opportunities,357 self-
segregation may reduce the gang’s power.358  Other aspects of the 
prison voucher system might also reduce the power of prison gangs.  
Prison gangs control street gangs in large part by threatening violence 
against gang members who don’t pay and by offering protection to 
gang members who do.359  To the extent that prison vouchers lead to a 
more secure prison environment,360 gangs’ carrot-and-stick scheme 
would be less effective, thus reducing their influence. 
This whole discussion implies a continuing role for government 
regulation to prevent prisons from offering amenities that are too at-
tractive and to prevent prisons from catering to prisoners’ socially un-
desirable preferences.361  One way to implement this would be to cre-
ate an oversight agency with the ability to prevent prisons from 
 
354 Peter M. Carlson, Prison Interventions:  Evolving Strategies to Control Security Threat 
Groups, CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q., Winter 2001, at 10, 21.  California separated different 
groups in the 1970s, but moved to integrated yards in the 1980s, which reduced vio-
lence.  Id. at 16. 
355 E.g., KNOX, supra note 21, at 437 (explaining that a maximum-strength model 
for a zero-tolerance gang policy would include removing from the general population 
all active and verified gang members and placing them in isolation); id. at 466 (show-
ing institutions increasingly consider gang membership in inmate classification); Knox, 
supra note 107, at 27 (“[T]wo-thirds [of surveyed prisons] have classification systems 
that consider gang membership”).   
356 See AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 297, at 20-21; KNOX, supra note 21, at 448, 467-
68; MONTGOMERY & CREWS, supra note 303, at 27; see also Knox & Tromanhauser, supra 
note 299, at 17 tbl.1, 19 (showing that 54.2% of administrators had used transfers to 
control gang activity); Mark S. Fleisher & Scott H. Decker, An Overview of the Challenge 
of Prison Gangs, CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q., Winter 2001, at 7-8 (discussing use of out-of-
state transfers to disrupt gang activity).   
357 See Fleisher & Decker, supra note 356, at 8 (stating that transfers may function 
to spread gangs rather than control them). 
358 Not all prison systems rely on dispersing inmates.  See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 
354, at 21 (describing Connecticut system of disincentives for inmates in gang activity).  
Knox lamented in 2000 that “[t]here has been absolutely no evaluation research what-
soever reported on the efficacy of any of [the common] techniques or strategies for 
dealing with gangs in the correctional environment.”  KNOX, supra note 21, at 441. 
359 Skarbek, supra note 350, at 702.  
360 See supra Section III.A. 
361 See supra text accompanying note 148. 
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offering, or competing based on, particular amenities that it finds to 
be undesirable.362 
This proposal would be a total reversal of the current political dy-
namic, where political forces work to keep prison quality low, and im-
proving it is extremely difficult. 
But government regulation, by agency or otherwise, is an imper-
fect fix because not all undesirable amenities can be monitored.  The 
“market success” argument against prison vouchers is strong, since so-
cial losses stemming from satisfying undesirable prisoner preferences 
may be great.  The question is whether this residual amount of unde-
sirable activity outweighs the desirable consequences of prisoner 
choice, such as reducing prison assaults and rapes, improving medical 
care, alleviating overcrowding, and providing better job training. 
IV.  THE POLITICS OF PRISON VOUCHERS 
I have already discussed how prison vouchers could completely re-
verse the current political dynamic, which conspires to keep prisons 
low quality.  Government instead would have to intervene to keep 
prisons from becoming too “good” from the prisoners’ perspective 
and maintain prison’s deterrent force. 
The revolutionary potential of vouchers may be more important 
for prisons than for schools.  There seems to be more hope to reform 
schools politically, without using choice, because society at large em-
pathizes with students in failing schools.363  Prisoners, by contrast, are 
generally despised, tend to come from communities without political 
power, and are often disenfranchised.364 
This proposal is of course subject to the same critique as all re-
form proposals seeking to remedy a politically insoluble problem.  If 
the problem is politically insoluble, there are likely constituencies op-
posed to any remedy at all, and therefore any reform, even if perfect, 
may never be adopted.365  Section A presents a practical vision of how 
prison vouchers could be adopted.  Essentially, if it is true that vouch-
 
362 For an argument that this is politically feasible, see infra text accompanying 
note 385.   
363 See supra note 24. 
364 See, e.g., Sigler, supra note 251, at 160 (explaining that inmates are virtually 
powerless to effect changes in prison conditions because they do not have a strong po-
litical position); Developments, supra note 40, at 1942-49 (describing various states’ felon 
disenfranchisement laws). 
365 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 26-28. 
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ers would improve prison quality and would also make faith-based 
prisons constitutional, vouchers could be adopted by a coalition of 
groups interested in prisoner welfare and groups interested in prison 
ministry—a coalition that would not exist for prison reform alone.  
Section B speculates on the political fate of vouchers once they are 
adopted.  One possibility is that funding might decrease if prison 
quality improves; another is that the political system could regulate 
prison quality to prevent it from becoming too good, perhaps by ad-
ministrative agency. 
A.  An Adoption Coalition 
One can tell a plausible story about how prison vouchers might 
succeed politically.  Support for prison vouchers is different than sup-
port for arbitrary prison-conditions reform; the political infeasibility of 
the latter need not imply the political infeasibility of the former. 
The “cultural cognition” literature suggests how to mobilize con-
stituencies by cleverly packaging reforms to convince different groups 
that their concerns are being heard.  For instance, Dan Kahan and his 
coauthors argue that conservatives during the George H.W. Bush ad-
ministration were convinced to support the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990 because environmental improvements were packaged 
with an emissions permit–trading scheme.366  Similarly, packaging nu-
clear power as a way to reduce reliance on fossil fuels responsible for 
global warming not only convinces environmentalists to become more 
supportive of nuclear power, but also convinces those generally un-
sympathetic to environmental concerns to become more supportive of 
action to address global warming.367 
 
366 See Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy:  A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on 
Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1097-98 (2006) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF 
FEAR:  BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005)) (dubbing this phenomenon 
the “self-affirmation effect”). 
367 Id. at 1098; see also, e.g., id. at 1098-99 (discussing similar mechanisms that led 
both pro-life and pro-choice factions to support an abortion law in France); id. at 1099-
1100 (exploring potential packaging mechanisms as options to achieve consensus on 
gun policy); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 168-70 (2006) (using the success of abortion reforms in 
France and the emergence of political consensus favoring tradeable emissions as ex-
amples of self-affirmation); Amanda Leiter, The Perils of a Half-Built Bridge:  Risk Percep-
tion, Shifting Majorities, and the Nuclear Power Debate, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 31, 47-48 (2008) 
(reviewing the self-affirmation theory through the lens of air pollution regulation and 
nuclear power policy). 
VOLOKH REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2012  7:15 PM 
854 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol.160: 779 
Prison vouchers could take advantage of a similar dynamic.  Peo-
ple on the left may not be inclined to support vouchers, but some 
could change their view if the program were packaged as a way to im-
prove prison conditions.  Economic conservatives may not be interest-
ed in improving prison conditions, but they might approve of vouch-
ers being tested in a new field, both to allow market forces to operate 
and because prison vouchers, if successful, may strengthen the case 
for vouchers in other areas, such as education.  Furthermore, social 
conservatives may support prison vouchers because such a program 
could make faith-based prisons constitutional.368  Such a left/right 
prison-reform coalition isn’t unheard of:  a bipartisan coalition enact-
ed RLUIPA based on reports revealing the heavy-handed treatment of 
prisoners’ religious claims,369 and the Prison Rape Elimination Act was 
likewise a bipartisan effort (indeed, it passed unanimously).370  As 
Robert Weisberg and David Mills write, “The clear interest of [con-
servative evangelical organizations] in promoting religion among in-
mates has helped create a strange-bedfellowship with leftist prisoners’ 
rights groups.”371 
This scenario is possible even without relying on “cultural cogni-
tion” theory.  Cass Sunstein has disputed Kahan’s account of the 
Clean Air Act, arguing that conservatives supported emissions trading 
not because of any clever crossover packaging, but rather because the 
Bush White House was under pressure to pass air quality legislation 
and emissions trading was the cheapest option.372  Similarly, there 
needn’t be anything cultural about voucher support; the left and dif-
ferent wings of the right can support prison vouchers for rational rea-
sons, even if those reasons are different for each group. 
This sort of coalition provides one explanation of how vouchers 
could be enacted—with all the potential beneficial effects for prison-
ers—even though there isn’t enough of a political constituency to im-
prove prisoner welfare by more direct means.  The entire coalition 
needn’t be motivated by prisoner well-being.  And once vouchers are 
enacted, the need to urge legislators or administrators to act contrary 
to their political self-interest evaporates; rather, the changes happen 
automatically, through market mechanisms.  In addition, “vouchers” 
 
368 See supra Section II.A.  
369 See supra text accompanying notes 231-34. 
370 See Weisberg & Mills, supra note 236. 
371 Id. 
372 Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing:  A Reply, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1110, 1120-21 (2006). 
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needn’t be an all-or-nothing proposition; politics would also deter-
mine which type of voucher scheme would be adopted. 
School vouchers are an instructive example.  Universal school 
vouchers have repeatedly failed at the polls, in part because of opposi-
tion from upper-income homeowners.373  Under a system of assigned 
neighborhood schools, the value of local schools is capitalized into 
home values.  Homes in good areas—areas which, under a system of 
local property tax-funded schools, tend to also have good schools—are 
worth even more, and homes in bad areas are worth even less:  the 
rich get richer.374  Universal school vouchers partially break the con-
nection between where one lives and where one attends school, alt-
hough distance still counts for something.  Thus, vouchers will reduce 
home prices in good areas and increase them in bad areas.375 Small 
wonder that upper-middle-class homeowners, whose schools are al-
ready good, don’t support universal vouchers. 
In a sense, this is good news for prison vouchers, which do not 
imply reallocations of property-based wealth.376  More to the point, the 
political problems of universal school vouchers have led to the adop-
tion of targeted vouchers, for instance to students in failing schools.377  
Thus, even if universal prison vouchers don’t have a constituency, 
 
373 Thomas J. Nechyba, Introducing School Choice into Multidistrict Public School Sys-
tems, in THE ECONOMICS OF SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 70, at 145, 189-91. 
374  Eric Brunner et al., Capitalization and the Voucher:  An Analysis of Precinct Returns 
from California’s Proposition 174, 50 J. URBAN ECON. 517, 519-21 (2001). 
375 See id. at 519 (explaining that the quality of a community’s public schools af-
fects home value); Nechyba, supra note 373, at 189 (noting that “homeowners in good 
districts experience relatively large capital losses” in a voucher system while those in 
poor districts experience gains). 
376 Actually, this isn’t quite true.  To the extent that corrections officials tend to 
assign inmates to prisons near their homes and families—and to the extent that in-
mates would choose different prisons under a voucher system—prison vouchers, like 
school vouchers, would break the link between place of residence and place of incar-
ceration (or education), which can alter residential patterns.  Criminals who expect to 
be eventually incarcerated wouldn’t need to live near a high-quality prison—they 
could just choose it with their vouchers.  Frankly, I find this mechanism quite specula-
tive, to say the least.  But I thought it worth mentioning as a potential intriguing impli-
cation of the system.  Cf. MARIO PUZO, THE LAST DON 56 (1996) (describing the fic-
tional Don Clericuzio, who upon hearing that Americans believed it was better to let a 
hundred guilty men go free than to convict one innocent man was “[s]truck almost 
dumb by the beauty of the concept . . . [and] became an ardent patriot”); Alexander 
Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 204 (1997) (advising criminals to move to 
New Mexico or Oklahoma, where the presumption of innocence, judging by state 
courts’ statements of the Blackstone ratio, seems strongest).   
377 See Nechyba, supra note 373, at 189-91. 
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there may still be a possibility for vouchers targeted, for example, to 
prisoners at the worst-performing prisons. 
B.  Post-Adoption Coalitions and Politics 
However, if there is a fundamental constituency opposed to good 
prison conditions, whether for deterrence purposes or because of 
populist “tough-on-crime” retributivism,378 that constituency won’t stay 
silent.  Even if the pro-voucher constituency remains intact, so that 
vouchers, once adopted, aren’t repealed, the voucher scheme will still 
be responsive to popular politics. 
First, much depends on how generously the vouchers are funded.  
As noted above, the per-pupil value of school vouchers is less than per-
pupil costs in public schools,379 and it’s unclear at what level prison 
vouchers would be initially funded.  If vouchers indeed improve pris-
on conditions, what funding level should rational voters choose?380 
Over time, voters would most likely decrease funding because as 
prison spending is more productive, the resulting savings could be 
applied to other social goals like welfare, education, the military, or 
tax reduction.381  Economic conservatives might accept funding de-
creases to pay for more worthy causes or provide tax relief.  Religious 
conservatives might accept funding decreases so long as they don’t 
threaten the viability of faith-based prisons, which may already be 
cheaper due to subsidies from local churches.  Finally, although 
“tough on crime” and deterrence-minded voters who want prison 
conditions to be bad may not have been part of the coalition that en-
acted vouchers, they will join the coalition to defund them.  This latter 
constituency may assert itself through populist outrage at the ameni-
ties enjoyed by inmates. 
These funding decreases will reduce the ultimate extent of any 
improvement vouchers may offer.  In the extreme case, funding may 
fall to keep prisoner welfare constant; all the benefits will thus accrue 
to the taxpayers, and none to the prisoners themselves.  This extreme 
 
378 See supra text accompanying notes 315-18. 
379 See supra note 128. 
380 For a discussion of endogenously determined voucher parameter levels under 
different sorts of school voucher schemes (a universal lump-sum voucher, a means-
tested voucher, and a means-equalizing voucher), see Raquel Fernández & Richard 
Rogerson, School Vouchers as a Redistributive Device:  An Analysis of Three Alternative Sys-
tems, in THE ECONOMICS OF SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 70, at 195, 221-24. 
381 Cf. Hoxby, supra note 198, at 1236-37 (arguing that, empirically, Tiebout choice 
improves school productivity by increasing quality while decreasing spending). 
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case seems especially likely if prisoner welfare helps no one but pris-
oners.  However, given that prisoner welfare does have some positive 
spillover for the rest of society such as rehabilitation, prisoners may 
reap at least some part of the gains. 
This argument is highly speculative.  The main point is that the 
level of funding is endogenous, so defenses of vouchers that rely on 
predicted quality improvements for a given level of funding382 may be 
mistaken.383 
So far, I’ve assumed that the only political avenue open after 
vouchers are approved involves fine-tuning the level of funding.  
However, there are also regulatory alternatives, which may be more 
attractive to deterrence- and retributivism-minded voters. 
I mentioned above that there’s a continuing role for regulation to 
play in preventing prisoners from choosing amenities that are posi-
tively harmful, or amenities that are neutral but dilute the deterrent 
value of prison.384  One way to implement such regulation would be to 
designate an agency—possibly the Department of Corrections or some 
independent agency385—to oversee prison offerings and to prevent 
specified amenities from being offered or advertised.  There’s proba-
bly an overlap between amenities preferred by efficiency-minded vot-
ers (where the rehabilitative value outweighs the decrease in deter-
rence value) and those preferred by retributivist voters (where the 
amenity is consistent with the moral purposes of punishment).  If such 
a system works, then both deterrence-minded and retributivism-
minded voters should have more confidence that, to the extent pris-
oner welfare increases, such increase is acceptable.  The more effec-
tive such regulation, the less pressure there will be to reduce the level 
of the voucher. 
 
382 Cf. Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 118-19 (“Until now we have put to 
one side the question of how generously indigent defense services will be funded; we 
have simply argued that, with whatever resources society allocates to indigent defense, 
freedom of choice will enhance the quality of the services delivered.”).  But see id. (ar-
guing also that a voucher system will alleviate funding inadequacies by making them 
more visible).  
383 Some privatization critics charge that prison privatization will make prisoners 
worse off because it will send the message that prisoners are “not our problem.”  See 
DiIulio, supra note 195, at 74 (“[S]ocietal pressures against inmate abuse and political 
corruption will be at low ebb when these largely underclass and minority populations of 
offenders are placed in nonpublic hands.”).  However, these concerns, even if true, are 
not issues here, since vouchers don’t need to change the level of prison privatization. 
384 See supra text accompanying notes 361-62. 
385 See HARDING, supra note 145, at 161-65 (proposing a prison model where pri-
vate and public prisons are governed by an independent authority). 
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In other work, I’ve considered the argument that prison privatiza-
tion increases pro-incarceration political advocacy on the theory that 
private prisons, unlike public prisons, benefit from having more in-
mates and keeping them behind bars longer.386  I’ve argued that this 
increase is unlikely:  public corrections officers’ unions are already 
major pro-incarceration lobbyists, and introducing more private pris-
ons could decrease the total amount of political advocacy, since any 
benefits from lobbying for increased incarceration would have to be 
shared with the rest of the prison sector. 
This conclusion depended on the assumption that “targeted” lob-
bying is difficult—that a private prison firm or a public corrections of-
ficers’ union will find it difficult to lobby for an increase in incarcera-
tion that would benefit the lobbying group exclusively.387  If, 
hypothetically, a single private prison firm, or the whole private-prison 
industry acting as a bloc,388 operated all minimum-security prisons 
while public prisons operated all maximum-security prisons, the pri-
vate firm would get all the benefit of its lobbying if it advocated a par-
ticular pro-incarceration measure that only affected minimum-security 
prisoners, like increased penalties for white-collar crime.  However, I 
considered that possibility to be fairly remote since private firms cur-
rently operate a range of facilities similar to the public sector. 
In a world with vouchers, though, there may be more and more 
specialized prisons catering to identifiable niches of prisoners.  In such 
a world, the possibility that private firms might lobby in favor of incar-
ceration could emerge as a realistic possibility.  Depending on one’s 
view of self-interested, pro-incarceration lobbying,389 this possibility 
might affect one’s opinion regarding the desirability of vouchers. 
 
386 See Volokh, supra note 268, at 1220-21 (arguing that prison privatization will not 
lead to more pro-incarceration advocacy); see also Alexander Volokh, Privatization, Free 
Riding, and Industry-Expanding Lobbying, 30 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 62, 65-66 (2010) 
(“[C]oncerns that privatization will increase the amount or effect of advocacy . . . are 
unfounded . . . .”). 
387 Volokh, supra note 386, at 67. 
388 See Volokh, supra note 268, at 1237-40 (describing the different possible forms 
of cooperation among private prisons); see also Volokh, supra note 386, at 64 (explain-
ing how each form of collusion would affect industry-expanding advocacy). 
389 See Volokh, supra note 268, at 1203 (assuming, for purposes of the analysis, 
“that economically self-interested pro-incarceration advocacy is undesirable”); id. at 
1248-49 (advancing the idea that pro-incarceration advocacy is not always self-
interested, or if self-interested, is not necessarily bad). 
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CONCLUSION 
In the Introduction, I invited the reader to speculate on prison 
vouchers by drawing an analogy with school vouchers.  Throughout, 
I’ve cited the education literature to see how it can inform our predic-
tions as to the operation of prison choice.  Let’s briefly do the same 
exercise in reverse and see whether thinking about prisons can shed 
any light on education. 
In today’s political environment, school voucher proponents and 
partisans of private education typically identify with the right, in part 
because most private schools are religious.  The status quo of public 
schools is identified with the left, although many on the left favor re-
forming public education from within.  Reinforcing this dynamic, 
vouchers are associated with economic arguments about the benefits of 
competition, which tend to be associated with the free market right.390 
However, for prisons, the political valence is reversed.  Prison re-
formers are usually associated with the left, though privatization pro-
ponents (who are usually on the right) argue strenuously that privati-
zation would improve prison quality.  Opposition to prison reform 
(the status quo) is associated with the law-and-order right. 
Suppose that prison vouchers would improve the well-being of 
prisoners, particularly regarding prisoner health care and freedom 
from assault—shortcircuiting the unsympathetic political and judicial 
processes.  Further suppose that the negative effects discussed above 
don’t outweigh the positives, so that vouchers end up actually being a 
good idea.  If so, from a prison-reform perspective, vouchers would 
have worked a humanitarian miracle.  Might the left then reconsider 
its opposition to vouchers in general, even as a tool of school reform? 
It may seem fanciful to think that people would change their 
minds entirely.  After all, education and prisons are distinct topics, 
with different policy concerns.391  What works in prison reform might 
not work in education.  But at least, if some people had been uncom-
fortable with the very idea of vouchers, due to a general unease with 
market-based arguments, perhaps a positive experience with prison 
vouchers would make these people more willing to entertain argu-
ments in favor of vouchers in other areas. 
 
390 But this is not necessarily so.  See Forman, supra note 3, at 1309-12 (discussing 
the supportive contributions of progressives to the school voucher debate). 
391 See Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 76-77 (concluding that varying policy 
considerations animate support for or opposition to privatization in different areas).  
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Consider the same issue from the other side.  People on the right 
who are unsympathetic to prisoners may oppose the idea of prison 
vouchers because vouchers give unwarranted decisionmaking authori-
ty to prisoners.  Depriving prisoners of decisionmaking authority may 
be considered another form of punishment, supported on retributivist 
grounds.  Or perhaps this opposition comes from the disconnect be-
tween prisoners’ and nonprisoners’ preferences:  after all, social wel-
fare does not include only prisoner welfare, but also (and perhaps 
primarily) the welfare of victims and members of society as a whole. 
But this last point is the exact argument made by the anti-school-
voucher left.  While some on the right have treated parental choice as 
an end in itself, communitarian arguments have stressed the interests 
of the children left behind, the true interests of children (such as ra-
cial balance) that some parents may not adequately value, the pres-
ence of antisocial values among certain parents, and the interests of 
society as a whole.  Perhaps greater exposure to communitarian ar-
guments against prison vouchers will make school voucher advocates 
more accepting of communitarian arguments generally—which 
might, in the long run, undermine their own arguments in favor of 
school choice. 
On the constitutional side, under a voucher system, I’ve noted 
that everyone should be entitled to a spot in a prison that provides the 
whole usual complement of rights.  This means that (focusing on the 
Establishment Clause) they’re entitled to a secular prison spot; it also 
means that (focusing on the other constitutional rights) they’re enti-
tled to not be offered “deals” that wouldn’t pass muster under the un-
constitutional conditions doctrine as it’s currently applied in prisons. 
So far, this issue rarely, if ever, comes up for schools.  Students 
almost always have the option of going to a government-run public 
school, which by nature must already be compliant.  But imagine a 
voucherized world where education is still compulsory but govern-
ment no longer provides it, or even a nonvoucherized world where 
the government assigns students to a private school.392 
In such a world, it seems that the government should be required 
to provide a compliant school experience to any student who wants 
one, either by running a public school of last resort or by contracting 
with a private school to provide constitutional rights.  This require-
 
392 See, e.g., Logiodice v. Trs. of Me. Cent. Inst., 296 F.3d 22, 24-25 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(providing an example of a school district that had no public high school and con-
tracted with a private school to educate its students). 
VOLOKH REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2012  7:15 PM 
2012] Prison Vouchers 861 
ment of constitutional compliance should exist as long as education is 
compulsory; the government could relieve itself of this duty by making 
education noncompulsory (not an option for prisons, of course). 
At least, that’s the rule that I’d like.  Unfortunately, it seems to fit 
uneasily within current state action doctrine.  The “traditional public 
function” doctrine isn’t well suited to schools, and it seems excessive 
(under current doctrine) to make all schools into state actors just be-
cause of compulsory education laws.  But the analysis here suggests a 
possible change to state action doctrine:  with respect to their status as 
custodians of school children subject to compulsory education, 
schools should be considered state actors.  Of course, these schools 
would still be able to benefit from a liberal unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine as long as any student can demand a “constitutionally 
compliant” school; students’ parents would still be able to agree to 
waive their children’s rights as the “price” of whatever educational 
benefits the school offered.393  The intuitive reason is the same as for 
prisons:  as long as education is compulsory, children are forced to at-
tend school just as inmates are forced to go to prison.394 
Even now, the education system contains both “voluntary” and 
“compulsory” students, depending on whether they’re above or below 
the compulsory education age.  In a fully voucherized world without 
public schools, a private school might then have some students with 
 
393 Or perhaps, transcending state action doctrine entirely, the duty to provide the 
constitutionally compliant alternative should merely remain with the government it-
self, rather than with the school.  See Metzger, supra note 120, at 1457-61 (advancing 
such a theory as part of a new “delegation” analysis). 
394 The Supreme Court has occasionally noted the connection between children’s 
constitutional rights and the existence of compulsory education laws.  However, at 
public schools, this connection hasn’t been important, since the mere fact that public 
schools are staffed by government employees is already sufficient for state action.  See 
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985) (explaining that public schools derive 
their authority from the state, not from parental authority, and therefore are subject to 
the Fourth Amendment as state actors); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977) 
(stating that, consistent with compulsory education laws, the state has the authority to 
impose corporal punishment); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 81 (1985) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (recognizing the distinction between Pres-
idential Proclamations regarding religion aimed at adults “in a noncoercive setting” 
and “government-sponsored religious exercises . . . directed at impressionable children 
who are required to attend school”); School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203, 307 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (arguing that public-school Bible read-
ings are unconstitutional in part because “school attendance is statutorily compelled”); 
cf. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 209 (1948) (noting disapprov-
ingly, in the context of a religious education program in public schools, that “[t]he 
operation of the State’s compulsory education system . . . assists and is integrated with 
the program of religious instruction carried on by separate religious sects”). 
VOLOKH REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2012  7:15 PM 
862 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol.160: 779 
unadulterated due process rights (based on a constitutional-school-of-
last-resort contract with the government), other students who (or 
whose parents) have traded away their due process rights, and still 
other students (above the compulsory education age) who lack due 
process rights entirely. 
 
*      *      * 
 
Some advocates for vouchers have been extremely optimistic 
about the ability of vouchers to improve quality of service.  School 
vouchers, for instance, promised to remove education reform from 
the hands of unresponsive democratic majorities, obstructionist 
teachers’ unions, and an unsympathetic legal system.  As early voucher 
advocates John Chubb and Terry Moe put it:  “Without being too lit-
eral about it, we think reformers would do well to entertain the notion 
that choice is a panacea . . . . It has the capacity all by itself to bring 
about the kind of transformation that, for years, reformers have been 
seeking to engineer in myriad other ways.”395 
I don’t make any such strong claims about prison vouchers 
(though I do agree with Chubb and Moe about the revolutionary po-
tential of market forces).  I do believe that prison vouchers, if enacted, 
could radically change how prisons work; the question is whether that 
change would be for the better.  I believe the constitutional effects—
making faith-based prisons constitutional and loosening the unconsti-
tutional conditions doctrine—would probably be positive.  But the ef-
fects on prison quality are much less clear. 
Potential social positives include improvements in the desirable  
aspects of prisoner welfare, like lower rates of prison rape and better 
prison medical care, along with the benefits that this would yield for so-
ciety at large, such as more effective rehabilitation and thus lower crime 
rates and less spread of communicable disease.  These have all been  
extremely difficult to attain in the current political climate, as reformers 
have had to rely on pro-prisoner legislation, administrative action, or 
judicial decisions to effect change.  These benefits are substantial. 
The negatives include reductions in deterrence from higher pris-
on quality or “improvements” in the antisocial aspects of prisoner wel-
fare that can’t be controlled through regulation.  These, too, are 
probably substantial. 
 
395 JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 
217 (1990). 
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If undesirable actions were fully observable, the negative effects of 
prison vouchers could be controlled by regulation,396 for example, 
preventing prisons from competing on ease of escape by penalizing 
escapes, or mandating cell phone jamming technology.  If inmates, 
not prisons, are responsible for the undesirable behavior, the regula-
tion could either act on inmates directly (for example, forbidding sex 
offenders from transferring into a prison without sex offender treat-
ment), or control inmates indirectly by acting on prisons (reducing or 
eliminating voucher revenues from sex offenders if the prison doesn’t 
have sex offender treatment). 
The real problem arises when undesirable actions are unobserva-
ble.397  It’s hard to tell how much contraband gets into a prison.  We 
don’t know who’s a gang member or gang leader,398 so we can’t control 
gang members’ movements if transfer is easy.  While some of the nega-
tive effects of prison vouchers can be controlled, some uncontrollable 
and residual effects will remain that we would just have to live with. 
The question is whether these residual negative effects outweigh 
the positives.  Perhaps they do; perhaps they don’t.  I hope this thought 
experiment stimulates further inquiry along these lines to investigate 
whether prison vouchers are a desirable reform proposal after all. 
 
 
396 These regulations could be promulgated by the regulatory agency discussed 
above.  See supra note 385 and accompanying text. 
397 This is the theory of “incomplete contracts.”  See Shleifer, supra note 12, at 137 
(referring to the government’s inability to “anticipate, describe, stipulate, regulate, 
and enforce exactly what it wants” as an incomplete contract). 
398 Several systems keep databases of gang members, but these are naturally quite 
incomplete.  See, e.g., AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 297, at 8 tbl.1. 
